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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Het is niemand ontgaan dat de recente financiële crisis een grote impact heeft gehad op ons dagelijks 
leven. Sinds het uitbreken van de financiële crisis in augustus 2007, kwamen niet alleen tal van 
banken in de problemen, maar ook de overheden van een aantal Europese landen. Tenslotte is de 
financiële crisis uitgemond in een wereldwijde recessie. Om te vermijden dat problemen in de 
banksector overslaan op de reële economie, hebben we nood aan een stabiele banksector. Elk van 
deze vier hoodstukken in dit doctoraat belicht een aspect van het risicogedrag van banken. Een 
betere en accuratere kennis van het risicogedrag van banken moet bedragen tot een betere 
financiële stabiliteit van ons economisch systeem.  
In een eerste hoofdstuk ga ik na of marktdiscipline echt werkt in het beïnvloeden van de strategische 
bedrijfsvoering van banken. In een tweede hoofdstuk ga ik na welke risicofactoren een effect hebben 
op aandelenkoersen van banken, en hoe deze variëren over de tijd heen. In een derde hoofdstuk ga 
ik empirisch na of er sprake was van besmetting tussen banken en landen tijdens de recente 
soevereine schuldcrisis in Europa, en wat de bepalende factoren zijn. In een laatste hoofdstuk stel ik 
een methodologie voor die beleidsmakers kunnen hanteren bij het uitvoeren van een stress test van 
de banksector.  
Hoofdstuk 1: Kan marktdiscipline de strategische bedrijfsvoering van banken beïnvloeden?  
In het eerste hoofdstuk van mijn doctoraat ga ik empirisch na of marktdiscipline via aandelenkoersen 
van banken in staat is hun gedrag te beïnvloeden. Marktdiscipline bij financiële instellingen betekent 
dat managers hun beleid of strategie aanpassen aan signalen die ze ontvangen vanuit de markt 
waarin ze effecten uitgeven. Dit kunnen bijvoorbeeld deposito's zijn, maar ook obligaties of 
aandelen. Deze paper gaat na of er marktdiscipline is bij banken op basis van de aandelenkoersen 
van financiële instellingen. Marktdiscipline maakt deel uit van het huidige regulerende kader van 
banken, nl. het Basel II akkoord en ook het recent overeengekomen Basel III akkoord dat de nieuwste 
reglementering op het bankwezen vastlegt. Op basis hiervan zou men verwachten dat 
marktdiscipline effectief is en bijdraagt tot de stabiliteit van het banksysteem. Toch bestaat er weinig 
empirisch onderzoek dat deze hypothese staaft. Om een antwoord te bieden op de vraag of 
marktdiscipline echt bijdraagt in de supervisie van banken, volg ik de theoretische literatuur waarbij 
marktdiscipline opgesplits wordt in twee componenten, nl. markttoezicht en marktinvloed. 
Markttoezicht betekent dat marktparticipanten wijzigingen en onderlinge verschillen in de conditie 
van banken correct kunnen inschatten, en die informatie opnemen in de effecten die de bank 
uitgeeft. Marktinvloed daarentegen betekent dat marktparticipanten via koersveranderingen in staat 
zijn om de acties van het bank management te beïnvloeden. Om de hypothese te staven dat 
marktdiscipline werkt, moet ik het empirisch bewijs leveren voor de beide componenten. Daarom 
probeer ik op basis van innovatieve econometrische technieken om signalen uit de aandelenkoersen 
van banken te identificeren. In een volgende stap ga ik na of er, als reactie op deze signalen, 
wijzigingen zijn in een aantal strategische ratios die het business model van de bank bepalen. Hierbij 
kijk ik naar de kapitaalratio van banken, het percentage deposito’s in de totale schuld van de bank, 
hoeveel dividenden er uitgekeerd worden, etc. Ik kom tot de conclusie dat banken wel degelijk hun 
gedrag aanpassen indien ze signalen ontvangen uit de aandelenmarkt. Zo vind ik bijvoorbeeld dat 
een risicosignaal ertoe leidt dat banken hun kapitaalratio optrekken en meer liquide activa 
aanhouden. Bij een marktsignaal van onderwaardering reageren banken door relatief minder kosten 
te maken en minder dividenden uit te keren.  
Hoofdstuk 2: Op zoek naar de relevante risicofactoren van bank aandelenkoersen 
In dit hoofdstuk ligt de nadruk op aandelenkoersen van financiële instellingen en ga ik na in welke 
mate deze informatie bevatten over hun risicoprofiel. In de empirische bankliteratuur gebeurt dit 
doorgaans door het schatten van een één-factor CAPM (capital asset pricing model), waarbij 
aandelenkoersen in een regressie gerelateerd worden aan een marketindex. De geschatte beta 
(marktbeta) geeft aan in welke mate het aandeel gevoelig is voor marktschommelingen. Dit model is 
echter al meermaals uitgebreid en aangepast, doordat additionele risicofactoren worden 
opgenomen. Hierbij denk ik aan renterisico, kredietrisico, risico voor schommelingen in huizenprijzen 
(denk maar aan de subprime mortgage crisis in de VS), maar recentelijk ook liquiditeitsrisico. Sinds 
het uitbreken van de financiële crisis werd immers duidelijk dat evoluties op de interbankenmarkt 
zeer grote gevolgen kunnen hebben voor banken met een business model dat te veel gebruik maakt 
van korte termijnfinanciering (vb. Dexia bank in België, of Northern Rock in het Verenigd Koninkrijk). 
Om na te gaan of aandelenkoersen van banken informatie bevatten over hun markt-, krediet-, rente-, 
huizenprijs- en liquiditeitsrisico ga ik uit van de hypothese van "modelonzekerheid". In de 
academische literatuur is er namelijk geen consensus over welke factoren thuishoren in een dergelijk 
model, noch over de impact van de toegevoegde risicofactoren. Daarom maak ik gebruik van een 
econometrische techniek, "Bayesian Model Averaging", die toelaat om niet één, maar verschillende 
modellen te schatten. Deze modellen verschillen in de factoren die ze bevatten. Concreet betekent 
dit dat op basis van een set van x factoren, 2x verschillende combinaties gemaakt kunnen worden. Al 
deze modellen bevatten een deel van de informatie. Daarom wordt in de finale schattingen de 
informatie uit al deze modellen simultaan opgenomen, waarbij de informatie uit elk model gewogen 
wordt met de kans dat elk van deze modellen het juiste model is. Deze econometrische techniek 
verschaft een uniek inzicht in het belang van deze risicofactoren. Over een tijdsperiode van 1986 tot 
eind 2010 vind ik dat de marktfactor met een zekerheid van 100% moet worden opgenomen in het 
model. Bovendien vinden we dat het marktrisico zeker niet de enige risicofactor is voor banken, maar 
dat ook additionele factoren belangrijk zijn, zoals bijvoorbeeld schommelingen in huizenprijzen, die 
ook met een zekerheid van 100% moeten opgenomen worden. Ook de high-minus-low Fama French 
factor blijkt zeer belangrijk.  
Uit een analyse met tijdsvariatie blijkt opnieuw dat bovenstaande risicofactoren doorheen genomen 
zeer belangrijk zijn. Daarnaast blijkt ook sommige factoren regelmatig aan belang winnen, en daarna 
opnieuw verdwijnen. Voorbeelden daarvan zijn de marktvolatiliteit, de term spread en de small-
minus-big Fama French factor. Deze conclusies blijken relatief robuust te zijn voor groepen banken 
met verschillende karakteristieken.  
Tenslotte toont dit hoofdstuk aan wat de implicaties zijn voor toekomstig onderzoek in het 
vakgebied, met name voor (i) het uitvoeren van event studies, (ii) het meten van bank "opaqueness" 
of ondoorzichtigheid van het risicoprofiel van banken, en (iii) het meten van systematisch bank risico.   
Hoofdstuk 3: De relatie tussen bankrisico en soeverein risico tijdens de Europese schuldencrisis  
In het derde hoofdstuk ga ik na in welke mate bankspecifiek risico interageert soeverein risico. 
Daarmee sluit dit werk nauw aan bij de recente actualiteit van de schuldencrisis in Europa. Meer 
specifiek analyseer ik of er sprake is van besmetting of "spillovers" in de kredietwaardigheid van 
banken naar landen, en andersom. De kredietwaardigheid van banken en landen wordt gemeten op 
basis van tijdreeksen van Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. Dit zijn verzekeringscontracten die 
financiële instellingen onder elkaar afsluiten om zich in te dekken tegen falingsrisico. Hoe hoger de 
CDS spread, hoe groter het kredietrisico en hoe groter de kans op falen. Nadat ik met behulp van 
empirische testen bewijs lever voor de hypothese van besmetting van kredietwaardigheid tussen 
banken en landen, ga ik na welke determinanten bepalend zijn voor de kans op besmetting. Hier 
wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen bank- en landspecifieke variabelen. Wat bankspecifieke 
variabelen betreft, tonen we aan dat banken met een hogere kapitaalratio en banken die zich in 
grote mate financieren op langere termijn beter bestand zijn tegen besmetting van andere landen. 
Bovendien nemen we de recent vrijgegeven informatie door de European Banking Authority over de 
blootstelling van banken aan de verschillende Europese landen mee in de analyse. Op basis hiervan 
weten we (sinds juli 2010) voor hoeveel deze banken blootgesteld zijn aan Europese 
overheidsobligaties. Deze cijfers tonen aan dat (i) banken meer blootgesteld zijn aan besmetting van 
landen naarmate ze een groter deel van hun soevereine obligatieportefeuille belegd hebben in deze 
landen, (ii) dat banken die een groter deel van hun portefeuille belegd hebben in een bepaald land 
kwetsbaarder zijn voor schokken in het kredietrisico van dat land. Wat landspecifieke variabelen 
betreft is de schuldraad van het land de belangrijkste determinant. Besmetting of "spillover" doet 
zich vaker voordoet tussen landen en banken indien deze landen kampen met een grotere 
overheidsschuld.  
Hoofdstuk 4: Methodologie voor een stress test van de Europese banksector op basis van publiek 
beschikbare data 
In het laatste hoofdstuk van mijn doctoraat ontwikkel ik een nieuwe methodologie voor een stress 
test van de banksector op basis van publiek beschikbare data. Het opzet van een stress test is om te 
kijken of banken bestand zijn tegen bepaalde schokken. Deze schokken worden gedefinieerd als 
bepaalde hypothetische scenarios die zich kunnen voordoen, bijvoorbeeld een substantiële krimp in 
de economische activiteit, of een verslechtering van de kredietwaardigheid van een aantal (vb Zuid-
Europese) landen. Om een stabiel financieel systeem te waarborgen, moeten alle banken overeind 
blijven indien zich dergelijke scenarios voordoen. Beleidsmakers voeren deze stress testen doorgaans 
uit op basis van de balansgegevens van banken. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat een gelijkaardige stress 
test ook mogelijk is op basis van de aandelenkoersen van de banken. De methodologie gaat ervan uit 
dat een bank niet alleen onderhevig is aan schokken in de macroeconomische omgeving, maar ook 
aan mogelijke schokken bij alle andere banken. De mogelijke risicofactoren worden ingedeeld in 
blokken: een macroeconomisch blok (met daarin o.a. inflatie, economische groei, maar ook 
kredietrisico, marktvolatiliteit), een soverein blok (dat het landenrisico in de verschillende Europese 
landen meet), een financieel blok (voor sector specifieke financiële schokken), een blok met 
Europese huizenprijzen en een bank blok (dat alle andere banken in het financieel systeem bevat).  
Ten eerste geeft dit hoofdzicht extra inzicht in hoe het belang van de verschillende risicofactoren 
varieert over de tijd heen. Ten tweede construeer ik een netwerk van de banksector in Europa. Dit 
geeft aan wat de belangrijkste relaties zijn tussen de banken. Ten derde toon ik aan hoe dit model 
gebruikt kan worden voor het opzetten van een stress test. Het model is in staat om in 81% van de 
gevallen een correcte voorspelling te doen van de toekomstige evolutie van de aandelenkoersen van 
banken, over een horizon van 3 kwartalen. De mogelijke toepassing van het model wordt verder 
geïllustreerd aan de hand van drie concrete stress test scenarios, nl. (1) een verslechtering van het 
Euopese sovereine crisis, (2) een stijging in het kredietrisico en een zwakkere economische 
economische omgeving en (3) een toename in de spanningen op de Europese  geldmarkt.  
Tenslotte laat het model toe om maatstaven te berekenen die inzicht verschaffen in de centraliteit 
van het financiële netwerk. Deze maatstaven tonen aan dat de centraliteit van het netwerk hoger is 
indien de groei in industriële productie lager is, wanneer het kredietrisico in de economie hoger is, 
wanneer de de aandelenkoersen lager staan en wanneer de geldmarkt krapper is.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
  
Introduction
In this introductory chapter, we rst discuss the general context of this dissertation in order to position it
in the economics literature. The three main topics (bank risk, interconnectedness and business models) are
discussed, as well as the di¤erent data sources and the methodologies that are used in this dissertation. The
second section looks in more detail into the specic research questions that we tackle, and the frameworks
that are used. We then also o¤er a glimpse of our results and their implications.
1 Orientation and Motivation
Everybody agrees that the recent nancial crisis had a considerable impact on the daily lives of many
people. Since the outbreak of the nancial crisis in August 2007, numerous banks got into trouble, but also
the governments of several European countries. Ultimately, the nancial crisis led to a global recession. To
avoid problems in the banking sector to spill over to the real economy, we need a stable banking sector.
Each of the four chapters in this dissertation highlights an aspect of risk-taking behavior of banks. A better
and more accurate knowledge of the risk-taking behavior of banks must contribute to a more stable nancial
system, and ultimately a higher welfare.
This dissertation deals with di¤erent aspects of nancial stability. The three main topics of this disserta-
tion (bank risk, interconnectedness, and bank business models) are present in all chapters of this dissertation.
First, the topic of bank risk is multi-faceted, and each chapter considers a di¤erent aspect of bank
risk. In the rst chapter, bank risk is measured as total risk, and is related to a wide range of business
model characteristics. The second chapter o¤ers a decomposition of total risk is in exposure to common
risk factors and idiosyncratic risk. The common risk factors considered in this chapter are market risk,
interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, currency risk, real estate risk, economic sentiment and the Fama-
French factors. The focus of the third chapter is on bank credit risk, as bank credit risk is here measured
with bank CDS spreads. This chapter considers the relationship between bank risk and sovereign risk, and
investigates whether there is contagion between bank and sovereign risk. In the nal chapter, bank risk
is again decomposed in exposure to common factors, but this time, all other banks in the system are also
considered as potential risk factors. Hence, banks are potentially exposed to common risk factors, but also
to all other banks in the system.
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The second topic, intereconnectedness, has gained in importance since the outbreak of the recent
nancial crisis. A major shock stemming from the banking system was the demise of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008, which provoked a substantial increase of CDS spreads for banks and also for certain
countries, typically smaller countries with large banks or countries where banks had to be rescued. This
lead to the view that bank risk can not be seen in isolation, i.e. banks are interconnected. This topic of
interconnectedness is addressed in the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. In the third chapter, the
focus is on the connections between banks and sovereigns during the recent sovereign debt crisis, whereas in
the fourth chapter the focus is on the connections of banks with other banks in the nancial system.
The third topic, the bank business model, connects the rst, second and third chapter. The chapter
investigating market discipline starts from a model that relates bank risk (and valuation) to di¤erent busi-
ness model charachteristics. The business model characteristics proxy for (i) overall bank strategy (capital
adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings and liquid assets), (ii) the banks funding structure,
(iii) asset mix, and (iv) revenue diversity. In the second chapter, we take a broader perspective, and compare
the factor exposures of di¤erent subgroups of banks, dened along specic criteria. We di¤erentiate between
four types of nancial intermediaries: depository institutions, insurance companies, security and commodity
brokers, and other non-depository institutions. In addition, we di¤erentiate between various typesby con-
structing portfolios of bank holding companies (BHCs) according to size, sound versus distressed BHCs and
BHCs with a stable retail focus versus diversied and fast-growing banks. The topic of bank business models
is also related to interconnectedness, i.e. the degree of contagion between banks and sovereigns. Therefore,
the chapter investigating contagion between banks and sovereigns considers several measures of the bank
business model, i.e. indicators of their retail orientation, funding structure, diversication and, especially,
the bankscapital adequacy.
To address the research questions in this dissertation, we make use of two types of data: market prices
on the one hand, and balance sheet and income statement information on the other. Market prices are used in
all chapters of this dissertation. Chapter one, two and three make use of bank stock prices, whereas the third
chapter uses (bank and sovereign) CDS spreads. This information is merged with balance sheet and income
statement information in the rst three chapters. Balance sheet and income statement information is usually
available at a lower frequency (quarterly) than market prices (daily), but o¤ers interesting information on
the business model of the bank. Finally, depending on the research question, this information is merged
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with data from other sources. Examples of this are data on earnings per share forecasts of bank holding
companies (rst chapter), country specic data (such as debt-to-GDP, government revenues to GDP and the
size of the bank sector in each country) (third chapter) and data on the sovereign exposures of the banks
(third chapter).
This dissertation makes use of both standard and non-standard methodologies in the eld of empirical
banking. First, standard pandel data techniques are used to combine both the time dimension and the
cross sectional dimension of the data. Extensions of this technique, i.e. stochastic frontier analysis and
multiplicative heteroscedasticity regression are used in the rst chapter. Second, Bayesian Model Averaging
is used as a technique in the second and fourth chapter. The use of Bayesian Model Averaging is new and
innovative in the eld of empirical banking. This technique is used in the context of model uncertainty,
where the researcher wants to extract the relevant regressors, out of a larger set of regressors.
2 Research Questions, results and contributions
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates empirically whether the stock market is an e¤ective
channel of market discipline. It is generally assumed that bank managers are disciplined by internal gover-
nance mechanisms and by their supervisors. Whether or not banks are also disciplined by nancial markets
is less clear. Yet, the Basel capital adequacy rules, one of the cornerstones of modern bank regulation,
mention market discipline as a separate third pillar (next to capital ratios and supervisory interventions). In
this chapter we revisit this issue by focusing on the stock market as a potential source of market discipline
on banks. The crucial question is: Can the stock market assess bank risk and inuence bank behavior?
This chapter presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or
valuation signal from the stock market. This is interpret as evidence of stock market inuencing.
Market discipline can be decomposed in two components: market monitoring and market inuencing.
Market monitoring is dened as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess the condition of the rm,
and market inuencing as subsequent managerial actions in response to these assessments. While there
is considerable evidence of market monitoring, research examining the market inuencing channel is more
scarce and generally inconclusive.
The main contribution of this chapter is the design of a new test for direct market inuencing. Our
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procedure starts by identifying stock market-based risk and (negative) valuation signals at the individual
bank level. Consequently, we test to what extent bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a
(combination of a) risk and negative valuation signal. Using a partial adjustment model, we test both for a
change in the long-term target value of the strategic variable, as well as in the speed of adjustment towards
that long-term target value.
The main result of this chapter is that we nd substantial evidence in favor of the direct market inuencing
hypothesis. We show that banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing their long-term target capital
bu¤er and their desired level of retail funding, and by decreasing their liquidity risk and reliance on potentially
volatile sources of non-interest income. Banks that receive a negative valuation signal react by increasing
their target prot level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio. This suggests that managers trying
to improve the market assessment of their banks value attempt this mainly by improving cost e¢ ciency.
Apart from adjusting their long-term target ratios, we also nd banks to more quickly bridge the gap between
the current and target rate following a market signal. These adjustments are in line with expectations and
with the objectives of supervisors.
The third chapter of this dissertation examines the driving factors of equity returns of U.S. nancial
institutions and connects to an expanding literature that measures banking risk as the exposure of bank
(sector) stock returns to some set of predened risk factors. The challenge is to discover which risk factors
are relevant for which types of nancial institutions at a specic point in time. In this chapter, we attempt
to answer this question within a Bayesian framework that explicitly takes into account the uncertainty about
the relevant set of factors ("model uncertainty"). We apply our methodology to US Bank Holding Companies
over the period 1986  2010.
Based on a broad literature survey, it is fair to state that there is little consensus on the risk factors, apart
from the market factor, that drive bank stock returns. The chapter presents an overview of 24 papers that
relate bank stock returns to various combinations of no less than 17 di¤erent risk factors. The uncertainty
about which risk factors to include in a bank factor model is labeled "model uncertainty". In this chapter,
we explicitly take model uncertainty into account by using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to estimate
bank factor models. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to apply Bayesian Model Averaging in
the banking literature. The main advantage of BMA is accounting for model uncertainty. Suppose that the
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literature o¤ers a list of k potential explanatory risk factors. In the set of linear factor models, 2k di¤erent
model combinations can be made, where each model consists of (a subset of) the explanatory variables.
Using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques, we are able to account for this considerable model uncertainty.
First, we relate the stock returns of US Bank Holding Companies to innovations in the di¤erent risk
factors. The results reveal that the market and real estate factor, as well as the high-minus-low book-to-
market Fama-French factor, are the most important risk factors. Other factors, maybe with the exception
of the 3-month T-Bill rate, do not seem to be reliably related to the returns on the broad bank index.
Moreover, our results indicate that there is no correct or dominant model. The most likely model has a
model probability of less than 25%, suggesting that accounting for model uncertainty is important.
Next, we investigate whether or not bank factor models vary over time. In fact, some risk factors may
be dormant for a long time, and hence undetectable in short (tranquil) samples, to suddenly appear in
times of market stress. The analysis reveals that factors such as the implied volatility index and term
and default spread frequently switch between being economically and statistically relevant or not. Hence,
specic periods (typically those characterized by increased nancial market stress) may be associated with
di¤erent bank risk exposures. To investigate whether or not di¤erent types of nancial intermediaries are
exposed to di¤erent risk factors, our benchmark results are compared to those of four types of nancial
intermediaries: depository institutions, insurance companies, security and commodity brokers, and other
non-depository institutions . In addition, we di¤erentiate between various typesby constructing portfolios
of bank holding companies (BHCs) according to size, sound versus distressed BHCs and BHCs with a stable
retail focus versus diversied and fast-growing banks. The general conclusion from this analysis is that while
the relevant set of exposures does vary substantially over time, it is relatively stable across bank types.
Finally, we discuss some implications of our ndings for empirical banking research based on stock returns.
Computing abnormal returns in event studies requires the specication of a benchmark model. Residual-
based measures of uncertainty (idiosyncratic volatility) or transparency (R-squared) require an accurate
identication of risk factors and a correct specication of the factor model. Accurate measures of banks
exposures to stock market movements (e.g. to compute capital charges for systematic risk) also hinge on the
correct specication of a factor model.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation investigates the presence of contagion between bank risk and
sovereign risk in Europe over the period 2006-2011. Contagion is dened as excess correlation, i.e. correlation
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between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at
the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing
bank-specic as well as country-specic variables and their interaction.
Due to the absence of a common European policy framework for handling the banking crisis as well as
missing bank resolution mechanisms, several European governments were forced to respond at the national
level by rescuing troubled banks headquartered in their countries during the nancial crisis. Various measures
have been taken, ranging from equity injections in troubled banks to the setting-up of bad banks Invariably,
these rescue operations have increased national debt burdens and caused a deterioration of public nances.
One consequence of the risk transfer from the private sector to sovereign treasuries has been an increased
interdependence of banks and states, causing negative feedback loops between their nancial conditions.
With the rise of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the link between bank- and country risk has intensied
further, especially for the countries that were quickly identied as vulnerable, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain.
Considering this increased interaction between sovereign and bank credit risk, the objective of this chapter
is twofold. First, we analyze whether we nd empirical evidence of contagion. We investigate the time-
varying intensity of the risk spillovers using excess correlations as our preferred contagion metric. Second,
we attempt to explain the contagion e¤ect by investigating the relationship between excess bank/sovereign
correlations and both bank and country characteristics. While there have been several papers investigating
the determinants of either bank risk or sovereign risk in isolation, there is less evidence on the potential
mutual contagion e¤ects. By analyzing a number of relevant variables and the interplay between bank
and country characteristics, we are able to identify critical interactions that are related to bank/country
contagion. This allows us to tackle a series of relevant policy questions concerning the banking system as
well as the nancial condition of sovereigns.
The main ndings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. We document signicant empirical
evidence of contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk during the European sovereign debt crisis. In
2009, when the sovereign debt crisis emerged, we nd signicant spillovers for 86% of the banks in our sample.
Second, given the home bias in banksgovernment exposures, i.e. their typically larger exposure towards the
home sovereign, we provide empirical evidence conrming the expectation that contagion between banks and
their home country is stronger. Third, we nd that the degree of contagion is signicantly linked to bank
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capital adequacy, and this e¤ect is economically very signicant. Furthermore, the higher a banks reliance
on short-term funding sources, the higher the intensity of spillovers between banks and sovereigns. Finally,
we conrm that higher sovereign debt holdings are associated with a stronger bank-sovereign contagion.
The fth chapter of this dissertation presents a methodology to stress test the European banking sector
using publicly available stock market data. The use of stress tests as a supervisory tool have gained in
importance since the recent nancial crisis and frames into the context of macroprudential supervision. The
goal of macroprudential supervision is to focus on the nancial system as a whole. This implies identifying,
assessing and prioritizing system-wide risks, and formulating recommendations on how to mitigate them.
This chapter aims to contribute to this by developing a stress test tool for the European nancial sector. The
proposed technique takes into account the network structure of the European nancial sector. Banks are
not only exposed to shocks from common risk factors (macroeconomic risk factors, sovereign risk, nancial
risk and housing price risk), but also to shocks from all other banks in the system. To do so, this chapter
relies on Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) of Locally Weighted Regression models.
Bayesian Model Averaging techniques allow to identify a set of relevant risk factors out of a larger set
of potentially important regressors. The idea departs from "model uncertainty", meaning that a researcher
is a priori uncertain about which (constellation of) risk factors a¤ects a particular nancial institution. To
address this issue of "model uncertainty", this chapter uses Bayesian Model Averaging techniques. In the
logic of Bayesian Model Averaging, the model space includes all model combinations which can be made
out of a given set of regressors. More specically, if there is a list of k potential explanatory variables, 2k
di¤erent model combinations can be made, where each model is dened through the inclusion or exclusion of
(a subset of) the explanatory variables. Locally Weighted Regression models allow to condition the estimate
of bank risk exposure on a certain state vector. This can for instance be the market index being on its
5th percentile, in line with previously proposed measures of bank tail risk, but it can also be conditioned
on a recession (measured by a specic value for industrial production), or any other common factor in the
model. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper which introduces and implements a Bayesian
Locally Weighted Regression model. This approach is especially usefull from a nancial stability (or stress
testing) perspective, since the supervisor is particularly interested in bank risk exposures during times of
nancial market stress, during a recession, during times of money market stress, ... Moreover, I show that
this particular feature of the model improves its perfornance as a stress test tool.
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The usefullness of this model is illustrated with di¤erent applications. First, this model provides insight
into the time varying importance of risk factors for nancial institutions, using the posterior inclusion
probabilities. Second, ability of this model to correctly project future evolutions bank equity prices is
assessed by analysing the percentage of correctly estimated directions of change in bank equity prices. The
model correctly projects 77% of bank equity price changes over an horizon ranging from one quarter to four
quarters ahead. Moreover, I show that the performance of my model increases to 81% due to the local
feature of the BMA set-up, further indicating the usefullness of this model as a stress test tool. Third, I
illustrate how this model can be used for stress testing under three hypothetical stress test scenarios, on
three stress test dates (the two CEBS/EBA stress test release dates, 1st of July 2010 and 1st of July 2011,
as well as the 1st of January 2012). Finally, I compute key indicators of network centrality (degree, closeness
and betweenness), and I assess the structure of the network over di¤erent realizations of state vectors (such
as industrial production, stress in the money market and economy wide credit risk).
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Abstract
This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or
valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher
volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when
they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial
adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the
speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret
this as evidence of stock market inuencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect
inuencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the
likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion
and specialization.
Keywords: monitoring, inuencing, stochastic frontier, partial adjustment, multiplicative heteroscedasticity
regression, opaqueness, earnings forecast dispersion, bank risk
JEL: G21, G28, L25
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1 Introduction
It is generally assumed that bank managers are disciplined by internal governance mechanisms and by their
supervisors. Whether or not banks are also disciplined by nancial markets is less clear. Yet, the Basel
capital adequacy rules, one of the cornerstones of modern bank regulation, mention market discipline as a
separate third pillar (next to capital ratios and supervisory interventions). Relatedly, stress testing exercises
have expanded the disclosure requirements of banks, with the explicit objective to foster market discipline.
In this paper we revisit this issue by focusing on the stock market as a potential source of market discipline
on banks. The crucial question is: Can the stock market assess bank risk and inuence bank behavior?
Bliss and Flannery (2002) distinguish two components of market discipline: market monitoring and
market inuencing. They dene market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess the
condition of the rm, and inuencing as subsequent managerial actions in response to these assessments.
While there is considerable evidence of market monitoring (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Saunders,
Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Morgan and Stiroh (2001)), research examining the market inuencing
channel is more scarce and generally inconclusive. Bliss and Flannery (2002) fail to nd evidence that
bank stockholders or bondholders e¤ectively inuence bank indicators controlled by bank managers, such
as the leverage position of the BHC, factors a¤ecting bank asset risk, changes in the number of employees
and the amount of uninsured liabilities. Gendreau and Humphrey (1980) nd that banks are penalized for
higher leverage by a higher cost of debt and equity, but nd no evidence that these relative cost changes
induce bank managers to alter their leverage position relative to other banks. Ashcraft (2008) shows that
the proportion of subordinated debt in total regulatory capital a¤ects the probability of failure and future
distress, suggesting that bank debtholders are able to signicantly inuence the behavior of distressed banks.
Schaeck, Cihak, Maechler, and Stolz (2012) nd evidence for debtholder discipline in a sample of small and
medium-sized commercial banks in the US over the period 1990-2007: Bank managers are more likely to be
removed if the bank is nancially weak and this e¤ect is stronger for banks subject to discipline exerted by
large debtholders. The authors nd no conclusive evidence of discipline exerted by shareholders or depositors,
nor that forced turnovers consistently improve bank performance (even at windows of three years after the
turnover). Hence, current empirical research predominantly supports the view that market discipline is, at
best, a relatively weak disciplining device.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a new test for direct market inuencing. Our
procedure starts by identifying stock market-based risk and (negative) valuation signals at the individual
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bank level. Consequently, we test to what extent bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a
(combination of a) risk and negative valuation signal. Using a partial adjustment model, we test both for a
change in the long-term target value of the strategic variable, as well as in the speed of adjustment towards
that long-term target value. This partial adjustment model has been used quite often to model various rm
characteristics, for example by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) for leverage,
Lintner (1956) for dividend payout ratios and Fama and French (2000), Raymar (1991) and Sarkar and
Zapatero (2003) for earnings.
An important innovation is the way we dene the risk and valuation signals. We model our risk measure,
total equity return volatility (TV, measured over one quarter of daily data), along a stochastic frontier.
The stochastic frontier describes the level of risk that the best performing banks with similar characteristics
can attain. We call a bank ine¢ cient from a risk perspective when it is situated above the risk frontier,
i.e. when it has more risk than its best performing peers. A bank will receive a risk signal at time t if its
ine¢ ciency score at that time is situated in the 10 percent worst ine¢ ciency scores and is hence substantially
above the risk frontier. We use a similar approach for our valuation measure, the market-to-book (MTB)
ratio, only here we allow banks to be either under- or overvalued relative to the average bank with similar
characteristics. We say that a bank receives a negative valuation signal when its quarterly valuation score
belongs to the 10 percent largest undervaluations. Looking at large signals relative to the best performing
peer is crucial. As market prices are forward looking, they reect information on rmsfundamentals, but
also on expected corrective actions. If investors expect a corrective action, the resulting signal will be smaller
(Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010)). Using the most extreme signals makes it less likely that we look at
events where investors have strong expectations on corrective behavior.
The main result of this paper is that we nd substantial evidence in favor of the direct market inuencing
hypothesis. We show that banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing their long-term target capital
bu¤er and their desired level of retail funding, and by decreasing their liquidity risk and reliance on potentially
volatile sources of non-interest income. Banks that receive a negative valuation signal react by increasing
their target prot level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio. This suggests that managers trying
to improve the market assessment of their banks value attempt this mainly by improving cost e¢ ciency.
Apart from adjusting their long-term target ratios, we also nd banks to more quickly bridge the gap between
the current and target rate following a market signal. These adjustments are in line with expectations and
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with the objectives of supervisors.1
Furthermore, we investigate whether or not our ndings can be interpreted as evidence of direct inuenc-
ing rather than indirect inuencing. As mentioned in Flannery (2001) and Federal Reserve System (1999),
market inuencing has two components. Direct market inuence means that a certain stakeholder can assess
the riskiness of bank holding companies (market monitoring) and induce bank managers to change their risk
behavior (market inuencing) in their interest. Indirect market discipline means that the change in bank
behavior is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than the stakeholder exerting the monitoring
e¤ort (see also Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008)). First, we argue that the number of Prompt Corrective
Actions (PCAs) is so small that our signals are unlikely to be proxies for regulatory interventions. Second,
our results do not appear to be driven by inuencing from subordinated debtholders, as we nd that our
inuencing results are most pronounced for those banks that do not have subordinated debt. Third, we test
whether or not our results are potentially driven by inuencing exercised by wholesale deposit holders. We
do observe that the share of retail funding in total funding is larger for banks receiving a risk signal. This
is mainly due to increasing the core deposits, as we do not nd evidence that it is more likely for a bank
to lose wholesale funding following a risk signal. Finally, we investigate in more detail which characteristics
make it more likely that a bank will receive a risk or valuation signal. We consider the variance of the signal
to be the scope for pressure from stock market investors. Therefore, in an extension of our setup, we allow
the variance of the residuals to vary through time and change with bank characteristics. We nd that stock
market investors punish discretionary accounting behavior and that the degree of bank opacity has a positive
e¤ect on the variance of the residuals (and hence the likelihood of observing market signals).
Many studies already addressed the issue of bank monitoring, i.e. the rst step in a test for market
discipline, by relating bank risk and/or return to bank-specic characteristics (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu
(1996), Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) or
(Calomiris and Nissim (2007)). Our focus and contribution lies in testing for market inuencing. Never-
theless, to allow comparison with existing studies and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of
1The key identication problem here is that stock returns reect news about (expected) fundamentals. Changes in funda-
mentals will themselves independently inuence future behavior of the bank. For example, a current undervaluation signal may
be an indication that investors worry about future cash ows and protability (negative relation between signal and outcome),
whereas inuencing implies that managers take actions to improve protability after a negative valuation signal (positive rela-
tion between signal and outcome). Hence, the identied support for the inuencing hypothesis is a lower bound of the overall
corrective behavior. Moreover, we only use extreme signals which correspond with situations where stock market investors have
low expectations of subsequent corrective behavior.
17
the analysis, we briey describe the results of the baseline equation of monitoring in an appendix. While
not the main contribution of this paper, we believe we still add to this literature by considering a more
comprehensive range of bank characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a new setup to assess the
di¤erent components of market discipline, i.e. market monitoring and inuencing, in a unied framework.
The rst part discusses the stochastic frontier model for Total Volatility and the linear regression model for
the Market-to-Book ratio. Next, we show how to extract risk and valuation signals from both models. The
nal section presents the partial adjustment model that we use to empirically test for market inuencing.
Section 3 contains the main empirical ndings for the inuencing hypothesis. In Section 4, we show that the
results are evidence of direct inuencing following stock market signals, rather than indirect inuencing via
regulators or wholesale nanciers. In Section 5 we analyze which banks are more likely to get signals. A
nal section concludes.
2 A New Setup to Test Market Discipline
2.1 Monitoring by Equityholders
Bliss and Flannery (2002) dene market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess
the condition of the rm. Previous papers have tested the market monitoring hypothesis by relating bank
risk and valuation to bank-specic characteristics in a linear regression framework (see e.g. Flannery and
Sorescu (1996), Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007),
Calomiris and Nissim (2007)):
Yi;t = 0 + Xi;t 1 + "i;t (1)
Equation (1) relates bank-specic stock market-based risk and valuation measures Yi;t to various lagged2
bank-specic characteristics Xi;t. We relate the dependent variable to four sets of bank characteristics,
proxying for respectively: (i) the banks funding structure, (ii) asset mix, (iii) revenue diversity and (iv)
overall bank strategy. Our vector Xi;t of bank-specic characteristics, which appears in Equation (1), is
2We use one-quarter lagged values rather than contemporaneous values to alleviate potential endogeneity problems and to
account for the lag with which accounting information is disclosed. A detailed appendix discusses the construction of these
indicators with a reference to the FRY9C codes of the constitutent items.
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hence given by:
Xi;t = [Bank Strategy; Funding Structure; Asset Mix; Revenue Streams]i;t (2)
Following Calomiris and Nissim (2007), we use the market-to-book value of equity as a measure of the
long-run value of the bank. The market-to-book value of equity (MTB) is measured as the end of quarter
market value divided by tangible common equity. As a measure of risk, we use the quarterly total volatility
(TV ) measured over a quarterly moving window of excess stock returns for bank i: Instead of using a
linear regression for risk, we model total volatility along a stochastic frontier. This allows us distinguishing
between banks that are on the frontier (given the characteristics associated with their business model) and
risk ine¢ cient banks. The best performing bank, relative to its peers with similar characteristics, has minimal
risk, and will be situated close or on the frontier.3 We call banks risk ine¢ cient if they are situated (much)
above the frontier, i.e. have much more risk compared to their best performing peers.
Summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables are reported in Table 1. Our sample
includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive
quarters in the period 1991-2007.4 The total sample consists of 17; 264 observations on 899 bank holding
companies. We exclude illiquid stocks as well as control for important mergers and acquisitions5 .
< Insert Table 1 around here >
Finding signicant relationships between these bank characteristics and the risk and valuation measure
would be evidence of the rst step in market discipline, market monitoring. If so, we can conclude that
equityholders track the di¤erent risks associated with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics.
3More specically, contrary to the linear model, we assume that the part of TVi;t not explained by bank characteristics can
be further decomposed in a pure noise component, i;t  iid N(0; 2v) and in one-sided departures (risk ine¢ ciencies), ui;t;
from the stochastic frontier. The stochastic frontier is determined by the equation ^0 + ^Xi;t 1.
4All data are collected from the publicly available FR Y-9C reports. Consequently, we link the FR Y-9C reports to
banks stock prices (obtained from CRSP) using the match provided on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York website
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
5As a liquidity threshold, we impose that the bank stocks traded volume should be non-zero in at least 80 percent of trading
days during the quarter. We control for mergers and acquisitions and create a new bank identity whenever a banks total assets
increase more than 10% on a quarterly basis and there is a change in activity mix. The change in activity mix is identied
as follows. We measure activities along three dimensions (funding structure, loan portfolio composition and revenue mix).
For each of these dimensions, we create a measure of focus/diversication. If there is a large change in focus in one of these
measures, i.e. a change larger than one standard deviation, within three years after a large jump in total assets (10% growth
on a quarterly basis), we label this as a change in activity composition following the expansion.
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Many studies already addressed the issue of bank monitoring by relating bank risk and/or return to bank-
specic characteristics. Our focus and contribution lies in testing for market inuencing. Nevertheless, to
allow comparison with existing studies and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of the analysis,
we briey describe the results of the baseline equation in an online appendix.
2.2 Extracting Stock Market Signals
Market inuencing refers to managerial actions in response to the risk and valuation assessments made in
the market monitoring stage (Bliss and Flannery (2002)). Hence, for the purpose of our study, the crucial
output from this rst stage regression described in the previous section are risk and valuation signals. We
say a bank receives an undervaluation signal when its residual (calculated using equation (1)) belongs to
the bottom decile. Equityholders are said to give a risk signal if the ine¢ ciency score is situated in the
highest decile, where risk ine¢ ciency is measured as the di¤erence between the banks total volatility and
the stochastic frontier (representing similar banks with the lowest risk). By only looking at the most extreme
deciles, we reduce the likelihood that investors incorporate the expected response in their assessment. Put
di¤erently, if investors expect a corrective action (as in Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010)), the resulting
residual/ine¢ ciency score will be smaller. This actually works against establishing a link between signals
and outcome variables, as we only exploit the information in signals where stock market investors have low
expectations of subsequent corrective behavior. We form deciles over the full sample, rather than at each
point in time, as the intensity of market discipline may vary over time.
Graph 1 provides information on the level and dynamics of the risk ine¢ ciency scores (Panel A) and MTB
residuals (Panel B). Each subplot presents the average ine¢ ciency score (the deviation from the stochastic
frontier or the tted regression line) of three portfolios in event time. Each quarter, we sort BHCs into
deciles according to the level of the market signal6 . The most extreme decile (highest risk or lowest value)
is represented by the thick line. We also report the least extreme decile as well as the two middle deciles
(combined in one line). The portfolio formation quarter is denoted as time period 1. We then compute
the average ine¢ ciency score for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 quarters, holding the portfolio
composition constant (except for BHCs that exit the sample). We repeat these two steps of sorting and
averaging for every quarter in the sample period (1993-2007). This process generates 60 sets of event-time
6The gure is inspired by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), who investigate the persistence of rm capital ratios. This
methodology is ideally suited for investigating the cross-sectional dispersion and time evolution of bank characteristics over
longer periods.
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averages, one for each quarter in our sample. We then compute the average risk ine¢ ciency score and
undervaluation residual of each portfolio across the 60 sets within each event quarter. The dashed lines
surrounding the portfolio averages represent 90% condence intervals. They are computed as the average
standard error across the 60 sets of averages (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)).
< Insert Figure 1 around here >
At portfolio formation time (event time 1), there are large and signicant di¤erences between the three
groups. The di¤erences between the extreme signal and the average signal remain signicant for about 5 to
6 quarters. The risk ine¢ ciency score of the highest decile portfolio improves substantially in the rst four
quarters after which portfolios are created, but is still signicantly higher than the mean. The persistence in
the market-to-book signal is even slightly higher than the stickiness of the TV signal. Di¤erences between
the best and worst group are evenmore persistent. The graphs show that there is substantial between and
within variation in the signals, which will allow us to identify whether or not banks respond to temporary
signals. The graph also highlights that extreme market signals are sticky in the medium run but are not
persistent or long-lived.
2.3 Inuencing by Equityholders
The inuencing channel of market discipline implies that bankers should take o¤-setting actions to align their
performance with the interest of monitors, which are stock market investors in the context of this paper.
We investigate the market inuencing hypothesis by testing whether or not bank managers make strategic
reallocations following a negative risk and/or valuation signal. We are particularly interested in the e¤ect
of market signals on the capital ratio and the protability of the bank (here measured as ROE), since an
increase in bank capital reduces risk and higher prots boost bank value. However, strategic reallocations
may take di¤erent forms. Therefore, we focus on an set of eight strategic bank characteristic which are next
to the capital ratio and protability (ROE), also asset quality (non-performing loans ratio), cost ine¢ ciency
(cost-to-income ratio), liquidity (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest income
to total income, the share of retail deposits in total deposit funding and the dividend pay-out ratio. The six
additional strategic bank variables can be interpreted as the underlying drivers of prots and capital levels.
We believe that these ratios reect the main strategic decision variables directly under the control of bank
management.
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To account for a gradual and potentially incomplete adjustment in the di¤erent strategic variables, we
estimate a partial adjustment model.7 The general specication for a partial adjustment model is:
yi;t = (y
   yi;t  ) + "i;t (3)
where y represents a strategic bank characteristic, y is the target level of y and  the speed of convergence to
this target level. To formally test for market inuencing, we investigate whether or not (i) the implied target
level is di¤erent for banks that receive a market signal and (ii) banks receiving a market signal converge
faster to the target. Therefore, Equation (3) is modied such that the adjustment speed and target level can
vary by bank and over time:
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where DTVi;t  is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i receives a risk signal at time period t   . Similarly,
DMTBi;t  is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i receives a valuation signal at time period t    . The
interaction term (DTVi;t  DMTBi;t  ) captures the additional e¤ect of banks receiving both signals simultaneously.
Since bank strategies are sticky in the short term and restructuring typically occurs as a series of incremental
adjustments, we measure reallocations over a two year period and dene  = 8 quarters to estimate Equation
(4).8 In addition, we allow for a di¤erent target level and a di¤erent speed of adjustment for banks that are
situated in the worst decile of the cross-sectional distribution of the strategic bank characteristic (Dyi;t  is
a dummy variable equal to one if the strategic bank characteristic for bank i at time t   is weak and zero
otherwise). Finally, we allow the target level y to be a function of the other strategic bank characteristics
Xi;t  (i.e. the eight strategic bank characteristics excluding the dependent variable). We estimate a reduced
form of Equation (4), for each of the eight strategic bank variables:
7The partial adjustment model has been used quite often to model various rm characteristics, for example by Flannery
and Rangan (2006) for rm leverage (Flannery and Rangan (2008) for bank leverage), Lintner (1956) for dividend payout ratios
and Fama and French (2000), Raymar (1991) and Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) for earnings.
8A concern is that the worst performers, which are more likely to fail or be acquired, would bias the results. Therefore, we
discard all observations up to eight quarters before the last quarter the BHC appears in the sample. Hence, this implies that
the last potential signal for each BHC occurs 16 quarters before the BHC disappears from the sample (as we look at a change
in strategic bank variables over a period of eight quarters following a risk or valuation signal).
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Pooling all terms that contain yi;t  (and bringing this combination in front) yields:
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Hence, the term before the square brackets corresponds with the rst term in Equation (4), whereas
the rst term in square brackets corresponds with the expression of the conditional target, yin Equation
(4). Rather than reporting the estimated coe¢ cients of the reduced-form partial adjustment model9 , which
we estimate for each of the eight strategic bank variables under consideration, we summarize the relevant
information in two statistics that we think are easy to interpret: the long-run target level and adjustment
speed. Calculating the target levels and speed of adjustment for the eight indicators using the coe¢ cients
of Equation (6) results in eight 2 by 2 matrices in Table 2:
DMTBi;t  = 0 D
MTB
i;t  = 1
DTVi;t  = 0   c0c5   c0+c2c5+c8
DTVi;t  = 1   c0+c3c5+c7   c0+c2+c3+c4c5+c7+c8+c9
and
DMTBi;t  = 0 D
MTB
i;t  = 1
DTVi;t  = 0  c5   (c5 + c8)
DTVi;t  = 1   (c5 + c7)   (c5 + c7 + c8 + c9)
The left10 hand side table contains information on the target level of the bank characteristic. The upper
left cell is the target level for each of the strategy variables implied by the inuencing equation in the absence
of market signals. The upper right cell contains the target level when there is only a valuation signal and the
lower left cell shows the target level in case of only a risk signal. The lower right cell contains the target level
when both market signals occur simultaneously. In each case we report the p-value to assess the statistical
signicance11 of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signals, i.e. the upper left cell. In the right
hand side panel, the corresponding ndings for the speed of adjustment are presented. Hence, from this
table we can infer whether or not the target level and speed of adjustment are di¤erent for banks receiving
either a risk signal, a valuation signal or both.
9Results are available upon request.
10We evaluate the expression of the targets at the sample mean of the variables in the X-vector. As we standardize all
variables in the X-vector , this simply implies that they drop from the equation. Furthermore, in the paper we report results
when the dummy variable Dyi;t  = 1. Results for D
y
i;t  = 0 are similar and available upon request.
11We cluster the standard errors at the bank level in the estimation of Equation (4).
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3 Empirical Evidence of Market Inuencing from a New Test
Setup
Table 2 contains the main results of this paper and are generally supportive for the hypothesis of stock
market inuencing in US banking. Starting with the capital ratio and bank protability (here measured
as ROE), we expect to nd that bank capital increases after a risk signal and that a negative valuation
signal induces bank management to improve protability. The target capital ratio in the no-signal case is
11:4%, which is in line with the summary statistics reported in Table 1. Banks that receive a risk signal
(TV ine¢ ciency in the highest decile) have a signicantly higher target capital ratio (12:6%). This indicates
that bank management reacts to a perceived increase in the riskiness of their bank by increasing the capital
bu¤er, as expected. Banks that receive a valuation signal from the stock market react by adjusting the
target capital ratio downwards (to 10:6%). This is in line with the results of Table A.1 (in appendix)
which indicate that higher capitalized banks have lower risk and lower market-to-book ratios. These ndings
support the hypothesis that banks adjust their capital adequacy target as a reaction to pressure from the
stock market. On the prot side, we observe that the target ROE ratio remains unaltered (at 3:4%) when
the bank receives a risk signal from the stock market. However, in case the bank gets a valuation signal,
bank management reacts by signicantly increasing the target prot level (to 4:1%). Note that ROE is
expressed at the quarterly frequency. On an annual basis, this implies an increase in target ROE from 13:6%
to 16:4%. Hence, bank management responds to market pressure by signaling a strategic refocusing aimed
at increasing ROE, although the speed of adjustment does not change signicantly, presumably indicating
that increased prots take time to materialize. However, we observe a reduction in target protability if
banks get both a risk and valuation signal. While this may at rst sight be surprising, it may be caused by
a shift to their core business and a search for retail funding. Acharya and Mora (2012) document that the
banking system in its role as a stabilizing liquidity insurer acts as an active seeker of deposits via managing
bank deposit rates. This is reected in the signicant increase in the share of retail deposits following a joint
signal (possibly at the expense of lower interest margins and hence lower prots).
< Insert Table 2 around here >
The other strategic bank variables can be interpreted as the underlying drivers of prots and capital
levels. The following picture emerges. When banks are confronted with a risk signal, they not only adjust
their target capital level upwards, but also reduce their liquidity risk by increasing the target liquid assets
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ratio from 2:3% to 5:6%. The target level for the reliance on non-interest income is lowered substantially,
although not signicantly, but the speed of adjustment towards the target increases from 14% to 26%. Banks
in the highest risk ine¢ ciency decile tend to increase their target proportion of non-performing loans, which
may be surprising at rst. However, credit risk in the loan portfolio is only one dimension of total bank
risk, which we measure as total stock market volatility. The increased non-performing loans ratio may be
the outcome of increased transparency (i.e. management having to report more accurately), rather than an
actual change in credit risk.
We showed before that in case of a valuation signal, banks respond by increasing their target ROE level.
Table 2 shows that at the same time, bank managers substantially and signicantly reduce the target cost-
to-income ratio (from 61:3% in the base case to 55:3%). This indicates that bank managers try to improve
prots primarily by focusing on the cost e¢ ciency of their organization. Since management has a large
degree of discretion in altering the banks cost structure12 , this may be interpreted as a credible signal by
the stock market. When both signals occur simultaneously, the most pronounced impact, both economically
and statistically, can be observed for the implied target levels of the retail funding ratio (from 65:5% to
81:5%).
The ndings for the speed of adjustment towards the implied target levels exhibit a similar pattern,
although the degree of signicance is usually lower. Nevertheless, whenever the adjustment speed is statisti-
cally di¤erent from the benchmark no-signal case, the evidence points in the direction of a faster adjustment
towards the target. Hence, banks respond by either changing a strategic bank characteristics or by reacting
more swiftly to deviations from the optimal level. Based on these results, we conclude that bank manage-
ment does react to stock market-based risk and valuation signals. Market signals inuence banks to adjust
the target levels of capital, prots and the main drivers of these two strategic indicators in the requested
direction. Our results help in explaining a pattern documented by Calomiris and Nissim (2007). They show
12 In unreported regressions, we investigate whether decisions in human capital management take place in response to market
signals. As a dependent variable, we constructed a binary variable, equal to one if a drop in full-time equivalent employees
takes place over a two year horizon, and equal to 0 in all other cases. The e¤ect of market signals is investigated with a probit
regression. The control variables in this set-up are the eight quarter lag in the number of employees, in addition to the strategic
bank characteristics that are also included in the specication of the target (Equation (4)). To investigate the potential reaction
to market signals, both the risk signal, the valuation signal and the interaction of both are included. The constant in the
probit regression indicates that the average probability for a layo¤ is 22%. The most important determinant of the probability
of lay-o¤s, both in economic and statistical terms, is past protability. In addition, the likelihood of layo¤s is 11% higher for
banks that simultaneously get a risk and valuation signal.
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that BHCs that have lower than predicted market-to-book ratios (compared to an estimated model) tend
to experience large, statistically signicant, predictable increases in market values in subsequent quarters.
They also investigate whether the predictable changes in stock prices reect priced risk factors and nd that
they do not. Our results lend support for the view that future increases in market value in response to a
large undervaluation signal are caused by corrective actions taken by managers.
Moreover, the identied support for the inuencing hypothesis is a lower bound of the overall corrective
behavior. The key identication problem here is that stock returns reect news about (expected) funda-
mentals. Expected changes in fundamentals will lead to a spurious relationship between current signals and
future values of bank strategic variables in the opposite direction of the inuencing hypothesis. For example,
a current valuation signal may be an indication that investors worry about future cash ows and protability,
whereas inuencing implies that managers take actions to improve protability after a negative valuation
signal. In general, we nd evidence for corrective behavior as risk signals lead to more prudent behavior and
undervaluation leads to improved performance. If it would be a reection of fundamentals, it would go in
the other direction (as for example the increase in non-performing loans following a risk signal). As the two
e¤ects are di¢ cult to disentangle empirically, we prefer emphasizing the nding of inuencing, rather than
focusing on the magnitude of the impact of inuencing.
4 Direct or Indirect Inuencing?
Some caution is necessary in the interpretation of our evidence of market discipline. As mentioned in Flannery
(2001) and Federal Reserve System (1999), market inuencing has two components. Direct market inuence
means that a certain stakeholder can assess the riskiness of bank holding companies (market monitoring) and
induce bank managers to change their risk behavior (market inuencing) in their interest. Indirect market
discipline means that the change in bank behavior is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than
the stakeholder exerting the monitoring e¤ort (see also Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008)). In our case,
indirect market discipline would then only be partly based on stock market information. For example,
managerial decisions could be taken in response to supervisory intervention, which could itself be triggered
by stock market signals. Disentangling direct from indirect inuence is probably the most daunting task in
the market discipline literature and probably requires a setup of a (controlled or natural) experiment or full
access to all actions (formal/informal) taken by the supervisor. In the absence thereof, we cannot completely
rule out that our ndings of market discipline are evidence of indirect inuencing. Nevertheless, we believe
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that we can exclude several potential channels of indirect inuence.
4.1 Regulatory Interventions
We are not able to compare the timeliness and accuracy of regulatory bank assessments against market
evaluations, as in Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) or Evano¤ and Wall (2002). However, as a rst
attempt to mitigate the impact of indirect discipline exerted by supervisors, we check whether or not there
were regulatory interventions by the Federal Reserve or FDIC (as listed on their respective websites). One of
the best known supervisory interventions is Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) enacted by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. FDICIA established capital ratio zones that
mandate PCA but also allow for discretionary intervention by regulators. This would allow us to distinguish
between direct inuence (the amount of inuencing when no PCA takes place) and indirect inuence (the
strength of the market signal over and above the supervisory intervention). We nd, however, that there were
very few enforcements or interventions13 , hence our signals are unlikely to be proxies for these regulatory
interventions. Next to discretionary intervention by regulators, FDICIA also denes thresholds on three
capital ratios which may trigger automatic PCA if banks are undercapitalized. We nd also these to be rare
events14 . Moreover, given that we allow the target and adjustment speed to be di¤erent for signicantly
undercapitalized banks, we believe that this is not driving our results.
13The FDIC provides on its website a list of all enforcement decisions and orders against FDIC-insured institutions. Similar
information on PCAs with respect to Bank Holding Companies is provided by the Federal Reserve on their website. Hence,
we are able to withdraw information on all past PCAs, either for the BHC or for the underlying commercial banks. Overall,
we nd 72 records in the FDIC database, of which 67 are PCA proscriptions, 5 PCA dismissal of O¢ cers or Directors and
9 PCA Submission of Capital Plans. However, only 38 of the 72 PCAs take place during the sample period in this paper
(1991-2007). These 38 PCAs take place in 20 distinct nancial institutions. 14 of these institutions are not a member of a
bank holding company. Only three banks are member of a one-bank holding company. With respect to the nancial insitutions
under supervision by the Federal Reserve, we nd 27 PCAs in the period 1991-2007. However, only 6 of them (in 5 distinct
institutions) took place during our sample period.
14 In our sample, we observe 91 bank-quarter observatios in which a BHC is categorized as undercapitalized. 41 of these
breaches occur in 1991 and 1992. As of 1993, we observe on average less than one bank per quarter that is forced to take a
prompt corrective action.
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4.2 Subordinated Debtholders
The majority of studies on market discipline look at subordinated debt15 to infer evidence of monitoring
and inuencing. The reason is that subordinated debtholders have a concave claim on the value of the bank.
Thus, the price of subordinated debt will be informative about the probability of left-tail outcomes, and
subordinated debtholders16 will have strong incentives to monitor and curb bank risk-taking. Using subor-
dinated debt prices, most studies tend to nd no response in bank behavior when the price of subordinated
debt changes (Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)). This could be interpreted in two ways. On the one
hand, it may indicate a failure to nd evidence of market inuencing, possibly because the choice of issuing
subordinated debt is endogenous. Most likely, only safer banks, or banks with a conjectured support of a
safety net, will issue subordinated debt. On the other hand, the mere presence of subordinated debt may be
su¢ cient to discipline banks and make future signals (i.e. changes in price rather than the rst issuance of
subordinated debt) uninformative.
< Insert Table 3 around here >
Therefore, we examine the presence of inuencing in the subsets of BHCs with and without outstanding
subordinated debt. The results are reported in Table 3. Summary statistics on the bank characteristics
in both subsamples are reported in Table 4. The general nding is that we obtain stronger evidence of
market discipline in the subsample of BHCs without subordinated debt. We nd in general less support for
market inuencing in the subgroup of banks issuing subordinated debt. For the latter, the target capital is
not signicantly di¤erent for banks which receive a risk or valuation signal. In the subgroup of banks that
have subordinated debt, the target ROE increases from 14% to 16% after a valuation signal, whereas banks
without subordinated debt increase this target from 13:2% to almost 17%. A higher target liquidity ratio
is observed for banks receiving both signals simultaneously. In contrast to the subsample of banks without
subordinated debt, there is no signicant e¤ect on the retail funding share and dividend pay-out ratio for
15For example, Ashcraft (2008), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Goyal (2005), Sironi (2003), Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011),
Evano¤ and Wall (2002), and Blum (2002).
16Subordinated debt, which is typically used in studies of market discipline, is junior to insured debt and senior to equity.
Subordinated debtholders give credit to shareholders for the portion of risk shifted past them to the senior claimant (insured
depositors and hence the guarantor). Levonian (2001) documents that subordinated debt therefore has features of both sources
of funding. Hence, he claims that (changes in) subordinated debt prices reveal two pieces of information about the bank: Info
on market value of assets and asset volatility. Exactly the same information can be obtained from bank stock prices and for a
larger sample of banks.
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banks with subordinated debt (neither on the target or the adjustment speed). The lack of robust results in
the sample of BHCs with subordinated debt is in line with the previous literature using subordinated debt
prices that nds no or weak evidence of inuencing (Bliss and Flannery (2002)). The inuencing results
for the subgroup of banks without subordinated debt are much stronger. As for the full sample, we nd
signicantly di¤erent target levels for the bank capital ratio, the ROE ratio, liquidity, retail funding and
the dividend pay-out ratio. Note that this sample, which is by denition omitted from most of the previous
literature, is also much larger than the set of BHCs with outstanding subordinated debt. Since there can
be no contemporaneous action or signal by debtholders, it is also more likely to support the direct inuence
hypothesis.
4.3 Wholesale Depositors
While we can to a signicant extent exclude that our stock market based signals coincide with supervisory
interventions or pressure from the subordinated debtholders, it may still be that the response following the
risk signal is indirect if the pressure would be coming from wholesale depositors (Calomiris and Kahn (1991),
Huang and Ratnovski (2011)). We observe that the share of retail funding in total funding is larger for banks
receiving a joint valuation and risk signal (see Table 2). However, we do not nd evidence that a BHC is more
likely to observe a decrease in the amount of wholesale deposits in response to a risk signal. We interpret
the latter as the absence of a run by uninsured wholesale nanciers (in contrast to what happened to some
banks in the recent crisis).
4.4 Risk versus Market-to-Book
We explore two dimensions of bank performance: risk and value. While bank risk is of interest to many
stakeholders (especially debtholders, regulators and depositors), stock market investors also care about the
long-term value of the bank. In particular, they care about the value of the bank relative to a peer group
of banks (that is why we use MTB signals conditional on a large set of bank characteristics). As no other
stakeholder is harmed by a low valuation, especially if there is no contemporaneous risk signal, a response to a
MTB signal (upper right cell of the two-by-two matrices in Table 2) can be interpreted as inuencing in favor
of the stakeholder who is giving the signal (hence direct inuencing). The results in Table 2 convincingly show
that there are signicant relationships between an undervaluation signal (MTB is substantially lower than
its peers; i.e. residual is situated in the lowest decile) and future changes in strategic bank variables. This
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can be interpreted as evidence of direct inuencing in response to a valuation signal by bank equityholders.
4.5 Stock prices versus subordinated debt yields
Apart from a new testing strategy, this paper di¤ers from many other studies on market discipline because
it infers evidence on market monitoring and inuencing from stock prices (as in Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck
(2008)), rather than from subordinated debt (e.g., Ashcraft (2008), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Goyal
(2005), Sironi (2003) or Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)). This is motivated by at least three
reasons. First, while bank risk is of interest to many stakeholders (especially debtholders, regulators and
depositors), stock market investors also care about the long-term value of the bank. A response to a
valuation signal can be interpreted as direct inuencing in favor of the stakeholder who is giving the signal,
as no other stakeholder is harmed by a low valuation (especially if there is no contemporaneous risk signal).
Second, subordinated debtholders have a concave claim on the value of the bank. Equityholders, on the
other hand, have a convex claim on banks assets, which may cause risk-shifting incentives (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). However, this need not be benecial to stockholders if the charter value is eroded. Park
and Peristiani (2007) show that there is a distinct convex nonlinear relationship between the market-to-book
ratio and bank risk. Based on their empirical tests, they conclude that for publicly held US BHCs, the
interests of bank stockholders are aligned with those of regulators and debtholders (except for a small subset
of extremely risky ones). Stockholders penalize riskier strategies to preserve charter value. Only when the
option value becomes large enough to compensate for the loss of charter value, stockholders elect instead to
reward risk-taking to further increase the put option value, but this only happens for a very small portion of
their sample. Third, in comparison with subordinated debt, stock prices are available for a larger sample of
banks. In addition, according to Kwan (2002), stock market data have an advantage over bond market data
in terms of higher quality. Stock market data are more likely to timely incorporate information than bond
prices, because stocks are traded more frequently, are easier to short, and because they are followed by more
professional analysts than bonds. Hence, we extend the test of market disciplining to the sample of BHCs
that do not have outstanding subordinated debt. This allows us to examine whether the lack of empirical
support for market discipline is due to the sample under consideration, the risk signal (subordinated debt
prices versus stock prices) or both.
Tying this evidence together, we conclude that banks respond to risk and value signals by equityholders.
Moreover, it is unlikely that other stakeholders give contemporaneous signals, which reinforces the case in
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favor of direct inuencing. Moreover, we nd that banks shift to less risky activities in response to a total
volatility signal, even though equityholders have a convex payo¤ function and may like risk. Moreover, this
claim is even more convincing in the case where there is both a risk and valuation signal. In these situations,
equityholders strongly indicate that the bank is taking risks for which they are not compensated and banks
react accordingly.
5 Which banks are more likely to get signals?
We now investigate in more detail which characteristics make it more likely that a bank will receive a risk
or valuation signal. Recall that these signals are based on the extreme ine¢ ciency scores (risk signal) or
residuals (valuation signal). All else equal, banks for which the variance of the ine¢ ciency scores or residuals
is larger, will have a higher chance of receiving a risk or valuation signal. Therefore, we investigate which
bank characteristics drive the variance of the total risk ine¢ ciencies or market-to-book residuals. For the
total volatility setup, we add scale heterogeneity to the stochastic frontier model. For the market-to-book
ratio, we use a regression model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity as in Harvey (1976).17 We make the
variance a function of time-varying bank-specic characteristics Zi;t, such that 2ui;t = exp (0 + Zi;t). We
use the exponential function to guarantee that the variance is positive. A positive and signicant  implies
that bank characteristics Zi;t increases the variance. A larger variance makes a larger risk ine¢ ciency score or
MTB residual, which may lead to inuencing, more likely. Therefore, we consider this dispersion or variance
to be the scope for pressure or signals coming from stock market investors conditional on their assessment
of banks risk and value proles. We hypothesize and test whether or not this pressure by stock market
investors is related to (1) complexity, (2) managerial discretion, and (3) opaqueness. We motivate each of
these variables individually and discuss the estimation results in parallel.
5.1 Complexity: Funding, asset and revenue composition18
In complex, diversied rms such as large BHCs, determining the nancial condition of a conglomerate might
be harder compared to assessing the nancial strength of a specialized rm. Diversication of activities might,
17Recently, Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011) use a similar model to analyze the dispersion in interest rates on loans
issued to small and medium-sized enterprises.
18Although the stochastic frontier model with scale heterogeneity or the multiplicative heteroscedastic regression model is
modelled in one step, the results are discussed in two steps.
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however, also yield more risk-e¢ cient banks if the shocks to the di¤erent types of activities are imperfectly
correlated (Laeven and Levine (2007)). Hence, one view is that equityholders use less discretion as they
expect shocks to di¤erent activities to cancel out. The other is that more diversied banks may be harder
to monitor as they leave more scope for managerial discretion. We include Hirschman Herndahl indices
(HHI) of specialization in each of the core activities of banks: a HHI for diversication in funding (deposit
diversication), a HHI for loan diversication, a HHI for revenue diversity in general (the mix between
interest and non-interest income) and a HHI capturing diversity of four non-interest income components. A
higher value of the HHI indicates that a bank has a more focused orientation19 . Lower values point to more
diversication. As the two e¤ects of complexity work in opposite directions, we include earnings volatility to
control for the risk reduction generated by portfolio diversication. If the portfolio risk-reduction view holds,
we should nd that more stable prots (potentially caused by combining imperfectly correlated activities)
lead to a lower variance. In addition, BHCs may alter their scope either by restructuring their activities or
by expanding their size. We include loan growth to control for banksoverall expansion strategies. A high
growth rate might indicate that banks expanded via mergers and acquisitions or attracted a new pool (of
probably more risky) borrowers20 .
< Insert Table 5 around here >
The estimation results can be found in Table 5. The variance of total risk ine¢ ciency is positively related
to specialization. This indicates that, from a monitoring perspective, the portfolio e¤ects of diversication
more than compensate the cost of increased complexity that diversication may entail. Note that this e¤ect
is not only statistically, but also economically signicant. A one standard deviation increase in income
specialization increases the dispersion of total risk with 18:3%.
19The general formula of the Hirschman Herndahl index is HHIi;t =
PJ
j=1

Xi;j;tPJ
j=1Xi;j;t
2
and is the sum of the squared
activity shares (i is a bank indicator, t is time and j=1,...,J refers to the activities over which one measures specializa-
tion/diversication). We compute four di¤erent HHI-measures: a HHI for diversication in funding (J=3, Noninterest Bearing
Deposits, Interest Bearing Core Deposits and Wholesale funding), a HHI for loan diversication (J=5, C&I Loans, Real Estate
Loans, Agriculture Loans, Consumer Loans, Other Loans), a HHI for revenue diversity in general (J=2, interest and non-interest
income) and a HHI capturing diversity of the four non-interest income components (J=4, Fiduciary Activities, Service Charges
on Deposits Accounts, Trading Revenue, Other Non Interest Income).
20For example by an expansion into subprime loans (see e.g. Knaup and Wagner (2012)) or by increasing the share of di¢ cult-
to-value Level III assets. Unfortunately, these conjectures cannot be tested in our sample as (i) the build up of subprime loans
only happened in the latter sample years and (ii) reporting the amount of "Level 3 fair value measurements of loans and leases"
(item bhckf245) only became compulsory in the last year of our sample (more precisely as of 2007-03-31).
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A higher loan growth rate leads to a larger variance in the valuation of BHCs but at the same time to
a lower variance in the risk ine¢ ciency scores. Hence, an expansionary strategy makes it more di¢ cult to
assess the true value, but makes banks safer (which is in line with the diversication results if the expansion
mitigates portfolio risk). More stable earnings, reected by a lower ROE volatility, lead to a lower dispersion
in total risk ine¢ ciency scores as well as in the residual variance of the market-to-book ratio. For instance,
a one standard deviation increase in ROE volatility leads to an increase in the variance of (risk) ine¢ ciency
of 24%. This suggests that the preference equityholders have for stable revenue streams dominates the
potential negative e¤ects that earnings smoothing and managerial discretion may have on their ability to
assess the situation of the bank. However, volatility of prots is only a crude proxy of managerial discretion
and earnings smoothing. As emphasized in Hirtle (2007), disclosure plays an important role in market
discipline since market participants need to have meaningful and accurate information on which to base
their judgments of risk and performance.
5.2 Managerial Discretion and Earnings Forecast Dispersion
We measure disclosure in a qualitative sense and focus on the extent to which bank managers have discretion
in reporting certain accounting items, with a potential impact on the banks perceived value and risk prole.
We hypothesize that the variance of the ine¢ ciency term will be larger for banks with more discretion in
earnings reporting.
To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we test whether or not bank-specic volatility, 2ui;t , of either
the MTB residual or the risk ine¢ ciency term, is increasing in measures of managerial discretion. Managers
can both over- and underprovision for expected loan losses and either postpone or prepone the realization
of securities gains and losses. As in Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian
(2009), we measure discretionary loan loss provisions by regressing21 loan loss provisions on total assets,
non-performing loans, loan loss allowances and the di¤erent loan classes. The discretionary component of
loan loss provisioning is the absolute value of the error term of this regression. Similarly, the discretionary
component of realized security gains and losses is the absolute value of the error term of the regression
of realized security gains and losses on total assets and unrealized security gains and losses. If managers
use more discretion in loan loss provisioning and realizing trading gains, the residuals of these models will
be larger. Both point to discretion in earnings management which may obscure true performance. While
21Results from these regressions are available upon request.
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unexpected loan loss provisions and security gains and losses may make bank performance more di¢ cult to
assess, it is often used to smooth earnings over time (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)).
Secondly, we relate the volatility of the TV ine¢ ciency term and the MTB residual to opaqueness,
measured by the dispersion in analystsearnings per share (EPS) forecasts. This measure is widely used in
the accounting literature to measure rm transparency (see e.g. Lang, Lins, and Ma¤ett (2012)), as well as
in the banking literature by Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) who compare the opaqueness of US
bank holding companies with similar-sized non-banking rms. We obtain the earnings forecast data from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). We calculate the dispersion measure on a quarterly basis
as the cross-sectional dispersion in the most recent forecast of all analysts that made their prediction within
the last year. We include only the analysts last forecasts and require this forecast to be made in the 4
quarters prior to the end of the quarter to avoid that stale forecasts would bias our dispersion measure. To
avoid the documented downward bias in forecasted EPS induced by the way IBES adjusts for stock splits,
we closely follow the adjustment method described in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Glushkov
and Robinson (2006). Finally, we only include the quarterly dispersion measure if at least two separate
analyst forecasts are available. After applying the di¤erent lters, we end up with a dataset consisting of 495
banks22 and 8271 bank-quarter observations. The average number of analyst forecasts per bank per quarter
is a satisfying 9:04.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5. We not only include the managerial discretion and
earnings forecast disagreement measures, but also loan growth, ROE volatility and the di¤erent complexity
indicators. It is comforting that the results for those variables are very similar in the reduced sample
compared to the full sample. With respect to management discretion, we nd that stock market investors
exert more pressure in their assessment of risk for banks exhibiting a high discretionary behavior in the
realization of securities gains/losses. A one standard deviation increase in this discretion measure leads to
a 14% increase in the dispersion of total risk ine¢ ciencies. Discretionary behavior in loan loss provisioning
matters less for risk. However, the main goal of active discretion in loan loss provisioning is earnings
smoothing, which is considered favorably (i.e. stable prot streams lead to a lower variance of the MTB
22We lose a signicant number of bank-quarter observations when matching the existing dataset with IBES data. Both
datasets are merged as follows. The main identier in IBES is the IBES ticker, whereas the main identier in CRSP is the
permno of the bank. Hence, in order to merge the information of both les, the best approach is to use common secondary
identiers to construct a linking table that relates the permno of the bank to the IBES ticker. We follow the procedure proposed
by WRDS (Moussawi (2006)), which assigns a score to each match, according to the quality of the link.
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residuals and the TV ine¢ ciencies). In fact, the leeway managers permit themselves in dealing with problem
loans leads to more pressure by bank equityholders in their assessment of bank value. Dispersion in IBES
analyst forecasts unambiguously increases the variance of both signals. This not only suggests that banks
di¤er substantially in their degrees of opaqueness, but also that stock market investors take these di¤erences
into account. The dispersion in total risk ine¢ ciencies increases by 17% (12:4% for MTB residuals) in
response to a one standard deviation increase in analyst forecasts dispersion.
6 Conclusion
The nancial crisis of 2007-09 has illustrated that the choice of business models and (lack of) transparency in
banking may have profound consequences for the risk prole of the banks. Even within certain bank business
models, we noticed a large discrepancy of banksvulnerability to adverse shocks. The question we address is
whether or not information about BHC risk and valuation can be extracted from stock market information
and whether or not market signals are su¢ ciently strong to force banks to alter their risk and performance
prole. These are the two faces of market discipline: monitoring and inuencing. If the stock market is
able to monitor bank risk, this information is useful for supervisors and they should include market-based
risk indicators in their information set. If the stock market is able to inuence bank risk behavior, this can
be complementary to supervisory actions and reinforce them. In this paper, we develop an empirical setup
to examine the ability of stock market investors to monitor and inuence bank risk and performance in a
sample of US BHCs over the period 1991-2007.
We investigate the inuencing hypothesis by analyzing if and to what extent bank managers react to risk
and valuation signals from the stock market over a medium to long-run horizon. The hypothesis is that banks
exhibiting a relatively high degree of risk ine¢ ciency will respond by taking remedial action in order to adjust
their risk prole. Similarly, banks that are judged to underperform relative to their peers are expected to alter
their cost and revenue structure to improve bank value. In contrast to most of the extant literature, we do
nd evidence of stock market inuencing in US banking. Banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing
their capital bu¤er and lowering their liquidity risk. These actions are in line with predictions and with the
objective of supervisors. Banks receiving a negative valuation signal react by increasing their target prot
level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio, indicating that most of the performance improvement
is intended to come from the cost e¢ ciency side. Hence, these corrective actions taken by managers in
response to a large undervaluation signal may lead to future increases in market value, which may explain
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the nding by Calomiris and Nissim (2007) that BHCs that have lower than predicted market-to-book ratios
(compared to an estimated model) tend to experience large, statistically signicant, predictable increases in
market values in subsequent quarters. Finding evidence of inuencing in this setup is indicative for a type of
market discipline that Bliss and Flannery (2002) label "more benign and commonplace" compared to, e.g.,
a distressed takeover, outright defaults or executive turnovers.
Next to investigating the response to risk and valuation signals, we also analyze which banks are more
likely to get signals. We nd that stock market investors punish discretionary behavior, especially in the case
of security gains and losses. More unpredictable banks exhibit larger deviations in terms of risk and valuation.
We also nd strong evidence that the degree of opaqueness is positively related to the variance of the risk
ine¢ ciencies and valuation residuals. Regulation should be designed to lower the degree of discretion that
bank managers can exercise. A reduction in the opacity of banks can be achieved by fostering information
disclosure, e.g. through a timely and accurate publication of relevant on and o¤ balance sheet risk exposures.
Providing better information may allow banks to avoid large random stock market penalties in terms of risk
or valuation.
To rule out that our results are driven by indirect inuencing, we also investigate the contribution of
other potential monitors, such as subordinated debtholders, wholesale depositors and supervisors. We nd
that regulatory enforcement actions are unlikely to explain our results, that inuencing is most pronounced
in banks without subordinated debt and that wholesale depositors are not reacting to our risk signals.
Nevertheless, as in most other studies addressing this issue, there is a need for caution since other sources
of discipline, such as unobserved actions taken by the supervisory authorities, may a¤ect bank behavior.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis of Bank Monitoring
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PANEL A
Valuation and risk metric based on banksshare price
Total volatility 0.3159 0.1423 0.1125 0.8938 17264
Market-to-Book Value of Equity 2.3758 1.1545 0.5196 7.2331 17216
PANEL B
Bank Strategy Variables
ln(Total Assets) 15.0901 1.5793 12.194 19.7077 17264
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 11.7388 3.1518 6.2556 27.72 17264
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.0114 0.013 0 0.0853 17264
Cost to Income 0.6384 0.12 0.3732 1.188 17264
Return on Equity 0.0324 0.0179 -0.0836 0.0686 17264
Liquid Assets 0.0455 0.0909 -0.1711 0.3711 17264
Funding Structure
Non-Interest-Bearing Deposits Share 0.1326 0.0704 0.0158 0.391 17264
Interest-Bearing Core Deposits Share 0.6687 0.1123 0.2867 0.8827 17264
Wholesale Funding Share 0.197 0.1052 0.0277 0.5896 17264
Deposits to Total Assets 0.7609 0.1056 0.3603 0.9238 17264
Asset Mix
Real Estate Loan Share 0.6316 0.1876 0.0653 0.9797 17264
Commercial and Industrial Loan Share 0.1935 0.1185 0.0034 0.6332 17264
Agricultural Loan Share 0.01 0.0208 0 0.1295 17264
Consumer Loan Share 0.1175 0.0999 0.001 0.5009 17264
Other Loan Share 0.0415 0.0592 0 0.3464 17264
Loans to Total Assets 0.6432 0.1209 0.2144 0.8709 17264
Revenue Streams
Interest Income Share 0.7373 0.1382 0.2487 0.9613 17264
Non-Interest Income Share 0.2627 0.1382 0.0387 0.7513 17264
Fiduciary Activities Income Share 0.0379 0.06 0 0.3835 17264
Service Charges on Deposit Accounts Share 0.0747 0.0369 0.0003 0.1806 17264
Trading Revenue Share 0.006 0.0186 -0.0078 0.1117 17264
Other Non-Interest Income Share 0.1405 0.1139 0.0075 0.6652 17264
Deposit-Loan Synergies
Deposit Loan Synergies 0.039 0.0306 0.0006 0.2723 17264
Unused Loan Commitments Share 0.1765 0.0957 0.0203 0.536 17264
Transaction Deposits Share 0.2214 0.1084 0.0298 0.5079 17264
This table contains summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis of bank monitoring and consists of two parts.
In panel A, we provide information on the equity market-based risk and value measures (the dependent variables). For
the calculation of total volatility, we take the standard deviation of the daily bank stock returns within a quarter. We
then annualize total volatility by multiplying with the squared root of 252. We also compute a market-based valuation
metric, which is the market value to the book value of tangible common equity. Both variables are measured over the
period 1991-2007 on a quarterly basis. Panel B of this table contains information on the independent variables. Bank size
is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets expressed in US dollar thousands and deated to 2007:Q4 values. All
other variables are measured as ratios. For detailed information on the exact computation of the ratios, we refer to the
Appendix. Income statement data are reported on a calendar year-to-date basis in the FRY9C reports and are therefore
converted to quarter-to-quarter changes before computing ratios. The variables are measured over the period 1991-2007
on a quarterly basis. The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least
four consecutive quarters. Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume for at least twenty
percent of the observations. The nal sample consists of 17264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. All variables
are winsorized at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2: Evidence of market Inuencing: The impact of market signals on the Target ratio and Adjustment
Speed
Target Ratio Adjustment Speed
MTB=0 MTB=1 MTB=0 MTB=1
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio TV=0 11.385 10.628 0.296 0.406
0.027 0.056
TV=1 12.582 11.554 0.307 0.573
0.004 0.729 0.843 0.000
Non-Performing Loans Ratio TV=0 0.708 0.647 0.560 0.588
0.263 0.338
TV=1 0.913 0.855 0.648 0.768
0.001 0.128 0.188 0.018
Cost to Income Ratio TV=0 0.613 0.553 0.335 0.332
0.001 0.958
TV=1 0.659 0.668 0.325 0.464
0.005 0.033 0.844 0.255
Return on Equity TV=0 0.034 0.041 0.524 0.539
0.000 0.840
TV=1 0.032 0.030 0.622 0.597
0.132 0.046 0.111 0.448
Liquidity Ratio TV=0 0.023 0.037 0.227 0.293
0.158 0.134
TV=1 0.056 0.051 0.233 0.230
0.005 0.175 0.913 0.973
Non-Interest Income Share TV=0 0.324 0.392 0.142 0.109
0.296 0.416
TV=1 0.302 0.329 0.258 0.434
0.331 0.867 0.033 0.009
Retail Deposit Share TV=0 0.655 0.617 0.187 0.177
0.093 0.808
TV=1 0.688 0.815 0.171 0.248
0.137 0.014 0.696 0.422
Dividend Payout Ratio TV=0 0.392 0.349 0.572 0.702
0.002 0.075
TV=1 0.377 0.334 0.594 0.658
0.510 0.130 0.728 0.532
This table contains results on the market inuencing tests. We use a partial adjustment model to test whether or not
reallocations in strategic bank characteristics occur in response to a risk (TV) and/or valuation (MTB) signal. We focus on
the e¤ect on eight strategic bank characteristics: the capital ratio, asset quality (non-performing-loans ratio), cost e¢ ciency
(cost-to-income ratio), protability (ROE), liquidity ratio (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest
income to total income, the share of retail deposits in total deposit funding and the dividend pay-out ratio. For each
characteristic, we estimate the following equation:
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For sake of space and clarity, we only report the target level (left panel) and the speed of adjustment (right panel) for the
eight indicators. We report the target and adjustment speed in four distinct cases where (1) the bank neither gets a a
risk nor valuation signal (dummy TV= dummy MTB=0, the upper left cell), (2) the bank gets only a risk signal (dummy
TV=1, dummy MTB=0, the lower left cell), (3) the bank gets only a valuation signal (dummy TV=0, dummy MTB=1, the
upper right cell) and (4) the bank gets both a risk and a valuation signal (dummy TV= dummy MTB=1, the lower right
cell). This results in sixteen 2 by 2 matrices. In each case, we report the p-value in parentheses to assess the statistical
signicance of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signal, i.e. the upper left cell. Signicant di¤erences (w.r.t. to
the benchmark case) at the 10 per cent level are highlighted in bold.
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A Online Appendix - Monitoring Bank Risk and Equityholder
Value
An essential rst step in our test for market inuencing is to establish a relationship between bank-specic risk
and performance measures and various (lagged) bank-specic characteristics, this within either a stochastic
frontier (risk) or linear regression (valuation) framework. The extensive literature on market monitoring,
which shows that securityholders indeed distinguish between banks with di¤erent risk proles, provides good
guidance on which proxies to include (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Saunders, Strock, and Travlos
(1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007)). To allow comparison with existing studies
and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of the analysis, we briey describe in this appendix
the results of the baseline equation. While not the main contribution of this paper, we believe we still
add to this literature by considering a more comprehensive range of bank characteristics which a¤ect a
banks business model. To assess how potential di¤erences in the bankscomposition of assets, liabilities and
operational characteristics are reected in bank risk and value, we relate TV and MTB to four sets of bank
characteristics, proxying for: (i) overall bank strategy, (ii) the banks funding structure (Calomiris and Nissim
(2007), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007)), (iii) asset mix (as e.g., Calomiris and
Nissim (2007), Morgan and Stiroh (2001)), and (iv) revenue diversity (as e.g., Stiroh (2006), Stiroh (2006b),
De Jonghe (2010)), as well as variables proxying for deposit-loan liquidity synergies (Gatev, Schuermann,
and Strahan (2009)). Our vector Xi;t of bank-specic characteristics, which appears in Equation (1) in the
paper, is hence given by:
Xi;t = [Bank Strategy; Funding Structure; Asset Mix; Revenue Streams]i;t (A.1)
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 of the paper. All data are collected from the publicly available
FR Y-9C reports. The denition and construction of each variable is described in Appendix B. Consequently,
we link the FR Y-9C reports to banksstock prices using the match provided on the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York website23 . Controlling for a large set of bank characteristics is important for our tests of market
inuencing. Both the magnitude and the accuracy of the risk and valuation signals, and hence the accuracy
of our test of market inuencing, will depend to a great extent on the quality and level of the bank-specic
characteristics included in either the stochastic frontier (TV) or linear regression (MTB) model.
Our sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four
consecutive quarters in the period 1991-2007. The total sample consists of 17; 264 observations on 899 bank
23http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
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holding companies. Our sample period covers two full business cycles as well as a number of stressed periods.
The impact of these events and the business cycle is captured by time xed e¤ects. We now motivate the
bank-specic variables and their e¤ect on risk and value group by group. The discussion is based on the
estimation results reported in the rst two columns of Table A.1, which correspond with a model without
conditional variance. In columns 3 and 4, we report the results of a model with conditional variance (as used
in Section 5 of the paper). We only refer to the latter results in the few cases where they di¤er from the
former.
< Insert Table A.1 around here >
To facilitate the economic interpretation of the coe¢ cients, we standardize all independent variables.
Bank xed e¤ects are included in all estimations.
Bank Strategy Variables The bank-specic proxies for overall bank strategy capture strategic choices
made by bank managers that may a¤ect a banks risk and valuation prole. We include the regulatory Tier
1 capital ratio24 and the liquid-to-total-assets ratio to incorporate the possibility that better capitalized and
more liquid institutions may be less vulnerable to shocks. Asset quality is measured by the ratio of loans
past due 90 days or more and non-accrual loans to total loans. We also include the cost-to-income ratio as
a measure of cost e¢ ciency. This ratio measures the overheads or costs of running the bank as a percentage
of total operating income before provisions. Finally, we include (the log of) bank size25 as larger banks
may diversify their risk more and may enjoy economies of scale (Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001)), and
bank protability (ROE) to control for a risk-return trade-o¤. The rst part of Table A.1 indicates that
stock market participants accurately identify and assess the e¤ect of the di¤erent bank strategy variables
on total volatility and the market-to-book value. Larger banks are more have less total risk and a higher
market-to-book ratio. More cost e¢ cient banks, with less credit risk (higher asset quality) that are more
24The capital measure used in this paper is the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. However, as mentioned in Ashcraft (2008),
the relevant capital measure for regulators is equity capital plus subordinated debt, as this is the cushion regulators consider
before the claims of depositors are a¤ected. Comparison of both capital measures indicates that the correlation is very high.
Estimating the frontier set-up with the regulatory capital measure yields similar results. They are available upon request.
25Bank size is, to a large extent, the outcome of strategic choices made by banks and is hence highly correlated with the other
control variables, and, more importantly, with the measures that capture the various business models we consider. Therefore,
we orthogonalize size with respect to all other variables. The natural logarithm of total assets is regressed on all independent
variables. The idea is to decompose bank size in an organic growth component and a historical size component, the residual.
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protable will have lower risk and higher valuations. A larger regulatory capital ratio makes banks safer but
harms their long-term value.
Funding Structure We decompose total deposits in three types: Interest-bearing core deposits, non-
interest-bearing deposits and wholesale funding. The rst is the share of deposits held by retail depositors,
which are protected by the deposit insurance scheme. Wholesale funding providers are generally more
sensitive to changes in the credit risk prole of the institutions to which they provide these funds. As such,
they are expected to track the institutions nancial condition more closely and withdraw money more swiftly
when they detect a deterioration in the banks risk prole. With respect to the funding composition, we
nd that a larger share of interest-bearing core deposits increases total risk (vis-à-vis the omitted share of
demand deposits), but has no e¤ect on the MTB ratio. However, the impact on total risk is di¤erent in
column 3. The latter ndings are in line with Hirtle and Stiroh (2007), who conclude that retail banking
may be a relatively stable activity. In line with expectations, we nd that banks with a larger fraction of
wholesale funding are considered as more risky.
Asset Mix We nd that banks which mainly focus on their core activity (a large loans-to-asset ratio)
exhibit lower market-to-book values (but are also less risky). Next to including the loan-to-asset ratio, we
classify loans according to borrower types. The loan portfolio composition26 may have an impact on stock
market participantsperceptions of banksrisk exposures. We categorize loans as commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans, real-estate loans, consumer loans, agricultural loans and a catch-all share that includes all
other loans. We leave the real estate loan share out of the equation to avoid perfect collinearity. Table 1
in the paper shows that banksloan portfolio composition varies substantially in the sample. The average
banks loan portfolio consists of 63% real estate loans, 19% C&I loans and 12% consumer loans. Banks with
a higher proportion of consumer loans face lower total volatility. The commercial and industrial loan share
has a small positive impact on total risk. Hence, we conrm the evidence by Morgan and Stiroh (2001) who
found that bond spreads are increasing in commercial and industrial lending.
26The FRY9C reports do not allow to distinguish directly between high and low quality loans within each category (e.g.:
focus on subprime versus prime loans within real estate loans). Note, however, that such di¤erences should show up in the
non-performing loans ratio. Moreover, to the extent that this is a deliberate, time-invariant choice, it will be captured by the
bank xed e¤ects. In unreported regressions, we included charge-o¤ rates by loan type. This does not a¤ect our ndings on
monitoring and the identication of the risk and valuation signals.
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Revenue Streams The activities of deposit-taking and lending predominantly generate interest margin.
However, some banks also generate a substantial amount of non-interest income (Stiroh (2006)). Therefore,
we also include variables capturing the importance of income generated by duciary activities and trading-
related income. All other activities that generate non-interest income are captured in the other non-interest
income share. Previous studies have documented that non-interest income is in general more risky than
interest income (e.g. Stiroh (2006b) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)). Our breakdown of non-
interest income in four subcomponents yields additional insights. First, relative to the omitted interest
income share, trading revenues and other non-interest income27 subcomponents lead to higher total volatility.
Second, banks with a larger fraction of their income generated by service charges on deposit accounts
experience lower stock market volatility. However, this coe¢ cient is no longer signicant in column 3.
Finally, we include three indicators to measure the potential diversication e¤ects of liquidity risk on
the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2009) nd scope for
deposit-loan synergies. Banks exposed to loan-liquidity risk without high levels of transaction deposits
have higher risk. Bank risk is expected to rise with unused commitments (reecting asset-side liquidity risk
exposure) and the use of transaction deposits (reecting liability-side liquidity risk exposure). The synergy
e¤ect is measured by the interaction term between the ratio of unused loan commitments and transaction
deposits. All three e¤ects are conrmed in our sample. Both unused loan commitments and transaction
deposits increase total bank risk, but the combination of both provides a statistically and economically
signicant hedge against liquidity risk and reduces the risk of the bank.
Overall, we can conclude that stock market investors accurately identify the di¤erent risks associated
with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics and use this in their assessment of the banks
valuation and risk prole. Although this evidence does not yet establish that market discipline can e¤ectively
control banking rms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally di¤erentiate among
the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking rms. This is evidence of the rst step in market discipline,
market monitoring, which is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition to support the market inuencing
hypothesis.
Robustness and remarks As a robustness check, we also include state xed e¤ects for at least two
27Other non-interest income are predominantly fees and commissions from investment banking and underwriting, (re)insurance
underwriting and venture capital revenue.
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reasons. First, unobserved heterogeneity at the state level, such as state-specic regulation or the composition
of the local economy may a¤ect banksriskiness as well as their business mix. Second, Mester (1997) has
documented that controlling for heterogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis is important to obtain accurate
estimates of ine¢ ciency. Rather than estimating the frontier at the state or region level, which would yield
imprecise estimates as the number of observations is small for many states, we allow the intercept of the
stochastic frontier to be di¤erent across states. Signicance and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are quite
similar in both speciciations. In the few di¤erences, we never obtain conicting results in terms of sign.
It is worth stressing that the (rank)correlation between the ine¢ ciency scores with and without state xed
e¤ects is almost perfect. In sum, including state xed e¤ects does not alter the results.
In the multiplicative heteroscedastic regression setup (the setup for MTB), we cluster the standard
errors at the bank level (which yields the most conservative standard errors). Unfortunately, clustering
techniques have not yet been implemented in the standard stochastic frontier models. Moreover, it is even
more complicated in our extended approach in which we also model the variance of the ine¢ ciency score.
Fortunately, as clustering does not a¤ect the coe¢ cients or ine¢ ciency score/residual, but only the standard
errors of the coe¢ cients; our setup to test for the presence and strength of inuencing (which is our main
contribution) is una¤ected by the choice of clustering.
Finally, the signals obtained from estimating a model with and without scale heterogeneity (i.e. modelling
the variance as a function of bank characteristics) are very similar. The correlation between the ine¢ ciency
scores in column 1 and 3 is 95%, whereas the correlation between the residuals of equation 2 and 4 is even
higher 98%. Recall that we dened signals as belonging to the highest decile. 84% of the TV signals based
on column 3 would also be classied as signals in column 1. An additional 14% of signals based on column 3,
belongs to the 9th decile (rather than the 10th decile) if signals were based on column 1. The correspondence
is even higher with respect to market-to-book-signals. 90% of the MTB signals based on column 4 belong
to the extreme decile based on column2. An additional 9.6% belongs to the 9th decile of residuals based on
column 2.
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Table A.1: Total Volatility and Market-to-Book: evidence of monitoring
Total Volatility Market-to-Book Total Volatility Market-to-Book
SFA OLS SFA (with scale) Cond. Het. regression
Bank Strategy Variables
Bank Size -0.00724** 0.183* -0.00215 0.231**
(0.00355) (0.110) (0.00323) (0.0932)
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio -0.00927*** -0.277*** -0.0103*** -0.273***
(0.00197) (0.0471) (0.00190) (0.0423)
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.0152*** -0.0862*** 0.00978*** -0.0948***
(0.000710) (0.0299) (0.00126) (0.0253)
Cost to Income 0.00435** -0.128** 0.00443** -0.148***
(0.00213) (0.0592) (0.00199) (0.0520)
Return on Equity -0.00724*** 0.0868*** -0.00661*** 0.124***
(0.00105) (0.0221) (0.00131) (0.0227)
Liquid Assets 0.00586*** 0.00473 0.00345** 0.0204
(0.00122) (0.0362) (0.00167) (0.0304)
Funding Structure
Interest-Bearing Core Deposits Share 0.00526** -0.0407 -0.00627* -0.0202
(0.00268) (0.0748) (0.00367) (0.0646)
Wholesale Funding Share 0.00687** -0.0819 -0.00522 -0.0655
(0.00290) (0.0780) (0.00369) (0.0662)
Deposits to Total Assets 0.00335 -0.0666 -0.000937 -0.126**
(0.00225) (0.0668) (0.00231) (0.0574)
Asset Mix
Commercial and Industrial Loan Share 0.0102*** -0.0308 0.0157*** 0.0111
(0.00246) (0.0512) (0.00234) (0.0427)
Agricultural Loan Share 0.00115 -0.0404 0.00231 -0.0483
(0.00102) (0.0382) (0.00207) (0.0367)
Consumer Loan Share -0.0163*** 0.00345 -0.0107*** 0.0363
(0.00200) (0.0644) (0.00232) (0.0526)
Other Loan Share -0.000713 0.139** 0.00541** 0.118*
(0.00228) (0.0651) (0.00230) (0.0669)
Loans to Total Assets -0.00358** -0.120*** -0.00618*** -0.120***
(0.00154) (0.0455) (0.00190) (0.0387)
Revenue Streams
Fiduciary Activities Income Share -0.00322 0.199 0.00615** 0.286**
(0.00285) (0.161) (0.00276) (0.122)
Service Charges on Deposit Accounts Share -0.00558*** 0.0423 -0.00147 0.0306
(0.00197) (0.0590) (0.00214) (0.0476)
Trading Revenue Share 0.00416*** 0.0707** 0.00424*** 0.0803**
(0.00105) (0.0350) (0.00154) (0.0316)
Other Non-Interest Income Share 0.00562*** 0.167*** 0.00951*** 0.170***
(0.00183) (0.0561) (0.00197) (0.0505)
Deposit-Loan Synergies
Deposit Loan Synergies -0.00775** -0.108* -0.00999*** -0.0925
(0.00356) (0.0617) (0.00308) (0.0599)
Unused Loan Commitments Share 0.00607* 0.112 0.00410 0.0959
(0.00326) (0.0710) (0.00298) (0.0645)
Transaction Deposits Share 0.00916*** 0.0300 0.00636** 0.0438
(0.00253) (0.0553) (0.00266) (0.0472)
Observations 17264 17216 17264 17216
Bank Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table presents estimation results for equation (1) in the paper. Columns 1 and 2 contain the results of the stochastic frontier model
(total volatility) and the conditional heteroscedastic regression model (market-to-book value of equity). Column 3 contains the results of
the stochastic frontier model (total volatility) where the variance of the ine¢ ciency term is a function of bank-specic characteristics (hence,
we allow for scale heterogeneity). Column 4 contains the results of the conditional heteroscedastic regression model, in which the volatility
of the error terms is a function of bank characteristics. We estimate a costfunction for total risk. That is, the ine¢ ciency score measures
excess risk above the frontier, which is determined by the banks with minimum risk given a set of bank characteristics. In particular,
stochastic frontier analysis allows decomposing the error term in random noise and a measure of risk ine¢ ciency. As rms (banks) can
be both over- or undervalued with respect to their fundamentals, we employ a standard OLS regression model (with both positive and
negative residuals) rather than a stochastic frontier model which only allows for one-sided deviations from the frontier. The variables are
measured over the period 1991-2007 at a quarterly basis. Bank balance sheets are observed and measured as stock values at a quarterly
basis. Data from the income statement is reported on a cumulative basis over the accounting year and are therefore rst transformed to
quarterly increments. The independent variables are lagged one quarter. The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have
publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive quarters. Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume
for more than 20 percent of the observations. The total sample consists of 17.264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. Time and
bank xed e¤ects are included in each column (but not reported). In the second column, the standard errors are robust and clustered at
the bank level.
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Abstract
This paper uses Bayesian model averaging (BMA) techniques to examine the driving factors of equity
returns of U.S. nancial institutions. The main advantage of BMA is accounting for model uncertainty. For
the period 1986-2010, we nd that the most likely model explaining banking sector returns has a probability
of 25% only. We also show that the optimal model changes considerably over time and across types of
BHCs. The market, high-minus-low (HML) Fama-French factor, and real estate factor are part of most
specications. Finally, we highlight some implications for banking studies using measures of idiosyncratic
volatility, abnormal returns or market betas.
Keywords: bayesian model average, bank risk, systematic risk, bank stock returns, bank supervision,
nancial stability
JEL: G01, G20, G21, G28, L25
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1 Introduction
The nature of their business exposes banks to various types of risk. Not only may these risks uctuate
over time as economic conditions change, also the exposure of banks to these risks may vary over time.
Since bank instability may spill over to the real economy, banks are subject to prudential regulation and
oversight by dedicated supervisors. However, extensive regulation and supervision were unable to prevent
the 2007-9 banking and economic crisis. As a result, there is renewed interest in the identication of relevant
risk factors a¤ecting banks and their evolution over time. One potential set of indicators relies on market
prices, such as bank stock market returns. These indicators can be obtained by relating bank stock returns
to various risk factors, such as market, interest rate, and other relevant risks. The challenge is to discover
which risk factors are relevant for which types of nancial institutions at a specic point in time. In this
paper, we attempt to answer this question within a Bayesian framework that explicitly takes into account
the uncertainty about the relevant set of factors ("model uncertainty"). We apply our methodology to US
Bank Holding Companies over the period 1986  2010.
Our paper contributes to an expanding literature that measures banking risk as the exposure of bank
(sector) stock returns to some set of predened risk factors. However, based on a broad literature survey,
it is fair to state that there is little consensus on the risk factors, apart from the market factor, that drive
bank stock returns. This is clear from Table 1 which gives an overview of the di¤erent (combinations of)
risk factors that have been used in the literature so far. The 24 papers we refer to have related bank stock
returns to various combinations of no less than 17 di¤erent risk factors. The uncertainty about which risk
factors to include in a bank factor model is labeled "model uncertainty". When estimating only one model,
the researcher imposes the chosen model on the data and the only uncertainty that is considered is parameter
uncertainty, where one typically interprets the coe¢ cients of signicant variables. In this paper, we explicitly
take model uncertainty into account by using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to estimate bank factor
models. Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) was rst developed by Leamer (1973), and has since been used
in several disciplines, ranging from statistics (Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) and Hoeting, Madigan,
Raftery, and Volinsky (1999)), over a large literature on cross-country growth regressions (Fernandez, Ley,
and Steel (2001b), Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) among
others) to nance (Cremers (2002), Avramov (2002) and Wright (2008)). To the best of our knowledge, we
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are the rst to apply Bayesian Model Averaging in the banking literature.
Suppose that the literature o¤ers a list of k potential explanatory risk factors. In the set of linear
factor models, 2k di¤erent model combinations can be made, where each model consists of (a subset of)
the explanatory variables. Using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques, we are able to account for this
considerable model uncertainty. BMA compares all models simultaneously, as opposed to conditioning
on a single individual model. Each individual model is attributed a posterior probability and the posterior
parameter estimate is obtained as the weighted average of the parameters over the di¤erent models, where the
posterior model probabilities are used as weights. Because this approach considers all models simultaneously,
we obtain useful insight into the importance of each regressor. For each risk factor, we can compute its
posterior inclusion probability, i.e. how likely it is that a particular risk variable is part of the model, making
it a useful tool to evaluate the relevance of the di¤erent risk factors.
In the rst part of the analysis, we compare the results of BMA versus OLS in explaining the impact
of various risk factors on the returns of a banking index. More specically, we relate weekly excess returns
of an equally-weighted portfolio of the 50 largest (in terms of total assets) US Bank Holding Companies to
innovations in the di¤erent risk factors. We cover most of the candidate risk factors that have been previously
used in the literature, but we also introduce some risk factors that have received attention only in recent
times, such as the volatility implied by option prices on the S&P500 and the TED spread, an indicator of
nancial sector credit risk. Details on the theoretical motivation for including those factors and on their
construction can be found in Section 2.2. Full sample (1986  2010) results reveal that the market and real
estate factor, as well as the high-minus-low book-to-market Fama-French factor, are the most important risk
factors, with posterior inclusion probabilities close to a 100 percent. Other factors, maybe with the exception
of the 3-month T-Bill rate, do not seem to be reliably related to the returns on the broad bank index. We
show that our BMA approach that takes into account model uncertainty leads to di¤erent conclusions than
one that does not (OLS). Moreover, our results indicate that there is no correct or dominant model. The
most likely model has a posterior model probability of less than 25%, suggesting that accounting for model
uncertainty is important.
In the second part of the analysis we investigate whether or not bank factor models vary over time or
di¤er according to the type of nancial institution we consider. Di¤erences across studies with respect to the
most relevant risk factors may not only be due to a failure to account for model uncertainty, but may also be
60
the consequence of looking at di¤erent periods. In fact, some factors may be dormantfor a long time, and
hence undetectable in short (tranquil) samples, to suddenly appear in times of market stress. In a rst step,
we estimate the BMA model with the same set of risk factors on a pre- and post 2007 sample. In a more
general analysis, we conduct rolling-window BMA regressions, basically re-estimating the BMA model each
quarter using two years of weekly data. We nd that factors such as the implied volatility index and term
and default spread frequently switch between being economically and statistically relevant or not. Hence,
specic periods (typically those characterized by increased nancial market stress) may be associated with
di¤erent bank risk exposures, which may have implications for, e.g., the supervision of bank risk or cost of
capital considerations.
Another reason why di¤erent studies may report a di¤erent set of risk factors is that they focus on di¤er-
ent types of nancial institutions. To investigate whether or not di¤erent types of nancial intermediaries are
exposed to di¤erent risk factors, we compare the results of our baseline portfolio of the 50 largest Bank Hold-
ing Companies with those (both static and time-varying) of four types of nancial intermediaries: depository
institutions, insurance companies, security and commodity brokers, and other non-depository institutions
(see Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012) for a similar classication). In addition, within
the sample of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), we di¤erentiate between various typesby constructing
portfolios of BHCs according to size (largest 15 versus smallest 50), sound versus distressed BHCs and BHCs
with a stable retail focus versus diversied and fast-growing banks. Details on the construction of these
portfolios are mentioned in Section 2.1. The general conclusion from this analysis is that while the relevant
set of exposures does vary substantially over time, it is relatively stable across bank types.
Finally, we discuss some implications of our ndings for empirical banking research based on stock
returns. In fact, return-generating models of bank stocks are not only a useful (supervisory) tool to uncover
risk exposures, but also serve as an input in various setups in empirical banking research. Computing
abnormal returns in event studies requires the specication of a benchmark model. Residual-based measures
of uncertainty (idiosyncratic volatility) or transparency (R-squared) require an accurate identication of risk
factors and a correct specication of the factor model. Accurate measures of banksexposures to stock market
movements (e.g. to compute capital charges for systematic risk) also hinge on the correct specication of a
factor model. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of our ndings for these setups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the data used in this paper. Section
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3 presents the BMA framework we use to analyze the importance of the risk factors. Section 4 in which
empirical results are presented consists of two subsections. In the rst subsection, we document the results
in a static time-invariant framework (section 4.1). In subsection 4.2, we allow for time variation in the model
specications as well as the signicance and magnitude of the factor exposures. We discuss the implications
of our ndings for di¤erent strands of empirical banking research (event studies, market risk, idiosyncratic
volatility) in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Since this paper is essentially empirical, we start with a detailed description of the data used in this paper.
Subsection 2.1 explains how the overall bank index and the cross-sectional portfolios sorted on bank char-
acteristics are constructed. Subsection 2.2 motivates our choice of the set of risk factors and discusses their
construction.
2.1 Portfolio construction
Our main analysis is conducted on a portfolio of the 50 largest (based on total assets) US Bank Holding
Companies (BHCs, henceforth) over the period 1986   2010. The set of BHCs is rebalanced quarterly to
reect the actual, time-varying ranking. The portfolio return is an equally weighted average of the underlying
weekly returns and measured in excess of the 3-Month Treasury Bill rate. In addition to this portfolio of
large US BHCs, we also examine in Section 4.1.2 portfolios of other types of nancial intermediaries as well
as portfolios of BHCs with a specic business model.
We di¤erentiate between the following types of nancial intermediaries: (1) Depository institutions, (2)
Insurance companies, (3) Security and Commodity Brokers and (4) Other non-depository institutions. This
distinction is based on Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012)1 and implemented by using
(CRSP) stock returns of the 100 largest nancial companies (in terms of market capitalization) with SIC
codes 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 67.
1Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012) also include real estate companies (SIC code 65). We decided to
drop companies with SIC code 65 from the sample, because we include a real estate factor as a regressor (see below) based on
the returns of the stock of these companies.
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Secondly, we construct di¤erent portfolios of BHCs with di¤erent business models. We construct port-
folios according to size (large versus small), sound versus distressed banks, and BHCs with a steady retail
versus an expansionary, wholesale focus. To dene the universe of publicly traded BHCs and relate the stock
price information to accounting data, we use the link provided by the New York Fed2 . We construct two
portfolios based on a size criterium: the largest 15 BHCs and the smallest 50 BHCs, based on total assets
(and quarterly rankings). In contrast to small BHCs, the largest 15 banks operate nationwide, are more
interconnected through interbank payments or correlated exposures and may benet from implicit too-big-to-
fail guarantees. Sound versus distressed banks are determined based on two characteristics: protability
and leverage. A bank is considered to be sound (in a given quarter) if it belongs to the highest quartile in
terms of both return on assets and the equity-to-total-assets ratio. Sound banks are hence protable and
protect this source of franchise value by means of prudent capitalization. A bank is categorized as distressed
in a given quarter if it is combining low prots and high leverage (lowest quartile of ROA and equity to
assets). We purposely identify sound and distressed BHCs using two dimensions to distinguish them from
(successful) gambling (poorly capitalized with high prots) or bad luck (low prots while strongly capital-
ized). Finally, we construct a portfolio of BHCs with a retail focus and one of expanding, diversied
BHCs. De Jonghe (2010) and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) show which bank characteristics
make banks more subject to extreme systematic risk. Large and expanding banks with low leverage, a re-
liance on wholesale funding and focused on non-interest income generating activities experienced the largest
stock price drops in the 1998 and 2007 08 crises (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012)) and have higher
tail betas (De Jonghe (2010)). To construct these two portfolios, we take the following steps. First, we
compute, by quarter, the quartiles of each of the following ve dimensions3 : size, asset growth, leverage,
wholesale funding and share of interest income; and allocate a score of 1 to 4 to the corresponding quartile.
Subsequently, we sum the quartile-based scores and obtain an index between 5 and 20. Diversied banks are
those with a score of at least 17, implying that they should score high in almost all dimensions, while retail
2This link is only available until the of 2007, but is manually extended until the end of 2010. Similar to the procedure
described by the NY Fed, we use information of the SNL nancial database containing all publicly traded bank holding
companies in a quarterly le format.
3The idea is to di¤erentiate between retail banks and wholesale oriented and revenue-diversied banks (Large and Complex
Banking groups, LCBGs, or Systemically Important Financial Institutions, SIFIs) as well as how aggressively they pursue their
strategy. Hence, next to the retail-wholesale dimension, we also control for asset growth and size.
63
banks are those with a score of eight or less.
Summary statistics of the returns on the various portfolios are reported in panel A of Table 2, while
Table 3 provides more detailed information on the (variables used in the) construction of the portfolios. The
average annualized return on the benchmark portfolio (largest 50 BHCs) is 14:1%. Brokerage companies
and diversied BHCs earned a higher annualized return over the period 1986  2010. While most portfolios
yield an annualized return of almost 10% or higher, the distressed BHC portfolios return is almost zero.
Larger BHCs, sound or diversied BHCs yield a higher annualized return vis-à-vis small, distressed or retail-
oriented BHCs. Depository institutions, insurance companies and other types of FIs yield similar annualized
returns, around 12% on an annual basis. The correlation between the returns for broker-dealers and the
other portfolios (around 50%) is lower than all other pairwise correlations (around 70%). In general, the
correlations between contrasting portfolios of BHCs (large versus small, sound versus distressed, and retail
versus diversied) are also slightly lower than the average pairwise correlation indicating that we are indeed
identifying types of BHCs with di¤erent strategies. In addition, the returns on the brokers-dealer portfolio
also di¤er from most other portfolios by exhibiting a much larger positive skewness and higher kurtosis.
More evidence on the heterogeneity between the identied BHC types is reported in Table 4. For each
constructed portfolio of BHCs, we report the average value of a set of bank characteristics as well as the
p-value of a di¤erence in means test for the opposite portfolios. The largest 15 versus smallest 50 BHCs
portfolios are determined only based on total assets, which is reected in the large di¤erence in the logarithm
of their total assets. However, large and small banks also di¤er substantially in their level of capitalization,
reliance on deposit funding and loan granting, and consequently also in the source of income (mainly interest
income for small banks). Sound, high franchise value banks are contrasted with distressed banks based
on their level of capitalization and prots. Distressed banks hold 50% less Tier 1 capital compared to
sound banks and are loss-making over the sample period. In addition, the BHCs in these two portfolios
di¤er markedly in the amount of loan loss provisions as well as their cost e¤ectiveness. Poor credit risk
management and ine¢ cient cost management lead to undercapitalization and poor protability. Retail
banks are di¤erentiated from diversied, wholesale-oriented banks in many dimensions. By construction,
the retail banks are smaller, better capitalized, experience stable (near zero) growth, and focus more on
retail deposits and interest income generating activities as compared to diversied, nancial conglomerates.
Nevertheless, they are equally protable and cost e¢ cient and provision similarly for potential credit risk.
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We relate excess returns (of each of the aforementioned portfolios) to innovations in a total of twelve risk
factors, which are classied in eight groups. In the next section, we briey explain, for each risk factor, how
it is constructed and why we expect it to be a potential source/contributor to bank risk.
2.2 Bank Risk Factors
2.2.1 Market risk
We include returns on a broad equity market portfolio (Market) as a rst factor, as in all previous studies
explaining (bank) stock returns. This exposure, or market beta, measures how sensitive (individual) bank
stock returns are to aggregate market movements, and hence to changes in general economic and nancial
market conditions. As a proxy for the market portfolio, we use the Non-Financial Market Index from
Datastream (code TOTLIUS). We use a market index excluding the nancial sector to avoid spurious results
when explaining the returns on an index of US BHCs.
2.2.2 The Fama French factors
Since the seminal work of Fama and French (1996), a large literature has emerged showing that stock returns
are not only related to market returns, but also to returns on a size and a value factor4 . More often than
not, however, the nancial sector is excluded from asset pricing tests. Nevertheless, Schuermann and
Stiroh (2006) show for a sample of US BHCs that the Fama-French factors are, next to the market, the
dominant factors explaining bank stock returns. Viale, Kolari, and Fraser (2009) in contrast show that a
model that includes a bank sector specic size and value factor, next to a market factor, is outperformed
by a model that includes the market and term spread. We follow these papers and common practice in the
nance literature, and include both the size and value factor in our set of potential risk drivers. We use the
size (SMB) and value (HML) factors made available by Kenneth French on his website. Both the size and
value factor earn a positive risk premium, implying that risk increases with exposures to both factors. Liew
and Vassalou (2000) argue that persistently high Book-to-Market stocks face a higher risk of distress and
that they are more likely to survive when the economic outlook is good rather than bad. Similarly, small
capitalization stocks are more likely to do well during periods of economic growth, and more likely to be the
4The size factor is calculated as the di¤erence in return between small and large stocks (SMB); the value factor is the
di¤erence in return between stocks characterized by high and low (HML) book-to-market value.
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rst to disappear during periods of economic slowdown. The vulnerability of high Book-to-Market and small
capitalization stocks to changes in the economic cycle leads to a positive link between the performance of
the HML and SMB strategies and future economic growth. They show that both factors contain information
about future economic growth not captured by the market factor. Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue that both
the HML and SMB contain some default-related information, but that this is not the main source of priced
information embedded in both factors. Chen and Zhang (1998) show that rms with high book-to-market
equity have persistently low earnings, higher nancial leverage and are more likely to cut dividends than
their counterparts with low book-to-market ratios. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that value and
small stocks are relatively more exposed to shocks in cash-ow expectations than large and growth shocks.
Zhang (2005) relates the higher riskiness of value relative to growth stocks, and hence their higher returns,
to asymmetries in capital adjustment costs and time-varying prices of risk, which make assets-in-place much
riskier than growth options in bad times, while growth options are riskier than assets-in-place in good times,
and to a lesser extent. In sum, both the size and value factor seem to contain information about the future
state of the economy not captured by the market factor alone, and are hence also candidate risk factors for
bank stock returns.
2.2.3 Interest rate risk
In theory, one would expect BHCs to be more exposed to interest rate movements than non-nancial com-
panies. A nancial intermediary is, through its activity of maturity transformation, exposed to interest rate
risk caused by di¤erences in the duration of its assets and liabilities. Since Flannery and James (1984a), most
studies also include at least one interest rate factor, in addition to a proxy for market risk. As a short-term
interest rate risk factor, we include the three-month Treasury bill rate (TB3). As the duration of bank
liabilities is usually shorter than the duration of banksassets, we expect rate increases to negatively a¤ect
bank stock returns. Not nding a signicant exposure does not necessarily mean that banks are not exposed
to interest rate risk, but that they may have succesfully hedged their exposure, e.g. by means of interest-rate
derivatives. Table 1 shows that most studies include the short-term interest rate, often combined with either
the term spread or a long-term interest rate. Hence, as a second interest rate risk factor, we include the
term spread (TS), calculated as the di¤erence between the yield on a 10-year government bond and the
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three-month Treasury bill rate5 . Depending on the duration mismatch between assets and liabilities, the
exposure to changes in the term spread may either be negative or positive. In models with both the short
rate and the term spread, the short rate captures the e¤ect of a parallel shift in the term structure, while the
term spread tests for the e¤ect of a change in the slope of the term structure of interest rates. Notice that
while both the short rate and term spread may also convey information about the (future) state of economy,
ination and monetary policy (see e.g. Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006)), we expect that the business cycle
information in both variables is already captured by the market factor.
2.2.4 Default Risk
Banks are exposed to corporate default risk, directly through loan exposures as well as indirectly via their
securities portfolio or investment vehicles (e.g. corporate securities, ABS, SPVs...). As a measure of economy-
wide corporate default risk, we include the yield di¤erence between Moodys BAA and AAA-rated corporate
bonds (DS). Because a rise in the default spread increases the probability of losses in the banks loan portfolio,
we expect a negative relationship between bank stock returns and innovations in the default spread.
Banks are also exposed to potential defaults of other banks, either directly through the interbank market
or indirectly through potential contagion e¤ects and correlated exposures. As an indicator of credit risk in
the nancial system, we include the Treasury-EuroDollar spread (TED spread), dened as the di¤erence
between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month Treasury bill rate (IMF (2009) and Garleanu and
Pedersen (2011)). Because a widening of the spread is an indication of increased distress risk in the nancial
sector, we expect bank stocks to react negatively to shocks in the TED spread6 .
2.2.5 Liquidity risk
Banks provide liquidity to the economy (by nancing illiquid assets with liquid claims) but this also poses a
risk. As a measure of liquidity tightness in the market of bank deposits, we use the spread between the three
month deposit rate (three month unregulated time deposit) and the three month Treasury Bill rate (DepS)
(see e.g. Dewenter and Hess (1998)). The second liquidity measure is the di¤erence between the Federal
5We do not include the long-term interest rate to avoid perfect multicollinearity as we already include the short rate and
term spread, dened as the di¤erence between the long and the short rate.
6The three-month LIBOR-OIS (overnight index swap) spread would be an alternative to the TED spread (Giesecke and Kim
(2011)) but is unfortunately not available over the entire period 1986-2010.
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Funds Overnight rate and the three month LIBOR rate (MMS, i.e. money market spread) and measures
tightness in the money market (see e.g. Taylor and Williams (2009)). While both measures are unlikely to
have an e¤ect on bank stock prices in tranquil times, we expect their importance to increase substantially
when stress in the nancial system increases. However, the sign is unpredictable. On the one hand, banks
can provide liquidity as deposit inows that are seeking a safe haven provide banks with a natural hedge
to fund drawn credit lines and other commitments (Gatev and Strahan (2006)). On the other hand, the
banking system in its role as a stabilizing liquidity insurer acts as an active seeker of deposits via managing
bank deposit rates (Acharya and Mora (2012)). Since MMS is related to funding conditions in the more
volatile money market, we expect it to be a more important risk factor in times of nancial market stress.
2.2.6 Real Estate risk
Real estate price drops and subsequent losses on (subprime) mortgage loans are often indicated as one of
the culprits of the nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Decreasing real estate prices may hence a¤ect the value of
banks negatively directly through their e¤ect on the value of outstanding mortgages7 , or indirectly through
the resulting drop in the value of mortgage-backed securities. While there exist several proxies for price
movements in the US real estate market (such as the Case-Shiller index), none of them is available at a daily
or weekly frequency. Inspired by the work of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), we construct a value-weighted
real estate index (RE) of all publicly traded real estate companies (with (header) SIC (major group) code
658) from CRSP.
2.2.7 Market Sentiment indicator
While most of the previous state variables already capture market sentiment in one or another way, we
additionally include the VXO implied volatility index9 . Our main motivation is that the VXO is a forward-
7The largest share of loans in banksoverall loan portfolio are residential and commercial real estate loans, even for large
BHCs.
8SIC code 65 consists of the following subgroups: 6510 (real estate operators (no developers) & lessors), 6512 (operators of
nonresidential buildings), 6513 (operators of apartment buildings), 6519 (lessors of real property), 6531 (real estate agents &
managers (for others)), 6532 (real estate dealers (for their own account)), 6552 (land subdividers & developers (no cemeteries)).
9This is a weighted index of American implied volatilities calculated from eight near-the-money, near-to-expiry, S&P 100 call
and put options with a 1 month maturity. We use the VXO rather than the better known S&P500-based VIX index because
the former is already available from 1986 on (compared to 1990 for the VIX index). Notice that the VIX and VXO index
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looking risk measure that has predictive power for returns at relative short horizons (up to 3 months), while
most of the other state variables have predictive power (if any) beyond that horizon (see e.g. Londono
(2011)). We expect bank stock returns to have a negative exposure to VXO innovations.
2.2.8 Currency risk
Some large banks may have exchange rate exposure, e.g. through foreign lending or derivative exposures.
As a measure of currency risk (FX), we use the Nominal Major Currencies Index, available from the Federal
Reserve Boards H 15 lings. An increase in the index is associated with an appreciation of the USD
with respect to a trade-weighed basked of (main) currencies. Such appreciation of the USD will a¤ect
banks either negatively or positively, depending on whether they are long or short the foreign currency
(see e.g. Chamberlain, Howe, and Popper (1997)). Of course, bank risk may also be indirectly a¤ected by
FX uctuations to the extent that the impact of these uctuations on the real economy leads to increased
riskiness of the existing loan portfolio and lower demand for new loans. The expected sign is ambiguous,
depending on how all the individual e¤ects aggregate.
2.2.9 Summary
To summarize, we relate excess returns to a total of twelve risk factors, which are classied in eight groups.
Note, however, that part of the information in the other risk factors will be captured by the market factor, to
the extent that they convey information relevant to the valuation of the market portfolio. Hence, exposures
to the other risk factors will capture the exposure of banks over and above the exposure to the market.
Moreover, according to the e¢ cient market hypothesis, we only expect a relationship between bank stock
returns and unanticipated changes in risk factors. To ensure that we capture unexpected movements in the
risk factors, we take the residuals from an AR(n) model for each risk variable, where n is determined by
the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for the di¤erent
factor shocks (and reports both the name and abbreviation used throughout the paper), as well as the
expected signs of the factor exposures. Two features of the data seem noteworthy. First of all, the volatility
of the bank sector index returns is a factor two higher than that of the aggregate market or the Fama-French
overlap perfectly until 22 September 2003, as until that date also the VIX was based on SP&P100 option prices. In the post
2003 period, both indices remain highly correlated.
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factors. Second, returns on the real estate index are highly volatile, even more than those on the market
and similar to the brokers-dealersreturn volatility.
3 Methodology
3.1 Estimation: Prior distribution and the likelihood function
This section outlines Bayesian Model Averaging in the normal linear regression model10 , similar as in Cremers
(2002), Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), Wright (2008) and Magnus, Powell, and Prufer (2010).
We start from the linear regression framework (as in Magnus, Powell, and Prufer (2010)):
y = x + " = x11 + x22 + "; " v N(0; 2) (1)
where y is the (n 1) vector of bank index returns, and " is the vector of random disturbances. x1 denotes
the (n  k1) matrix of variables for which there is no model uncertainty. In our setup, k1 = 1 such that
x1 is vector of ones (the constant term) to emphasize that the constant is included in each model. x2 is an
(n  k2) matrix of at most k2 independent variables theorized to be predictors of bank stock returns. 1
and 2 are the unknown parameter vectors. We assume that the disturbances ("1; :::; "n) are independently
and identically distributed. Model uncertainty implies that the researcher does not know ex ante the exact
composition of the matrix of independent variables x2 (out of a known and dened set of potential variables).
Since model averaging takes place over k2 regressors, there exist K = 2k2 di¤erent model combinations (in
the linear case). Let M (k) denote model k under consideration, then
y = x11 + x
(k)
2 
(k)
2 + " (2)
with x(k)2 a subset of matrix x2 with dimension (n k(k)2 ). For model k, (k)2 is the corresponding subvector
of interest.
Bayesian model averaging implies that one has to chose prior distributions for the model parameters and
the model probability. In specifying priors for BMA, the following general rule applies (Koop (2003)): "When
comparing di¤erent models, it is acceptable to use non-informative priors over parameters which are common
10We stick to a general description of Bayesian Model Averaging in which we explain the main ingredients. For more technical
details, we would like to refer the reader to Magnus, Powell, and Prufer (2010)).
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to all models. However, informative, proper priors should be used over all other parameters". As mentioned
in Kass and Raftery (1995), at priors are specied only up to an undened multiplicative constant and so
the posterior model probabilities contain an undened constant. Hence, a non-informative (improper) prior
for 2 and 1, respectively Equation (3)
11 and Equation (4), can be used since these parameters are common
to all models. The prior for 2, Equation (5) is informative and centered around zero.
p(2jM (k)) _  2 (3)
p(1j2;M (k)) _ 1 (4)
p(
(k)
2 j1; 2;M (k)) _ N(0; 2V (k)0 ) (5)
These priors have been used by Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a) and many others in the BMA literature.
We specify the prior variance V (k)0 using Zellners (1986) g-prior. Following Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a)
among others, we set g = inv(max(n; k22)) and assume
V
(k)
0 = g
 1(x(k)2 M1x
(k)
2 )
 1 (6)
where M1 = In   x1(x01x1) 1x
0
1. Intuitively, when the data is more informative (the sample size n is larger
or the number of explanatory variables k2 is larger) a weaker prior for 2 can be used. A larger dataset or
a large list of explanatory variables causes g to be smaller, and hence V (k)0 to be larger. This means that
the prior is weaker, and hence the model will give more weight to the data, relative to the prior. The value
g = 0 corresponds to a perfectly non-informative prior.
Similar to the priors for the model parameters, we assign a prior for the model probability for each of
the 2k2 possible combinations of regressors. As is common practice in the model averaging literature, we
11This stems from p(log(2)jMk) / 1. The log transformation is applied to dene the probability over both positive and
negative values. Since the logarithmic function is a monotone transformation, it holds that fY (y) = fX(x)
 dxdy , where y =
exp(x) , x = log(y) and fX(x) / 1. The second term in the equation can be expressed as 1=y or 1=2. Hence, we obtain that
p(2jMk) _  2.
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will assign equal12 prior probability to all models under consideration. Hence, the prior model probability
of model M (k) is expressed as
p(M (k)) =
1
K
(7)
The advantage of using the above priors is that the posterior density can be obtained analytically and no
posterior simulation is required for the calculation of the posterior and the standard deviation. Under the
normal linear regression framework, the likelihood function, assuming model M (k) is the most likely model,
is given by
p(yj1; (k)2 ; 2;M (k)) _ (2) n=2 exp( 
(y   1x1   x2(k)2 )
0
(y   1x1   x2(k)2 )
22
) (8)
By combining the likelihood function and the above priors, given the data y and model Mk, one obtains
the joint posterior density (for more info, see e.g.: Koop (2003), OHagan (1994), Magnus, Powell, and Prufer
(2010)), which takes the form of a normal-gamma distribution.
3.2 Inference: posterior estimates, posterior variance and posterior inclusion
probabilities
The above ndings can be used to carry out posterior inference conditional on a specic model. However,
our goal is to combine information from multiple models. Given the data y and a prior model probability
for model M (k) (Equation (7)), the posterior model probability13 -i.e. the probability that model M (k) is
the most likely model, after seeing the data and updating the prior belief- can be expressed as
p(M (k)jy) = p(M
(k))p(yjM (k))P
j p(M
(j))p(yjM (j)) = 
(k) (9)
12 In an online appendix, we describe an alternative setup, i.e. using the collinearity adjusted dilution prior of George (2010).
We document the robustness of our results compared with this model prior.
13 In a traditional setup, researchers may use the Akaikes information criterion (Akaike (1974)), the Schwarzs criterion (a
Bayesian information criterion, Schwarz (1978)) or the Fishers information criteria (Wei (1992)), among others (Bossaerts and
Hillion (1999)) to select a single, most likely model. Because researchers may searchfor the best specication among a set of
alternatives, data snooping and overtting are genuine concerns, in particular when there are many plausible risk factors that
are potentially correlated. Our approach, on the other hand, does not seach for a unique model, but averages over all possible
linear models giving a higher weight to more likely models.
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where p(yjMk) is the marginal likelihood. Since all model probabilities sum to one, we must also have
that
KX
k=1
(k) = 1
To obtain posterior estimates of the slope parameters 2i with i = 1; :::; k2, Bayesian Model Averaging
combines the information from all models. The posterior parameter estimate is obtained as the weighted
average of the parameter estimates over the di¤erent models, where the weights are determined by the
posterior model probability (k).
E(2ijy) =
KX
k=1
(k)  E((k)2i jy;M (k)) (10)
where E((k)2i jy;M (k)) is the estimate for the slope parameter 2i given modelM (k). Hence, the posterior
mean is a weighted average of the estimated slope coe¢ cients.
Following Leamer (1978), the posterior variance is dened as
V (2ijy) =
KX
k=1
(k)  V ((k)2i jM (k)) +
KX
k=1
(k) 
h
E(
(k)
2i jy;M (k))  E(2ijy)
i2
(11)
As one can see from equation 11, the posterior variance of 2i consists of two terms: the rst is the
weighted sum of the variances across all models, whereas the second terms depends on the di¤erence between
the posterior mean (equation 10) and the model specic estimates E((k)2i jy;M (k)). Hence, if the parameter
estimate is very dispersed across models, this implies larger model uncertainty which is translated into larger
parameter uncertainty.
The posterior model probability gives insight into which model is most likely. However, a model is dened
through the inclusion or exclusion of a set of explanatory variables. Hence, it would be more interesting to
have a metric that expresses how likely it is a certain regressor should be included in the "true" model. This
is what is captured by the "posterior inclusion probability". This can be interpreted as the probability that
the corresponding explanatory variable should be included in the model. Using this metric, (static) Bayesian
Model Averaging gives insight into the probability that a factor should be included in a model explaining
bank stock returns. Following Leamer (1978) and Doppelhofer and Weeks (2009), it is calculated as the sum
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of the posterior model probabilities of the models that include variable x2i with i = 1; :::; k2. Formally, the
posterior inclusion probability of variable x2i is given by
p(x2ijy) =
KX
k=1
(k)  I(x2i 2 x(k)2 jy;M (k)) (12)
where I is an indicator equal to one if the variable x2i is present in model M (k) and zero otherwise. Since
a model is dened through the inclusion or exclusion of a set of variables, the importance of a variable
(captured by its posterior inclusion probability) and its signicance (captured by its estimated standard
error) are related objects. Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) state that a posterior inclusion probability
of 0:50 corresponds approximately to an absolute t statistic of 1. This idea is similar to the relationship
between the adjusted R2 and the t statistic in frequentist economics. If one variable is deleted from a model,
it will always decrease the R2, but it will only decrease the adjusted R2 if the t statistic is below 1 in absolute
value (Magnus, Powell, and Prufer (2010)).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Bayesian Model Averaging: Full Sample Results
4.1.1 The sample of the 50 largest BHCs
Table 5 summarizes the full-sample estimation results for the Bayesian Model Averaging approach using
the 12 bank risk factors discussed in Section 2.2 and the benchmark index of the 50 largest BHCs. In the
top panel, we report for each risk factor (12 columns) the OLS factor exposure and t-statistic, the BMA
factor exposure and t-statistic as well as the Posterior Inclusion Probability of that factor. We see that the
market, HML, and real estate factor have a Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP)14 of 100 percent, strongly
indicating that these three factors should be included in a model for bank stock returns. The low uncertainty
14 In addition to the posterior mean and the posterior inclusion probability of the coe¢ cient, we also compute the sign certainty
statistic, as used in Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) and Doppelhofer and Weeks (2009). This is a measure of
the posterior condence in the sign of the coe¢ cient, and it is calculated as the posterior probability that the coe¤cient is on
the same side of zero as its mean conditional on inclusion. We nd that the sign certainty statistic is very much in line with
the posterior inclusion probability of the risk factors. When the posterior inclusion probability of a variable is high (such as for
the market factor, the HML and the real estate factor), the sign certainty statistic is also high, meaning that we can be quite
condent about the direction of the impact of a change in the risk factor on bank stock returns.
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about the inclusion of these three factors is reected in the small di¤erences between the OLS and BMA
factor exposures. In line with previous literature, we nd the estimated market beta to be around 1 over the
full sample period. The HML exposure is highly statistically signicant and has a positive sign, as expected
given its positive (negative) association with future economic growth (distress risk). Given that booming
and subsequently rapidly decreasing housing prices were one of the key causes of the nancial crisis that
started in 2007, our nding of a positive and signicant association of our real estate factor with bank stock
returns is unsurprising15 . All other factors, with the exception maybe of the short rate (TB), have PIPs and
factor exposures close to zero. That PIPs are either relatively close to a 100 or 0 percent signals the ability
of the model to distinguish between important and redundant factors.
BMA also provides information on how likely a given model is, represented by the posterior model
probability. In the lower panel of Table 5, we report information on the ten model specications that get the
highest model probability. We report information on the likelihood of the model, which factors are included
in the model as well as its adjusted R-squared. The combined information in the upper panel and lower
panel is indicative of why relying solely on OLS and/or including all factors at the same time may yield
misguided conclusions. First, the 12 factor model is not among the top 10 models. The richest top 10 model
contains at most 5 factors. Not surprisingly, the market, HML, and real estate factor are part of all these
models (thus leading to a PIP of 100%). Second, a model consisting of only these three factors is the most
likely. Nevertheless, it has a posterior model probability of only23:83 per cent. One other specication
(which also includes the T-bill rate) is almost as likely and has a PMP of 23:5%. None of the other models
has a posterior model probability exceeding 7:5%. Alternative models include other factors (2 of the top-10
models include the default spread or money market spread; the TED spread, the deposit spread, the e¤ective
exchange rate, and the VXO each appear once), but have much lower PMPs (7:3 percent for the 3rd most
likely model to only 1:8 percent for the 10th most likely model). Third, based on the full specication and
OLS results, we would conclude that the 3 month T-bill, interbank distress (MMS) and market sentiment
(VXO) are also signicantly related to bank stock returns. However, they only appear sporadically in the
15Because our real estate factor is based on a market-weighted index of listed real estate companies that invest both in
residential and commercial real estate, this factor may not only reect movements in housing prices, but also broader changes
in the economic environment. However, when we orthogonalize this factor with respect to contemporaneous innovations in the
market and Fama-French factors, its PIP remains close to a 100 percent, and the factor exposure is positive and signicant.
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top 10 models. For example, there is a large di¤erence between the OLS and BMA factor exposure for the
three month Treasury Bill ( 2:37*** versus  0:69). From an OLS regression of returns on our benchmark
index on all 12 risk factors, the econometrician would conclude that this factor is an important explanatory
variable for bank stock returns. The much lower BMA exposure suggests, however, that this model has a
very low Posterior Model Probability (PMP) and that it is not an important component of much more likely
models. Fourth, while PIPs are in general much better in discriminating between good and bad models (see
e.g. Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010)), it is still worth noting that the di¤erences in adjusted R2 between a
specication with just the market, HML, and real estate factor and more elaborate models is rather small,
casting serious doubt on the usefulness of these additional factors in explaining bank stock returns16 .
4.1.2 Heterogeneity across types of Financial Institutions and BHCs
The ndings for our benchmark portfolio of the 50 largest BHCs are largely replicated for samples of Depos-
itory, Insurance, Broker-Dealer, and other non-depository nancial institutions. These result are reported
in Columns 2 to 5 of Table 6 (the rst column reproduces the results of the baseline portfolio). The market
and real estate factor are part of the preferred model for all types of nancial institutions, whereas the HML
factor is signicant for all except insurance corporations. All exposures to these factors have the expected
positive sign, are highly statistically signicant, but the estimated coe¢ cients vary in magnitude across the
di¤erent portfolios. The other factors have PIPs close to zero with very few exceptions. The VXO factor
has a PIP of 51 percent for depository and of 72 percent for other non-depository nancial institutions, and
16Multicollinearity between the regressors could prevent us from nding the correct signicant relationships, as it tends
to blow up standard errors. To test the robustness of our results to multicollinearity, we replace the TED, money market,
and deposit spread  all measures of some aspect of liquidity stress  with their rst principal component. Additionally, we
orthogonalize the VIX and the real estate indicator to innovations in the market and Fama-French portfolio returns. Our BMA
results remain qualitatively the same. The change in posterior inclusion probability between the results in Table 5 and the
results with this new set of regressors is 2% at most (for the three month Treasury Bill rate). Second, we test the robustness
of our results with respect to a di¤erent model prior. One could argue that the uninformative model prior, giving equal prior
probability to all models, puts too much weight on redundant models with correlated regressors, and too few weight on good
but unique models. To address this critique, we use the collinearity adjusted dilution prior (George (2010)) to downweight
models with highly collinear regressors. Again, our conclusions remain unchanged. The highest di¤erence in posterior inclusion
probability between the two di¤erent model priors is 3% (for the VIX). Results of these additional tests are available upon
request.
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the expected negative sign. The term spread factor is part of the preferred model for other non-depository
institutions, while its PIP is only marginally below 50 percent for broker-dealers. We observe similar PIPs
of about 40 percent for the Treasury Bill factor for depository institutions and broker-dealers, both with the
expected negative sign.
For the various BHC portfolios (Columns 6-11 of Table 6), the preferred models include the SMB Fama-
French factor next to the market, HML, and real estate factor. Again, other factors have PIPs close to zero
with very few exceptions. The volatility index VXO has PIPs of 85 and 90 percent for the portfolios of
smallest 50 and retail BHCs, respectively, while the di¤erence between the Federal Funds Overnight Interest
Rate and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate seems signicantly related to the portfolio returns of the smallest
50 BHCs.
In sum, our full-sample BMA results suggest that the market, Fama-French, and real estate factors are
the most relevant factors for bank stock returns, and that most other factors, maybe with the exception of
the volatility index VXO, are largely unimportant. While the limited support for many of the additional
risk factors conrms previous evidence of e.g. Schuermann and Stiroh (2006), the lack of nding signicant
exposures over the full sample may just reect structural instability in the parameters. For instance, factors
mimicking stress in the interbank or deposit market may only become important during business cycle
downturns or nancial crises. The focus on liquidity risk, for instance, intensied since the collapse of the
UK-based bank Northern Rock, which failed mainly because it was too heavily reliant on wholesale funding,
and hence, could not refund itself in case of a dry-up in the interbank market. Therefore, we introduce time
variation in the model selection and factor exposures in the next subsection.
4.2 Modelling Time Variation in Model Uncertainty
To show the importance of allowing for time variation, we proceed in two steps. In a rst step, we show in
Table 7 the composition of the top-10 models before and after the start of the nancial crisis in 2007 for our
benchmark portfolio of the largest 50 BHCs17 . We notice a number of interesting di¤erences between the
full and subsample results. First, the optimal number of factors seems to be somewhat larger in the pre-2007
period, suggesting that the lack of accommodating for structural breaks may indeed be one of the reasons for
the lack of signicant factor exposures. The VXO volatility index, the T-Bill rate as well as the di¤erence
17The sample period is split in two: January 1986 - July 2007 and August 2007 - December 2010.
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between the three month deposit rate and the three month Treasury Bill rate (DepS) are part of most, if
not all, top-10 models pre-2007. Hence, in the pre-2007 period, banks did not have signicant exposure to
credit risk, but were exposed to market sentiment (VXO) as well as interest rate risk. Most of these factors
disappear after 2007, but are replaced by the default spread factor, which is part of all of the top-10 models
in the post-2007 period. As the banking crisis started to spill over to the real economy, default risk started
to increase, further depressing bank stock returns. Second, while before August 2007 the top-3 models have
a joint probability of nearly 60 percent (23:5% for the top model), this drops to less than 22 percent in the
post-2007 period (8:06% for top model). Somehow it seems that the uncertainty induced by the nancial
crises also leads to higher model uncertainty. Relying on a single model during a crisis to assess and monitor
bank risk is clearly insu¢ cient. Third, the adjusted R2 of the top-10 models is much higher in the post-2007
period (83% versus 51%), which is consistent with the notion that common factors (and hence correlations
between banks) become more important in times of high volatility.
In a second step, we investigate the time-varying factor inclusion and exposures in more detail. We
estimate our BMA model over quarterly rolling windows of two years using weekly data18 . Panel A of Table
8 shows for each bank type-risk factorpair the percentage of observations with a PIP larger than 50 percent.
Panel B of the same Table 8 shows for each bank type-risk factorpair the corresponding marginal R2. The
latter is calculated as the average (over time) di¤erence in R2 between a model that does and one that
does not include a particular risk factor, conditional on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP
larger than 50 percent19 In panel C, we report the average factor exposure for a given portfolio, conditional
on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP larger than 50 percent. Figure 1 gives a graphical
representation of when which factors are important and for which types of banks.
On average across all portfolios, the market factor has in 92% of times a PIP larger than 50 percent, with
an interquartile range (di¤erence between value of 75th and 25th percentile) of 14%. The smallest percentage
is observed for the portfolio of 50 smallest BHCs (66%). Panel A of Figure 1 shows that small banks were
mainly disconnected from the market over the 2000-2008 period, after which the connection was restored
18The rst estimate is obtained for the last quarter of 1987.
19The marginal R2 is calculated as follows: for each risk factor and in each estimation window, we take the di¤erence between
the model weighted R2 (where the weights are given by the posterior model probabilities), and the model weighted R2 of all
models, excluding the specic risk factor. In the latter case, the posterior model probabilities are rescaled to ensure that the
posterior model probabilities sum up to one.
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again. For large banks (both 50 or 15 largest BHCs), we nd, on the other hand, that the market factor
loses signicance from the second half of 2009 onwards (which corresponds with an estimation window of
2007Q2-2009Q2). In the last six quarters of our sample period, the HML factor, which captures distress and
credit risk, becomes more important than the market factor for the (larger and) largest BHCs.
Panel A of Table 8 conrms the result from the full-sample analysis that the Fama-French and real estate
factors are the most important bank risk factors other than the market. The HML factor is on average
onin 58:3% of observations, with a tight interquartile range of 27%: In contrast to the full sample results
(see Table 6), where the SMB factor was found to be an unimportant factor for the returns on depository,
broker-dealer, and insurance corporations, the rolling-window estimates reveal that the SMB factor enters
the optimal model in on average 53:5% of observations, though with a rather broad interquartile range
(44%). Not including the HML and SMB factors in times their PIP is larger than 50 percent would lead
to a substantial (absolute) loss in R2 of 7:9% and 6:3%, respectively. Despite having a PIP of 100% in the
full-sample analysis, our time-varying analysis reveals that the real estate factor has a PIP larger than 50%
in on average 25% of observations, with an interquartile range of 19%. Wrongly excluding the real estate
factor would lead to a moderate loss in R2 of 2:2% on average. Figure 1 shows that nearly all cross-sectional
BHC portfolios disconnect from the HML factor in the 2004-2007 period, to reconnect again during the
global nancial crisis. The HML is onmost of the other times, except for the Broker-Dealer and other non-
depository nancial institutions, which seem rather unexposed to the HML factor. The SMB risk factor seems
to mainly a¤ect the cross-sectional portfolios of BHCs, and to a lesser extent the Insurance, Broker-Dealer,
and other non-depository nancial institutions. The largest BHCs and broker-deal and other non-depository
institutions are, however, most frequently exposed to real estate shocks. The marginal increase in R2 from
including the real estate factor is largest for the portfolio of 50 smallest BHCs (5%).
The other factors exhibit a considerably smaller proportion of observations with a PIP larger than 50%:
The implied volatility index (VXO) is on in on average 13:8% of cases. The VXO seems most relevant
during the LTCM-Russian crisis and to some lesser extent during the global nancial crisis. We observe the
largest proportions for the distressed BHCs (18:7%) and 50 largest banks (17:6%). The marginal increase
in R2 is comparable to that of the real estate factor, about 2:2%, with a narrow interquartile range: The
term spread factor is part of the preferred model in 11:9% of cases, and increases the R2 with on average
3:1% (interquartile range of 1%). The highest frequencies of onstates are observed for the Broker-Dealer
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(20:9%) and other non-depository nancial institutions (22%). The largest 15 banks are more exposed to
term spread shocks than the smallest 50 banks (12:1% versus 4:4%). Similarly, non-retail banks have a more
frequent exposure than retail banks (12:1% versus 4:4%).
To further investigate whether other factors than the market are signicantly related to bank stock
returns, Figure 2 plots at each point in time the number of factors with a PIP larger than 50 percent, (left
axis) and the average di¤erence in R2 between the optimaland a simple market model (dotted line with
scale on the right axis). The optimal number of factors seems to vary mostly between 1 and 6 (in some
exceptional cases 0 or 7), and seems to be highest on average in the aftermath of the Russian/LTCM crisis
and subsequent burst of the technology bubble, and since the start of the nancial crisis (third quarter of
2007). The lowest number of relevant factors is observed during the relatively tranquil 2004-2006 period.
The increase in adjusted R2 from including risk factors other than the market ranges from slightly negative20
to more than 10%: For our benchmark index (Panel A of Figure 2), the marginal R2 peaks to values close to
10% in the mid-nineties, directly after the Russian/LTCM crisis, and during the global nancial crisis. The
increase in R2 is not purely the result of increased explanatory power of existing factors, as the increase in
R2 seems also associated with an increase in the optimal number of factors. We obtain similar results for
the cross-sectional portfolio analysis. For each of the four types of FIs, the time-varying optimal number of
factors with a PIP exceeding 50%, ranges between 1 and 6, with incremental gains in the adjusted R-squared
(with respect to a single factor model) of up to 10%. For the various portfolios of BHCs, we nd similar
results with respect to the number of factors (with a maximum of seven relevant factors around the turn
of the millennium for small BHCs, diversied BHCs and sound BHCs). The gains in R-squared can be
even more substantial, with maximal gains of 20% (for distressed BHCs) and 15% for the smallest BHCs
and diversied BHCs. The main conclusion drawn from Figure 2 is that factors other than the market are
important. Moreover, how many factors are important and their impact on explanatory power varies over
time (especially in times of market stress) and across types of BHCs and FIs.
20Because we look at adjusted R2s, this di¤erence can indeed be negative.
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5 Implications for empirical bank research using stock returns
Models of bank stock returns are used as inputs in various types of empirical banking research, e.g., event
studies, the decomposition of total bank risk in relevant components, proxies for bank opacity, and various
related types of analysis. We document that the optimal combination of relevant risk factors may vary over
time and may di¤er according to the type of nancial institution under investigation. This implies that due
diligence is required in the specication of the bank factor model and that each empirical setup has to be
tailored to the specic research question.
Many empirical banking studies examine the impact of an exogenous event on banksvaluation. These
events could be bank-specic, such as mergers and acquisitions (Kane (2000) and Hankir, Rauch, and Umber
(2011)), or sector-wide; e.g. banking or nancial crises or regulatory changes (Johnson and Sarkar (1996) and
Mamun, Hassan, and Maroney (2005)). To conduct such an event study, it is crucial to obtain an accurate
measure of the (cumulative) abnormal return in response to the announced event. Our study yields three
suggestions for the computation of cumulative abnormal returns. First, it is important to control for other
risk factors in addition to returns on a broad market portfolio. For example, for the set of the 50 largest
banks, the optimal number of factors varies over time between one and six. The explained variation in bank
stock return can be increased by as much as 10%. Not controlling for other factors may yield a misspecied
factor model leading to incorrect abnormal returns. A simple exercise gives an indication of the potential
magnitude. For the portfolio of 50 largest BHCs, we compute for each quarter (event window) the cumulative
abnormal return, using the previous 8 quarters as the estimation window, based on our model as well as
a single factor model. The average di¤erence over the 91 events (quarters) is small ( 0:4%)21 . However,
the bias can be quite substantial during specic quarters and especially during NBER-dated recessions. In
recessions, the average deviation in quarterly CARs is  4:9%. Second, the BMA implied model specication
varies over time. Hence, in an ideal setup, the specication of the factor model changes for events that take
place at di¤erent points in time (for example, M&As). Third, imposing the same model for various types
of BHCs in a given time period may yield biased (cumulative) abnormal returns, since di¤erent types of
BHCs sometimes imply di¤erent models. For example, in 2000, a model with a single factor (the market)
21This di¤erence in abnormal returns between our model and a single factor model is conceptually the same as the di¤erence
in one-quarter ahead forecast errors between these two models.
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is su¢ cient for retail BHCs, but would underestimate the R-squared of the richest model by almost 14%
for diversied BHCs. Hence, abnormal returns (or other performance indicators such as alpha), based on a
single factor model, could lead to an incorrect comparison between diversied banks and retail banks at the
turn of the millennium.
The ip side of the above comment is that idiosyncratic volatility is overestimated whenever R-squared
is underestimated. Using BMA, we document that this measurement is heterogeneous in two dimensions.
Model uncertainty (both in terms of number of factors and the goodness of t) varies over time, but more
importantly, also in the cross-section. Many studies try to explain the cross-section of banksidiosyncratic
volatility. For example, Stiroh (2006b) and Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) document that
banks with more non-interest income have lower idiosyncratic risk up to a turning point (at which they
become overexposed to non-traditional banking activities). In both studies, a similar return-generating
model is used for the entire set of banks. However, we document that the model specications (and increased
goodness of t) for retail and diversied BHCs can be substantially di¤erent from each other over certain
episodes, which may a¤ect the results of the aforementioned studies.
There is a large literature that studies the link between opacity and R-squared (see e.g. Jin and Myers
(2006) and Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)). Firms with more opaque nancial reports have stock
returns that are more synchronous with market-wide factors and hence have a higher R-squared. In addition,
there is theoretical and empirical evidence that opaque rms (with higher R-squared) are more prone to stock
price crashes. Our results in Table 8 indicate that opacity is substantially larger in the post-2007 period
compared with the pre-2007 period. When the R-squared is based on a single factor model, substantial
mismeasurement can occur. For the benchmark portfolio of the 50 largest BHCs the underestimation of
the R-squared ranges between 0% and 10%. More important, however, is that ignoring model heterogeneity
for di¤erent banking types can lead to imprecise (but not necessarily incorrect) conclusions. For example,
the di¤erence in R-squared between distressed and sound banks is underestimated (based on a single factor,
market model) by 5 to 10 percent over the period 1999-2002. Based on an extended and more appropriate
model, the di¤erence in opacity and crash risk between distressed and sound banks would be estimated more
precisely. Similarly, in the 4 years prior to the 2007 crisis, the crash risk of broker dealers was underestimated
when measured with a single factor model.
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Finally, omitting important risk factors may lead to biased estimates of market betas. Accurate estimation
of the market beta is important for several reasons. First, the estimate of a banks systematic risk directly
a¤ects the banks cost of capital22 . A second reason is that the estimate of systematic risk may a¤ect the
banks (regulatory) provisions for market risk. Finally, systematic risk is used as a measure of risk in several
studies (see e.g., Stiroh (2006) and Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990)). In these papers, the estimate of
market risk exposure (obtained in a rst step) is used in a second step as a dependent variable, and related
to the riskiness of non-interest related sources of income, or the banks ownership structure. Hence, it is
important that systematic risk is properly measured in the rst step.
Figure 3 shows the divergence in market beta estimated in a benchmark one-factor model versus our
posterior estimates of market risk exposure in the BMA analysis. During the period between 2000 and 2006,
we nd a steady increase in the market beta from 0:5 to 0:9, a nding that has also been documented by
Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam (2012), who report an increase in market beta from 0:4 in 2000 to 1 in
2006. During this period, both market beta estimates are very similar, suggesting a minor role for the other
risk factors. However, during the most recent nancial crisis, we nd that the market beta obtained from a
benchmark one-factor model increases, whereas the BMA market beta decreases; a clearly opposite pattern
(see Figure 3). This suggests that the other risk factors gain in importance, as discussed in Section 4.2.
In the recent crisis, the HML Fama-French factor, an indicator of distress, becomes more important. A
similar pattern emerges during the period of the millennium change, where the market beta estimated in a
one-factor model is overestimated with respect to our BMA estimate, although to a lesser extent.
The gure shows that both measures are not always equal and that the largest di¤erences arise during
periods of market stress, such as the period around the millennium change, and most strikingly during the
recent nancial crisis. In a single factor model, the market beta "absorbs" information contained in the
(missing) risk factors and tends to increase23 . Yet, as is reected by the substantially higher R-squared of
the multifactor model and the many signicant factor exposures, information is lost in this "absorption"
22This paper does not provide evidence on the pricing of the risk factors. To do so, one would need to set up cross sectional
asset pricing tests such as in Fama and French (1992), or in Viale, Kolari, and Fraser (2009) in the empirical banking literature.
However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
23To show this, we also run our time-varying BMA analysis on the twelve factors, in which each of the factors (except the
market factor) is orthogonalized with respect to the market. Even in this setup, some of the other factors are signicant and
the t of the regression is improved, indicating that these factors contain additional information.
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process. We believe that studies trying to understand bank risk should not just relate bank-specic variables
to the market beta, but to exposures of the full set of risk factors that are found to be relevant at a particular
point in time.
6 Conclusion
Banks are exposed to various risks by the nature of their business. Through interconnectedness and contagion,
individual bank defaults may a¤ect nancial system stability and ultimately spill over to the real economy.
Therefore, prudential regulation in the banking industry tries to limit banksrisk taking incentives. However,
regulation did not prevent the 2007  9 crisis. Therefore, it remains important for supervisors to adequately
track bank risk over time. The identication of relevant bank risks and their measurement remains an
important challenge. Therefore we investigate the question: Which risk factors are relevant to which type
of nancial institution at which point in time?
This paper contributes to the literature that measures banking risk as the exposures of bank stock returns
to a set of pre-dened risk factors. We start by arguing that there is no consensus on what the correct set
of risk factors is. The 24 previous papers that we identify relate bank stock returns in various combinations
to no less than 17 di¤erent risk factors. All models include a market and (combinations of di¤erent) interest
rate factor(s).
Factor exposures are typically estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with a xed set of risk
factors. There is, however, considerable uncertainty about what the appropriate set of risk factors is. Missing
important factors may lead to underperforming models at best and wrong conclusions at worst. We apply
an empirical technique, Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), which explicitly takes into account this model
uncertainty. BMA compares all models (potential combinations of the di¤erent risk factors) simultaneously,
instead of focusing on just one specication, and attaches a posterior probability to each model. Individual
factors will only be considered important (have a high posterior inclusion probability) to the extent that the
models in which they appear have a high posterior model probability.
We apply BMA to a benchmark portfolio of Bank Holding Companies, as well as to returns on portfolios of
other types of nancial institutions (insurance companies and broker-dealers) and of Bank Holding Companies
with di¤erent characteristics (large/small, retail/diversied, and sound/distressed BHCs). Our set of 12
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candidate risk factors includes most of the risk factors used in previous papers, as well as some that recently
emerged, such as the implied volatility on S&P500 options (as a measure of sentiment) and the TED spread
(as a measure of nancial sector credit risk).
Full sample (1986 2010) results reveal that the market, real estate, and the high-minus-low (HML) Fama-
French factor are the most important drivers of bank stock returns, with posterior inclusion probabilities close
to 100 percent. The importance and positive and signicant sign of the HML factor exposure is consistent
with the ndings of Liew and Vassalou (2000) that the HML factor is positively (negatively) associated with
news about the future state of the economy (distress risk) that is not captured by the market portfolio.
Given that booming and subsequently rapidly decreasing housing prices were one of the key causes of the
nancial crisis that started in 2007, our nding of a positive and signicant association of our real estate
factor with bank stock returns is a relevant nding for bank supervisors. What is more surprising is that
other factors, and in particular interest rate factors, do not seem to be reliably related to bank stock returns.
This may suggest that changes in the risk factors were largely anticipated by market participants or that
nancial institutions are expected to hedge their associated exposures. Overall, we nd limited evidence
that the relevant set of risk factors varies signicantly across di¤erent types of nancial institutions / BHCs.
Our time-varying analysis shows that our failure to nd signicant exposures to risk factors other than
the market, HML and real estate factor in the full sample is at least to some extent caused by structural
instability in the estimated parameters. Other factors, such as the implied volatility, term spread, and SMB
factor, which remained undetected in the full sample estimations, frequently switch between the onand
o¤state. The optimal number of factors varies between 1 (just the market) and 7, and tends to increase
with market uncertainty. The increase in (adjusted) R-squared from including risk factors other than the
market amounts at times to more than 20 percent (10 percent for our benchmark model). Hence, relevant
bank risk exposures vary over time, which may have implications for bank management (e.g., the cost of
capital), investors (e.g., expected returns from investing in bank stock) and supervisors (e.g., time-varying
exposures of nancial institutions to unexpected economic or nancial market shocks).
A nal section explores the implications of our ndings for empirical banking research based on stock
returns and for bank supervisors. Using a simple simulation exercise, we show that abnormal returns typically
used in event studies are meaningfully a¤ected by a (suboptimal) choice of risk factors, especially in bad
times. Failing to include relevant risk factors also biases residual-based measures of uncertainty (idiosyncratic
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volatility), measures of opaqueness (R-squared), and, as we show, also indicators of systematic risk (betas).
This paper has focused on the set of linear factor models only. Future research could explore non-linear
models as well. Theoretical work by Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003),
and Santos and Veronesi (2004) shows that rm betas may change with the state of the economy and rm
characteristics. Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht (2010) show that the exposures of stock and bond returns
to a set of fundamental factors varies with measures of market sentiment and liquidity. As a rst exploration,
we perform a full sample BMA estimation for our benchmark portfolio on our 12 risk factors, and those same
risk factors interacted with the implied volatility index. We nd the number of linear factors with a PIP
larger than 50 percent to increase (apart from the market, HML, and real estate, also the T-bill rate, term
and default spread). The exposure to the real estate and HML increases with the implied volatility index,
while the exposure to the term and default spread decreases. We leave a full exploration of such nonlinear
models for further research.
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Table 6: Bayesian Model Averaging in the static linear model
This table summarizes estimation results for the static linear model estimated over the full sample (January 1986 to December 2010).
The columns correspond with the eleven portfolios we use. These eleven portfolios are the benchmark series (column 1), four portfolios
of di¤erent types of nancial institutions (columns 2-5) as well as six portfolios of various types of bank holding companies (columns
6-11). For each risk factor-portfolio pair, we report 5 statistics, i.e. the OLS factor exposure and t-statisitc, the BMA factor exposure and
corresponding t-statistic and the Posterior Inclusion Probability.
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Market OLS 0.96 0.86 1.26 1 0.72 1.07 0.23 0.51 0.67 0.33 0.9
tOLS 19.22 17.16 14.89 18.52 17.18 18.75 8.43 18.52 12.41 11.49 21.02
BMA 0.99 0.93 1.27 1.05 0.77 1.11 0.23 0.53 0.74 0.36 0.88
tBMA 24.33 16.18 19.05 22.78 15.56 22.27 7.38 22.69 12.14 9.58 24.43
PIP 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SMB OLS 0.04 -0.06 0.1 0.03 -0.1 -0.21 0.23 0.39 0.51 0.36 0.33
tOLS 0.73 -0.98 1.05 0.42 -2.10 -3.18 7.40 12.24 8.24 11.07 6.71
BMA 0.00 0 0 0 -0.02 -0.22 0.23 0.39 0.52 0.37 0.3
tBMA 0.06 -0.21 0.07 0.02 -0.45 -2.8 7.35 12.57 7.93 10.44 6.17
PIP 3% 6% 3% 3% 21% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HML OLS 1.15 0.93 0.14 0.51 0.61 1.19 0.35 0.61 1.03 0.52 0.97
tOLS 20.06 16.10 1.39 8.18 12.65 18.27 11.19 19.31 16.60 15.92 19.78
BMA 1.14 0.95 0.01 0.51 0.64 1.19 0.35 0.62 1.05 0.53 0.95
tBMA 21.03 17.12 0.17 8.6 13.14 17.95 11.07 19.74 15.58 14.86 19.59
PIP 100% 100% 5% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TB3 OLS -2.37 -2.97 -2.51 -3.14 -1.42 -2.23 -0.17 -0.68 -1.1 -0.84 -2.18
tOLS -3.15 -3.95 -1.98 -3.85 -2.25 -2.60 -0.41 -1.62 -1.34 -1.94 -3.34
BMA -0.69 -0.68 -0.04 -0.75 -0.03 -0.2 0 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.52
tBMA -0.84 -0.68 -0.14 -0.72 -0.14 -0.38 -0.06 -0.3 0.04 -0.15 -0.74
PIP 47% 38% 4% 40% 5% 16% 3% 11% 3% 5% 42%
TS OLS -0.47 -1.26 -0.96 -1.97 -1.86 -0.62 -0.33 0.13 -1.05 -0.34 -0.89
tOLS -0.88 -2.35 -1.06 -3.40 -4.13 -1.02 -1.14 0.43 -1.80 -1.11 -1.93
BMA 0.00 -0.34 0 -0.77 -1.82 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.24 -0.02 -0.06
tBMA -0.03 -0.53 -0.02 -0.85 -4.14 -0.05 -0.15 0.25 -0.47 -0.2 -0.25
PIP 3% 27% 3% 48% 99% 3% 5% 8% 22% 6% 9%
DS OLS 2.17 -0.07 0.21 -0.03 -1.33 2.12 -0.8 0.22 -1.96 -0.18 -0.06
tOLS 1.61 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -1.17 1.38 -1.10 0.29 -1.33 -0.24 -0.05
BMA 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.25 -0.04 0 -0.15 -0.01 0.01
tBMA 0.34 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.16 0.28 -0.17 0.04 -0.22 -0.04 0.07
PIP 13% 3% 3% 3% 5% 10% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3%
TED OLS 0.49 -0.17 -2.42 -1.32 -2.92 0.73 0.51 -0.54 -0.53 -0.69 -0.16
tOLS 0.45 -0.15 -1.32 -1.13 -3.21 0.59 0.88 -0.90 -0.45 -1.12 -0.18
BMA 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0 -0.17 0.11 0 0.04 -0.12 -0.22 0.01
tBMA 0.31 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.37 0.29 0 0.25 -0.32 -0.58 0.06
PIP 12% 4% 3% 3% 16% 11% 4% 9% 12% 30% 4%
DepS OLS -0.91 -1.2 1.97 0.45 1.37 -1.1 -1.7 0.58 -0.5 -0.45 -0.55
tOLS -0.87 -1.14 1.10 0.39 1.55 -0.92 -3.02 1.00 -0.44 -0.74 -0.61
BMA 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 -1.4 0.11 -0.12 -0.27 -0.01
tBMA 0.06 -0.17 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.07 -4.22 0.41 -0.31 -0.65 -0.07
PIP 5% 6% 4% 3% 4% 4% 99% 18% 12% 35% 4%
MMS OLS -0.8 -0.89 -0.94 -1.03 -0.75 -0.87 0.14 -0.33 0.02 -0.21 -0.65
tOLS -2.07 -2.30 -1.43 -2.45 -2.31 -1.97 0.69 -1.57 0.05 -0.97 -1.97
BMA -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.13 0 -0.02 0.02 0 -0.03
tBMA -0.43 -0.24 -0.12 -0.28 -0.12 -0.39 0.1 -0.23 0.15 0 -0.22
PIP 19% 8% 4% 10% 4% 17% 3% 8% 5% 3% 7%
Exchange OLS 0.1 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.12
tOLS 1.50 0.90 2.33 0.93 1.62 1.19 -0.48 0.57 0.49 -0.36 1.94
BMA 0.01 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
tBMA 0.22 0.09 0.38 0.09 0.2 0.16 -0.1 0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.28
PIP 7% 3% 16% 3% 6% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 10%
VXO OLS -0.05 -0.1 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0
tOLS -1.75 -3.58 -1.95 -2.14 -3.46 -1.98 -3.05 -1.68 -1.69 -3.59 0.06
BMA 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0 -0.04 0 -0.01 -0.04 0
tBMA -0.17 -0.89 -0.29 -0.28 -1.35 -0.17 -1.89 -0.18 -0.3 -2.16 0.14
PIP 5% 51% 10% 10% 72% 5% 85% 5% 11% 90% 4%
RE OLS 0.2 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.13
tOLS 7.13 6.06 3.91 7.43 5.65 6.89 3.75 5.78 3.02 2.87 5.65
BMA 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.13
tBMA 7.83 6.02 5.18 8 5.19 6.62 3.14 5.8 1.67 1.21 5.69
PIP 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 81% 67% 100%
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Table 8: Time-Varying BMA Estimation Results
This table summarizes estimation results for the time-varying BMA analysis over the period 1986-2010, using quarterly
rolling windows of two years of weekly data. The table consists of three equally designed panels. The columns correspond
with a risk factor, whereas the rows correspond with a bank type. Panel A (top panel) shows for each bank type-risk factor
pair the percentage of observations with a PIP larger than 50 percent. In panel B, we report a marginal R-squared. The
latter is calculated as the average (over time) di¤erence in (model weighted) R-squared between a model that does and one
that does not include a particular risk factor, conditional on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP larger than
50 percent. Finally, the lower panel C contains for each bank type-risk factor pair the average factor exposure, conditional
on the pair having a PIP > 50 percent. In each panel, we also report for each risk factor the average and the interquartile
range of the results for the eleven portfolios.
Market SMB HML TB3 TS DS TED DepS MMS FX VXO RE
Panel A: Percentage of PIPs >50%
Largest 50 0.93 0.36 0.65 0.16 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.26
Depository 0.96 0.43 0.64 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.15 0.08
Insurance 0.97 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.16
Broker Dealers 0.99 0.34 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.36
Other 1.00 0.33 0.45 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.45
Largest 15 0.93 0.43 0.63 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.35
Smallest 50 0.66 0.74 0.63 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.26
Sound 0.98 0.78 0.70 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.21
Distressed 0.85 0.79 0.77 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.20
Retail 0.85 0.78 0.74 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.15
Diversied 1.00 0.68 0.73 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.25
mean 0.92 0.54 0.58 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.25
IQR 0.14 0.44 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.19
Panel B: Contribution to R-squared
Largest 50 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Depository 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Insurance 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Broker Dealers 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Other 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Largest 15 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Smallest 50 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Sound 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Distressed 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03
Retail 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01
Diversied 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
mean 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
IQR 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Panel C: Beta
Largest 50 0.91 0.33 1.10 -1.74 -2.53 7.99 18.52 -26.48 2.52 0.34 -0.22 0.31
Depository 0.99 0.42 1.11 -1.06 -4.13 NaN 29.33 -31.59 0.64 -0.18 -0.36 0.21
Insurance 1.40 0.90 0.41 NaN -2.37 NaN 1.07 -1.72 -3.21 0.49 -0.32 0.49
Broker Dealers 1.09 0.38 0.77 -2.96 -4.16 16.33 22.91 -50.92 -3.02 -0.35 -0.42 0.29
Other 0.82 0.21 0.70 -3.11 -3.15 3.00 -13.24 -10.56 NaN 0.26 0.02 0.21
Largest 15 1.02 -0.15 1.26 -1.57 -4.56 8.38 25.74 -20.68 -0.05 0.31 -0.22 0.33
Smallest 50 0.38 0.39 0.46 -2.48 -1.40 -0.83 4.48 -3.77 -0.63 -0.25 -0.11 0.18
Sound 0.50 0.47 0.54 -0.38 -1.86 3.64 4.23 3.21 1.00 0.08 -0.12 0.16
Distressed 0.73 0.74 1.00 -2.92 -1.77 4.75 -3.12 -2.52 1.95 -0.27 -0.22 0.21
Retail 0.39 0.47 0.52 0.97 -1.33 -1.51 1.68 -2.95 0.46 -0.07 -0.07 0.15
Diversied 0.85 0.47 0.92 -2.78 -2.76 6.39 12.12 -22.19 1.49 0.05 -0.01 0.24
mean 0.83 0.42 0.80 -1.80 -2.73 5.35 9.43 -15.47 0.11 0.04 -0.19 0.25
IQR 0.52 0.14 0.58 2.04 2.36 7.10 21.84 23.96 2.83 0.56 0.24 0.13
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Figure 2: Number of Factors and Marginal R2: Cross-sectional and Time variation
This Figure plots at each point in time the optimal number of factors (left axis) as well as the contribution of other factors than the market
to the total (adjusted) R-squared (dotted line, scale on the right axis). Panel A reports results for our benchmark portfolio of the 50 largest
BHCs, Panel B for the 4 cross-sectional portfolios of di¤erent types of nancial institutions, and Panel C for di¤erent types of BHCs.
Panel A: 50 Largest BHCs
Panel B: Cross-section of Financial Institutions
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Panel C: Cross-section of BHCs
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Figure 3: Estimates of the market beta in the benchmark one-factor model and in the BMA analysis
This Figure plots the market exposure obtained via two di¤erent approaches. The solid line depicts the time-varying market
beta from a single factor model. The dashed line depicts the exposure to market risk estimated in the BMA analysis with eleven
additional factors. The beta reported for a given quarter is obtained by using weekly stock returns of the preceding two years.
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1 Correlated Regressors
One issue of potential concern is that the independent variables included in the analysis are correlated.
This multicollinearity issue is best addressed by investigating the cross correlation matrix, displayed in
Table 1.
<Insert Table 1 here>
From this matrix we can see that the market factor has a correlation of  69% with VXO and 65%
with real estate. Moreover, the 3 Month Treasury Bill rate has a correlation of  47% with the TERM
spread. The correlation between the liquidity related variables is also rather high. The correlation of the
TED spread with DepS and MMS is 87% and  39% respectively, and the correlation of DepS with MMS
is  28%. Hence, it seems that at least for some variables, the interdependencies between them might be
an issue. We address the issue of collinearity in three ways.
Principal Components Analysis and Orthogonalization A rst solution to deal with the correla-
tion between the regressors is to use principal components analysis (PCA) to extract the rst principal
component of a set of related variables. Arguably, the TED spread, DepS (capturing funding need in the
deposit market) and MMS (capturing funding need in the money market) are closely related variables,
capturing some aspect of liquidity risk. We run a PCA on these three variables and retain only the rst
principal component. The rst principal component explains almost 70% of the variation in the variables
and has a coe¢ cient of  0:66 on the TED spread,  0:64 on DepS and 0:40 on MMS. Moreover, the mar-
ket factor has a strong correlation with the implied volatility index ( 69%) and the Real Estate factor
(65%). Therefore, we orthogonalize both variables with respect to the market factor, and use the residuals
instead. The resulting correlations of these adjusted regressors with the other regressors is reported in
the lower part of Table 1.
Table 2 reproduces the OSL and BMA results of the baseline regression reported in the paper. In
addition, in the middle panel, we display the OLS and BMA results on the set of modied regressors. Our
conclusions regarding the importance of each of the variables remains the same. The posterior inclusion
probability of the rst principal component of liquidity is 15%. Moreover, the results remain unchanged
for the VIX and the real estate factor. For the other variables, the order of magnitude of the estimated
regression coe¢ cients and the posterior inclusions probabilities is similar.
<Insert Table 2 here>
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Collinearity Adjusted Dilution Prior (George (2010)) First, we modify our model priors, such
that models with correlated regressors get a lower prior model probability. We check the robustness of our
results with respect to the dilution prior of George (2010). The model prior in equation 7 (in the paper)
implicitly assumes that the probability that one regressor appears in the model is independent of the
inclusion of others, whereas regressors are typically correlated. George (2010) argues that the assumption
of prior independent inclusion of regressors is too strict. The model prior that gives equal prior probability
to all models does not take into account similarity of models. This implies that these model priors assign
too much probability to neighborhoods of redundant models. As a result, good but unique models will
receive too little weight, whereas bad but similar models receive too much weight. George (2010) accounts
for this by introducing a dilution prior. This type of prior assigns lower prior probability to models with
correlated regressors. Hence, modifying the model priors is an ex ante way of correcting for the correlation
between regressors. More specically, the prior probability of each model M (k), is downweighted using
the collinearity in x(k)2 (George (2010)). Dene R
(k) to be the correlation matrix of x(k)2 . Note that jR(k)j
is an overall measure of collinearity. For jR(k)j = 1, the columns of x(k)2 are orthogonal. The lower jR(k)j,
the greater the redundancy in a model M (k). Therefore, one can use this measure to alter equation 7 (in
the paper) as follows
p(M (k)) = h(jR(k)j)  1
K
where h(.) is a monotone function satisfying h(1) = 1 and h(0) = 0. Here, h(.) is modelled as h(r) = r.
In the lower panel of Table 2, we replicate the resuls in the upper panel of Table 2 with the dilution
prior of George (2010). We can see that our conclusion with respect to the importance of our regressors
and the estimated coe¢ cients remain the same.
References
George, E. I., 2010, Dilution priors: Compensating for model space redundancy, IMS Collections,
Borrowing Strength: Theory Powering Applications â¼AS¸ A Festschrift for Lawrence D. Brown, 6, 158
165.
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Table 1: Cross correlations of the independent variables
This table shows the cross correlations between the independent variables. In the upper part of the table, we report
the correlation matrix of the factors included in the baseline setup. In the lower part of the table, we report the
correlation matrix after making two adjustments. The TED spread, DepS (capturing funding need in the deposit
market) and MMS (capturing funding need in the money market) are closely related variables. All three variables
are capturing some aspect of liquidity risk. Therefore, we run a principal components analysis on these three
variables and retain only the rst principal component. The rst principal component explains almost 70 per cent
of the variation in the variables and has a coe¢ cient of 0.62 on the TED spread, 0.63 on DepS and -0.40 on MMS.
Moreover, the market factor has a strong correlation with the implied volatility index (-0.69) and the Real Estate
factor (0.65). Hence, we orthogonalize both variables with respect to the market factor, and use the residuals
instead. The correlation coe¢ cients of these three adjusted regressors with respect to the others is displayed in the
lower part of the this table.
Correlation matrix
Market SMB HML TB3 TS DS TED DepS MMS FX VXO
SMB -0.01
HML -0.25 -0.20
TB3 0.14 0.14 -0.08
TS -0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.47
DS -0.13 -0.13 0.01 -0.06 -0.06
TED -0.17 -0.07 0.04 -0.54 0.42 0.08
DepS -0.15 -0.07 0.06 -0.52 0.45 0.04 0.87
MMS 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.39 -0.28
FX -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.00
VXO -0.69 -0.08 0.11 -0.33 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.16 -0.01 0.08
RE 0.65 0.22 0.06 0.13 0.00 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 0.01 -0.07 -0.51
Correlation matrix (after PCA and orthogonalisation)
Market SMB HML TB3 TS DS PC(LIQ) FX VXO ?
PC(LIQ) -0.14 -0.06 0.03 -0.46 0.42 0.07 0.01
VXO ? -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.32 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.02
RE ? 0.01 0.30 0.29 0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.12
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Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis
Valerie De Bruyckere  Maria Gerhardt Glenn Schepens Rudi Vander Vennet
Abstract
This paper investigates contagion between bank risk and sovereign risk in Europe over the period
2006-2011. We dene contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns
over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign
level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specic as well as
country-specic variables and their interaction. We provide empirical evidence that various contagion
channels are at work, including a strong home bias in bank bond portfolios, using the EBA's disclosure
of sovereign exposures of banks. We nd that banks with a weak capital and/or funding position are
particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver
of contagion.
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The most serious threat to nancial stability in the European Union stems from the inter-
play between the vulnerabilities of public nances in certain EU member states and the banking
system, with potential contagion effects across the Union and beyond.
Jean-Claude Trichet, 22th of June 2011, ESRB1
1. Introduction
Due to the absence of a common European policy framework for handling the banking crisis as well as miss-
ing bank resolution mechanisms, several European governments were forced to respond at the national level
by rescuing troubled banks headquartered in their countries during the nancial crisis. Various measures
have been taken, ranging from equity injections in troubled banks to the setting-up of bad banks (Petrovic
and Tutsch (2009)). Invariably, these rescue operations have increased national debt burdens and caused a
deterioration of public nances. One consequence of the risk transfer from the private sector to sovereign
treasuries has been an increased interdependence of banks and states, causing negative feedback loops be-
tween their nancial conditions. With the rise of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the link between bank-
and country risk has intensied further, especially for the countries that were quickly identied as vulnerable,
namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the GIIPS countries). This increased interdependence is
illustrated in the gures in appendix. The gures depict the country CDS spread and the average bank CDS
spread for the countries in our sample. They illustrate that there is a lot of heterogeneity in both the level of
the sovereign and bank CDS spreads and in the comovement between the sovereign and bank spreads. The
link between the risk prole of banks and countries in which they are headquartered varies over time and
is partly inuenced by shocks in the economy or the banking system. A major shock stemming from the
banking system was the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which provoked a substantial in-
crease of CDS spreads for banks and also for certain countries, typically smaller countries with large banks
or countries where banks had to be rescued. The sovereign debt crisis further intensied the link between
bank- and country risk. The sovereign debt crisis is usually considered to have started at the end of 2009,
when the newly elected Greek government announced that the country's budget decit was much larger than
previously reported. In the case of Greece, two bailout packages were put together under the surveillance
of the "troika" (IMF, ECB, European Commission), one of them including a substantial write-off of Greek
1 http://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/2011/html/is110622.en.html
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debt in the books of private investors. Later, further rescue packages were implemented for Portugal and
Ireland, all under the supervision of the troika. A series of credit rating downgrades of the affected countries
followed, causing bond and CDS spreads to widen considerably, as shown, e.g., in the Global Financial
Stability Reports of the IMF.2
During the sovereign debt crisis, banks in Europe were and remain confronted with stress in their capital
and liquidity positions. A substantial number of banks had to rebuild their capital buffers after the losses they
innitially incurred in their securities (mainly asset-backed) and lending portfolios, especially those with real
estate exposures. A general lack of trust hampered the access of banks to money market funding, which was
eventually alleviated, at least temporarily, by non-conventional longer-term renancing operations set up
by the ECB. Further, the European Banking Authority (EBA) decided to conduct a sovereign stress testing
exercise and required that banks execute detailed capital rebuilding plans before mid-2012. The disclosure
of detailed information on banks' exposures to sovereign risk in the EBA (and former CEBS) stress testing
exercises provided valuable information to market participants to gauge the risk prole of European banks.
Overall, the consequence of the continued stress in the banking system and the vulnerability of certain Eu-
ropean sovereigns is that the nancial conditions of banks and sovereigns became increasingly intertwined.
Considering this increased interaction between sovereign and bank credit risk, the objective of this paper
is twofold. First, we analyze whether we nd empirical evidence of contagion. We investigate the time-
varying intensity of the risk spillovers using excess correlations as our preferred contagion metric. Second,
we attempt to explain the contagion effect by investigating the relationship between excess bank/sovereign
correlations and both bank and country characteristics. While there have been several papers investigating
the determinants of either bank risk or sovereign risk in isolation, there is less evidence on the potential
mutual contagion effects. By analyzing a number of relevant variables and the interplay between bank and
country characteristics, we are able to identify critical interactions that are related to bank/country contagion.
This allows us to tackle a series of relevant policy questions concerning the banking system as well as the
nancial condition of sovereigns.
The main ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. We document signicant empirical ev-
idence of contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk during the European sovereign debt crisis. In
2009, when the sovereign debt crisis emerged, we nd signicant spillovers for 86% of the banks in our
sample. Second, given the home bias in banks' government exposures, i.e. their typically larger expo-
2Throughout the paper we use the terms contagion and risk spillover interchangeably.
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sure towards the home sovereign, we provide empirical evidence conrming the expectation that contagion
between banks and their home country is stronger. Third, we nd that the degree of contagion is signi-
cantly linked to bank capital adequacy, and this effect is economically very signicant. Furthermore, the
higher a bank's reliance on short-term funding sources, the higher the intensity of spillovers between banks
and sovereigns. Making use of the EBA stress test disclosures, which include bank-specic information
on banks' sovereign debt holdings, we conrm that higher sovereign debt holdings are associated with a
stronger bank-sovereign contagion. This suggests that the disclosures made in the context of the EBA stress
tests have increased the degree of transparency of bank risk exposures and that market participants use this
information to assess the creditworthiness of banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on contagion and
more specically the European sovereign debt crisis. In Section 3 we describe the data and the methodology.
Section 4 reports our empirical ndings, including robustness checks. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions
and policy implications.
2. Bank/Sovereign Contagion: Literature Overview
This paper is closely related to three strands of the existing literature. First, our paper is linked to work on the
emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis and the transmission channels through which it propagates.
Second, our empirical analysis is closely related to work on nancial contagion. The third strand of relevant
literature investigates the risk prole of bank business models.
Regarding the risk transmission channels, BIS (2011b) identies four main channels through which
sovereign risk can have an impact on nancial institutions. First, there is an asset holdings channel, since
the asset side of banks' balance sheets may directly be weakened through losses on holdings of sovereign
debt. This channel is investigated by Angeloni and Wolff (2012), who study whether banks' sovereign
exposure to GIIPS countries had an effect on their stock market values. They nd that banks' market
performance in the period July to October 2011 was impacted by Greek debt holdings, and in October to
December 2011 by Italian and Irish sovereign exposures. Spanish exposure did not appear to have an impact
on banks' stock market values. On the relationship between sovereign risk and bank risk, Kyle and Wirick
(1990) test whether the August 1982 advent of the Latin American debt crisis affected the implicit value
of commercial bank equities. They nd indeed that the market value of banks with major Latin American
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loan exposure was signicantly reduced.The second transmission channel is a collateral channel. Sovereign
risk can potentially spread to banks when the value of collateral that banks hold in the form of sovereign
debt is reduced. This relates to studies such as Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Kaminsky et al. (2003), who
describe how negative shocks in one market can directly affect collateral values or cash ows associated
with securities in other markets. Related to this, a rating channel may impact banks' funding conditions,
since downgrades of sovereigns may inuence the rating of domestic banks negatively. This may in turn
affect banks' funding costs and possibly worsen their access to money market and deposit markets. Arezki
et al. (2011), for example, focus on European sovereigns between 2007 and 2010 and show that sovereign
rating downgrades cause a signicant spillover, both across markets and countries. Finally, the guarantee
channel is related to the too-big-to-fail status of some large banks. When the scal position of sovereigns is
weakened, implicit and explicit government guarantees might lose value, making it harder for the nancial
sector to derive benets from such guarantees.
In line with the guarantee channel, Brown and Dinc (2011) provide evidence that a country's ability
to support its nancial sector, as reected in its public decit, affects its treatment of distressed banks.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) nd that in 2008 systemically large banks saw a reduction in their
market valuation in countries running large scal decits, as these banks became too big to save. When
governments bail out banks, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) show that there can be a `credit risk transfer'. Explor-
ing the developments of CDS spreads for Euro area countries and banks from January 2008 to June 2009,
they show that the bailouts during that period caused a credit risk shift from the banking to the sovereign
sector, with banks' CDS spreads decreasing at the expense of increasing sovereign risk spreads. Alter and
Schuler (2012) also focus on bank bailouts during the recent nancial crisis in Europe. They use a vector
error correction framework to analyze price discovery mechanism of CDS spreads prior to and after gov-
ernment rescue packages. Their main results state that before bank bailouts, increased bank default risk was
transmitted to sovereign CDS, yet the impact the other way around was weak. They further nd that after
bank rescues, increased sovereign default risk does have an impact on banks' CDS spreads.
We contribute to the literature on risk transmission channels by analyzing different credit risk trans-
mission channels. First, we use detailed sovereign bond holdings data - collected from the EBA stress test
reports - to better identify the asset holdings channel. Further, we focus on the collateral channel by investi-
gating the impact of bank funding structures. The guarantee channel is addressed by including data on bank
size relative to the GDP of the country where it is headquartered.
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Second, this study is closely related to existing work on nancial contagion. The literature on conta-
gion is very broad; excellent overviews can be found in Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), Dungey et al. (2005)
and Pesaran and Pick (2007). We are particularly interested in default risk contagion at the bank and the
sovereign level. As mentioned by Caporin et al. (2012), recent research on sovereign credit contagion es-
pecially focused on the relationship between sovereign risk and common global and nancial factors (see,
e.g., Kamin and von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (2000), Mauro et al. (2002), Pan and Singleton
(2008), Longstaff et al. (2011) and Ang and Longstaff (2011)). At the bank level, there exists a vast literature
on systemic risk, which is closely related to contagion, since systemic risk usually refers to situations where
multiple nancial institutions fail as a result of a common shock or a contagion process (Allen et al. (2010)).
For an excellent overview on this topic, we refer to Allen et al. (2009). Papers looking at contagion between
the sovereign and the banking level, however, are rather scarce as this topic only recently gained importance
during the European debt crisis (see Angeloni and Wolff (2012), Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2011), Alter and Schuler (2012), Acharya et al. (2012), Alter and Beyer (2012), Gross and
Kok (2012) and Bosma and Wedow (2012)). Acharya et al. (2012), for example, provide empirical evidence
of a two-way feedback between nancial and sovereign credit risk during the recent crisis. They nd evi-
dence for widening sovereign spreads and narrowing bank spreads shortly after a bailout, but signicantly
higher comovement in the long term. Finally, sovereign credit risk is found to be related to the crash risk of
the euro. Hui and Chung (2011) investigate the relationship and nd that the impact of sovereign credit risk
on crash risk is mainly driven by individual euro-area countries with weaker scal positions.
We add to this part of the literature by documenting the evolution of risk spillovers between the sovereign
and the banking sector during the recent nancial crisis and by explaining differences in spillovers based on
observable characteristics of banks and sovereigns.
Finally, this paper relates to an extensive literature on the impact of bank business models on their risk
prole. Previous studies primarily focused on the impact of business model characteristics on idiosyncratic
or systematic bank risk. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) focus on US banks between 1984 and 1994 and nd
that lower capitalized banks are at greater risk of failure, as are banks with low earnings. Stiroh (2004),
Stiroh (2010) and Baele et al. (2007) investigate the link between non-interest income and risk-taking. Oth-
ers focus on the impact of funding structure on bank risk. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that institutional
investors tend to be relatively sophisticated compared to depositors and hence are expected to provide more
market discipline. The recent crisis also brought out the dark side of bank wholesale funding, as described
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by Huang and Ratnovski (2011). They show that in an environment with a costless but noisy public signal
about bank quality, short-term wholesale nanciers have lower incentives to monitor, and instead may with-
draw based on negative public news, which could lead to severe funding problems for banks. Related to this,
several recent studies have linked these business models to bank performance and riskiness during the recent
nancial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) nd that banks heavily
relying on wholesale funding were perceived as being more risky by the market during the recent nancial
crisis. Altunbas et al. (2011) conrm these ndings and also show that undercapitalization was a major
driver of bank distress. Ayadi et al. (2011) screen 26 major European banks for their business models before
and after the crisis and conclude that wholesale banks had the worst performance and were most likely to
receive state support, whereas retail banks exhibit less risk with a more stable performance. We contribute
to this part of the literature by investigating the impact of bank business models on their vulnerability to
contagion risk, which became particularly important during the European sovereign debt crisis. Rather than
focussing on idiosyncratic or systematic bank risk, we are interested in business models that can allow banks
to minimize contagion exposure.
3. Data & Methodology
3.1. Measuring credit risk
To make inference on contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk, we make use of the spreads on
credit default swaps. CDS contracts are bilateral swap agreements that represent a protection provided by
the CDS seller to the buyer. The seller engages to compensate the buyer in case of the occurrence of a
pre-dened credit event.3 The buyer makes regular payments to the seller, the so-called CDS spread, and in
return receives a compensation for his loss in case of a credit event. Given the setup of CDS agreements,
their spreads capture the credit risk of the underlying asset. An important feature of CDS quotes is that
CDS markets react instantly to changes in credit risk. Hence, the premia reect market perceptions in real
time, as opposed to rating agencies, for instance, which may take a broader view before changing ratings
of entities. Alternative indicators of sovereign and bank credit risk are government and bank bond yields.
As mentioned by Aizenman et al. (2011), CDS spreads have three main advantages compared to sovereign
3CDS are typically based on the standard industry terms for credit events, as dened by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). For further information, see http://www.isda.org.
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bond spreads. First, CDS spreads provide timelier market-based pricing. Second, using CDS spreads avoids
the difculty in dealing with time to maturity as in the case of using interest rate spreads (of which the zero
coupon bonds would be preferred). Third, bond spreads include ination expectations and demand/supply
for lending conditions as well as default risk. As we explicitly want to capture default risk, we focus on CDS
spreads. Similar to previous studies on CDS spreads (e.g. Aizenman et al. (2011), Alter and Schuler (2012),
Anderson (2011) and Barrios et al. (2009)), we use CDS spreads on 5-year senior debt contracts, since these
are known to be the most actively traded and therefore most liquid ones. All CDS quotes are obtained from
Bloomberg, CMA.4 We obtain CDS spread series for 15 countries5 and for more than 50 banks over the
years 2006-2011. The number of banks in our sample increases over time due to data availability. The CDS
spread series are transformed into arithmetic returns. We impose strict liquidity criteria to ensure that the
CDS spread changes reect meaningful information on bank and sovereign credit risk. More specically,
we only retain CDS spread changes during a certain quarter if at least 70% of observations are non-zero
during the quarter.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the CDS spread changes for both sovereigns and banks. The
volatility of sovereign credit risk was highest during 2008, for the banks covered in our sample volatility
was highest during 2007 and 2008.
3.2. Measuring contagion
The concept of contagion is difcult to grasp and there exist several different methodological approaches
to analyze contagion. The rst important question is: How to identify contagion? Constancio (2012) lists
four criteria that have been used in the literature to dene contagion, namely: "(i) the transmission is in
excess of what can be explained by economic fundamentals; (ii) the transmission is different from regular
adjustments observed in tranquil times; (iii) the events constituting contagion are negative extremes; (iv) the
transmission is sequential, for example in a causal sense." There is no agreement in the literature on a single
4Credit Market Analysis. CMA receives quotes for credit instruments from large investors active in over-the-counter markets.
Different sources are aggregated and combined by CMA to calculate one average quote. We use daily end-of-day London prices.
Mayordomo, Peña and Schwartz (2010) nd that the CMA quotes lead the price discovery process in comparison to quotes provided
by other databases (GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, Market or JP Morgan). Leland (2009) mentions that CDS spreads from Bloomberg
are frequently revised weeks after, and often disagree substantially with Datastream CDS spreads.
5The 15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the UK, Norway and Switzerland.
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denition, however the rst criterion, which is mainly attributed to Bekaert et al. (2005), has been widely
used, and this is also the one we focus on in our study.6
As discussed in the introduction, we are interested in potential contagion between sovereign and bank
default risk. The risk transfer from the private to the public sector through bank rescue schemes during
the recent nancial crisis has increased bank and sovereign interdependence. Furthermore, the exposure of
banks to governments through sovereign debt and the potential lower probability of future bailouts for banks
due to deteriorating public nances are additional reasons to expect higher interconnectedness between
banks and states. An intuitive starting point to measure this potential increase in interdependence could
be looking at simple correlations between two default risk indicators. However, simple correlations during
crisis periods could be misleading, as one would simply expect higher correlations during periods of higher
volatility (see Boyer et al. (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). Following Bekaert et al. (2005), we
dene contagion as excess correlation, which is correlation over and above what one would expect from
economic fundamentals. By dening a factor model in the rst stage of our analysis, we avoid problems with
the bias correction for correlations that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose. Assuming that CDS spreads
are adequate credit risk proxies and assuming that CDS spread changes follow a linear factor structure,
increased correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk can be driven by three potential sources (also
see Anderson (2011)): (i) an increase in exposure of CDS spread changes to common factors, (ii) increased
correlation between the common factors, and (iii) an increase in the correlation between unexplained CDS
spread changes, which is what we label as contagion. More specically, the correlation between CDS spread
changes of a bank b and a country c can be decomposed as follows:
E[CDSb;tCDS
0
c;t] = E[(bF
0 + "b;t)(cF
0 + "c;t)0]
= bE[F
0F ]0c + E["b;t"
0
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The excess correlation between a bank b and a country c is then dened as
6The difculty of identifying contagion is not only present in academic literature, but practitioners and bankers face the same
challenge. In 2009, the Fitch Global Credit Derivatives Survey revealed that many banks were surprised by the sovereign-bank
contagion that built up in the markets during the previous year. In particular, "market participants, when referring to contagion,
highlight the speed at which credit spreads widened, particularly for nancial institutions and sovereigns, the volatility of credit
spreads, the unanticipated convergence in correlation values across asset classes and the heightened perception of counterparty risk
which resulted in many institutions refusing to deal with other ones in the nancial markets."
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Hence, we investigate the presence of contagion between banks and countries by considering excess
correlation, which is the correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk over and above what can be
explained by fundamental factors. When the jump in correlation is fully driven by fundamental factors,
we expect the excess correlations to be zero. However, when bank and sovereign CDS spreads are still
correlated after controlling for fundamental factors, we see this as evidence of contagion between the bank
and the country level.
In order to address these common risk factors, we condition CDS spreads on four state variables. To
control for market-wide credit risk, we include the iTraxx Europe index7, an index constructed as the equally
weigthed average of the 125 most liquid CDS series in the European market. A higher iTraxx indicates
a higher overall default risk in the economy, thus we expect a positive relationship between the iTraxx
index and the bank and sovereign CDS spreads. To control for market-wide business climate changes in the
European Union, we include Datastream's total stock market index for the EU8. A better overall business
climate should reduce default probabilities and hence we expect a negative sign for the stock market index in
our factor models. The third common factor is the Vstoxx9 volatility index, capturing market expectations of
volatility in the Eurozone (also see, e.g., Berndt et al. (2005), Tang and Yan (2010)). This index is generally
perceived as a market sentiment or investor fear indicator. The higher the volatility, the higher the economic
uncertainty. We thus expect a positive relation between credit spreads and market volatility. Finally, we
control for market expectations about future conditions in the nancial market, measured with the Term
Spread. The term spread is calculated as the difference between the 10-year government bond yield for each
country and the 1-year Euribor rate. We expect a negative relationship between the term spread and CDS
spreads. All state variables are obtained from Datastream and transformed into arithmetic returns, except
for the term spread, which we include in rst differences.
7DS mnemonic "DIXE5EC". Both nancial and non-nancial rms are included. In order to be consistent with our bank and
sovereign CDS data, we use the index that is based on 5-year maturity assets with end-of-day quotes.
8DS mnemonic "TOTMKEU". It mirrors all EU stock markets, not only the nancial sector.
9DS mnemonic "VSTOXXI". The calculation of the VSTOXX is based on option prices for EURO STOXX 50, which incorpo-
rates stocks from 50 supersector leaders from 12 Eurozone countries. For more information, see: http://www.stoxx.com.
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With the above selection of state variables, the regression specication of the factor model looks as
follows:
CDSi;t = c+ 1 Markett + 2  Itraxxt + 3  V stoxxt + 4  Termt + "i;t (1)
where CDSi;t is the change in CDS spread for bank or country i,Market is the stock market index
for the EU, Itraxx is the iTraxx Europe CDS index, V stoxx is the a volatility index and Term is the
term spread. To control for possible time variation in the exposures we run this factor model for every year
in the sample separately. This way, we obtain time-varying coefcient estimates. In Section 4.3, we redo
our analysis for two alternative specications of the factor model: (i) we run the factor models including
the Itraxx index as the only state variable, and (ii) we take a different choice of the regression windows,
coinciding with major credit events in the CDS market. The main results remain unaltered.
The above analysis allows us to investigate whether, on a year-by-year basis, there is contagion between
all bank/sovereign pairs. However, we are also interested in how this contagion evolves over time. To
formally test whether changes in excess correlation are statistically signicant, we make use of the Fisher
transformation of (excess) correlation coefcients. We denote with corr the correlation between a bank and
a country (the home country or another country). The Fisher transformed correlation is then given by corr
corrb;c = 0:5  log(j
(1 + corrb;c)
(1  corrb;c) j)
The standard error or corrb;c is given by
1p
N 3 whereN is the number of observations. The test-statistic
for the difference between two measures of (excess) correlation corrb;c (labeled the Z-statistic) is given by
Zt1;t2 =
(corrt1   corrt2)r
1p
Nt1 3
+ 1Nt2 3
where Nt1 is the number of observations during the rst period, and Nt2 the number of observations
during the second period. The Z-statistic is normally distributed, and hence signicance can be assessed
with the usual test statistics.
3.3. Explaining contagion
Once we have established the presence of contagion between sovereign and bank credit risk, we take the
analysis a step further by investigating bank- and country-specic characteristics that could be driving this
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excess correlation. For each country-bank combination in our sample, we calculate excess correlations on
a quarterly basis using daily CDS data10. This is the dependent variable of interest in our panel analysis.
Throughout the analysis, we exploit the fact that we have multiple observations (i.e. excess correlations
with different countries) for each bank at each point in time. This allows us to look at the impact of country-
specic characteristics while making abstraction of bank-specic factors. Similarly, since we have multiple
observations for each country at each point in time, we are able to analyze the impact of bank-specic
characteristics on the bank-country relationship.
We start by exploring cross-sectional differences between bank-country excess correlations by focussing
on bank balance sheet characteristics. For example, we hypothesize that banks with higher capital adequacy
levels are better able to withstand nancial shocks, lowering the expected correlation between the bank and
country level. To identify the impact of bank-specic factors we regress the excess correlations on a vector
of bank-specic characteristics11 and a home/foreign country time xed effect. By using this three-way
xed effect, we can compare the excess correlation of bank i with country j to the excess correlation of
another bank k - located in the same country z as bank i - with country j at the same point in time. This
way, the variation left in the country-bank correlations can only be related to bank-specic differences. The
specication thus looks as follows:
Corri;j;t = + 1  Zi;t + z;j;t + "i;j;t (2)
where Corri;j;t is the excess correlation between bank i and country j at time t, Zi;t is a vector of bank-
specic variables and z;j;t is a three-way xed effect, which addresses differences over time at the home
and foreign country level.
In a next step we use a similar setup to analyze the potential impact of country-specic characteristics.
We start by analyzing whether domestic banks have a stronger relation with the sovereign, by looking at the
impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads on excess correlations, and by focusing on whether bank-specic
characteristics can change the impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads. We use the following specication:
Corri;j;t = + 1 Homei;j + 2  CDSj;t + 3  CDSj;t Xi;t + i;t + "i;j;t (3)
10We calculate excess correlations at quarterly frequency since this is the highest frequency for which we have bank balance
sheet data available. The balance sheet data is linked to correlations in a later step.
11More detailed information on the bank-specic variables that we use can be found below in part 3.4 Bank- and country-specic
factors
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where Xi;t is a vector of bank-specic variables , CDSj;t is the sovereign CDS spread of country
j at time t , Homei;j is a dummy variable, which equals one when bank i is located in country j , i;t
is a bank-time xed effect and "i;j;t is the error term. By using bank-time xed effects, we can compare
the relationship of the same bank with different countries at the same point in time. In other words, by
using bank-time xed effects we ensure that the variation left in the excess correlations can be attributed to
country-specic factors. We expect the home dummy coefcient to be positive and signicant for several
reasons. First, banks tend to have a strong home bias in their government bond portfolios, making them
more vulnerable to home country shocks. Second, when banks get into distress, the probability of a bailout
of that bank increases. As bailouts are typically nanced by the home country of the bank, this can cause a
contagion effect. Related to this, a government in a weak scal position is less likely to step in when things
go wrong in the banking sector, potentially increasing the credit risk of the nancial institutions in the home
country. Fourth, problems at the sovereign level may lead to scal consolidation, which, although potentially
benecial in the long term, may lead to lower economic activity in the short term, which could increase loan
losses and hence bank credit risk (Avdjiev and Caruana (2012)).We also expect that higher default risk at
the country level will lead to higher excess correlations. Bank default risk is more likely to be related to
sovereign default risk when sovereigns are in distress situations than when default risk at the sovereign level
is low. We are also interested in whether some bank business models are better in withstanding sovereign
distress than others. Therefore, we also interact the sovereign CDS spread with a set of bank business model
characteristics.
In a following step, we consider the actual exposures of banks towards European countries and analyze
whether these exposures have a direct impact on the contagion variable. We apply a similar setup as in
equation 3. We focus on sovereign debt exposures, for which we have data available from the EBA stress
test reports since mid-2010. We hypothesize that a bank's default risk is more strongly correlated with a
country's default risk when the bank has a higher exposure to that country.
In a last step, we focus on country-specic factors that could be driving the relationship between sov-
ereign CDS spreads and the excess correlations. We hypothesize that a banks' default risk is more strongly
correlated with countries that have higher debt-to-GDP ratios, higher government revenues in percentage of
GDP, a larger banking sector (in percentage of GDP) and a less optimistic economic sentiment indicator.
We again expect this effect to be stronger towards the home country, which is why we also interact each of
these variables with the home country dummy. The regression specication looks as follows:
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Corri;j;t = + 1 Homei;j + 2 Xj;t + 3 Homei;j Xj;t + i;t + "i;j;t (4)
whereXj;t is a vector of country-specic variables12. By using bank-time xed effects, we can compare
the relationship of the same bank with different countries at the same point in time.
3.4. Bank- and country-specic factors
An important contribution of our paper is to investigate the relationship between bank/sovereign contagion
and the characteristics of the banks and countries involved. For the banks in the sample, we use a variety
of measures intended to capture their business model. Consequently, we focus on indicators of their retail
orientation, funding structure, diversication and, especially, the banks' capital adequacy (see Baele et al.
(2012), Altunbas et al. (2011), Ayadi et al. (2011)). For countries, the selected variables focus on debt
sustainability and business cycle conditions. Bank-specic data is mainly taken from Thomson Reuters
Worldscope database; country-specic series are taken from a range of other sources (Eurostat, Oxford
Economics, ECB statistical data warehouse). Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table
3.
The rst bank-specic variable we consider is bank size, measured as the ratio of each bank`s total assets
over its home country GDP. The rationale is that large banks are more likely to be systemic institutions that
may need a public bailout in case of distress. The larger the bank, the more likely it is that a bank bailout
will affect condence in the nancial system (BIS (2011a)). We expect that the relative size of banks is
positively related to the excess bank/sovereign correlations, especially with the home sovereign.
Capital regulation is the cornerstone of the prudential regulation of banks. Since capital serves as a
buffer for unexpected losses (e.g. value losses on sovereign bonds), the higher the capital buffer, the less
risky a bank is and, hence, the lower we expect the excess correlations with sovereigns to be. In general,
banks with adequate capital buffers are perceived by market participants to be able to withstand shocks much
better than their less capitalized peers, which is reected, e.g., in a lower market beta (Altunbas et al. (2011);
Baele et al. (2007)). In our main analysis, we focus on an unweighted capital ratio that is calculated as the
sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over total assets. As a robustness check, we also consider the risk weighted
Tier 1 ratio.
12More detailed information on the country-specic variables that we use can be found below in part 3.4 Bank- and country-
specic factors
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The fundamental role of a bank is to transform deposits into loans to businesses and households. There-
fore the loan-to-asset ratio is a typical indicator of a bank's retail orientation. Retail banks have been
perceived as less risky than their non-retail peers, especially during the nancial crisis. Schepens and Van-
der Vennet (2009) show that European retail banks, dened as banks with a high loan-to-assets ratio as well
as a high deposit-to-assets ratio, have considerably lower market betas. Moreover, when a bank is charac-
terized by a high proportion of loans in its total assets, the relative weight of securities is lower, entailing
less exposure to (sovereign) bonds. Finally, when a bank operates a protable lending portfolio, this should
serve as a generator of prots and capital, which make a bank safer over time. Consequently, we expect that
banks with a relatively high loan-to-asset ratio will exhibit lower excess correlations.
To assess the relevance of banks' exposures to (foreign) sovereign risk, we include information on
country exposures. This data is taken from the CEBS and EBA stress tests of 2010-2011 that were carried
out to assess the nancial strength of European banks under different scenarios. The CEBS/EBA stress tests
were the rst Europe-wide exercises of that kind and the results as well as the main data inputs where made
publicly available. The exercises included 90/91 of Europe's largest banks, covering over 65% of the EU
banking system total assets and at least 50% of each national EU banking sector. In the context of the stress
testing exercise, data was published on banks' sovereign debt exposures to the 30 European Economic Area
states and was made available at two points in time: in July 2010 (data collection either in December 2009,
in March or in May 2010) and in July 2011 (data collection in December 2010). Such detailed data had
never been available at the bank level before; therefore, it was not possible to analyze the direct impact of
sovereign debt exposure on individual bank's credit risk in the past. Our study is one of the rst ones to
include sovereign exposures to investigate such link, which basically captures the above described `asset
holdings channel'.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, the composition of the funding sources is an important de-
terminant of the risk prole of a bank. Several papers have demonstrated that banks relying on wholesale
funding, predominantly through the interbank market, are perceived by market participants to be more risky
than banks predominantly funded with retail deposits. Especially during the nancial crisis, funding through
potentially volatile sources proved to be catastrophic for some banks. Altunbas et al. (2011) and Schepens
and Vander Vennet (2009) report that banks with a relatively high proportion of wholesale funding exhibit
signicantly higher systematic risk, measured by the market beta. Hence, when the asset quality of a bank
deteriorates (in this case because of the exposure to bonds of fragile sovereigns), informed market partic-
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ipants (e.g., institutional depositors) will focus on the sustainability of the bank's funding structure. This
may hamper access to the interbank market and increase the cost of funding in the repo or deposit markets.
Such risk spillovers between sovereigns and banks are another example of transmission channels that affect
the cost of funding for banks. We measure the impact of a bank`s funding structure by including the ratio of
short term and money market funding over total funding.
The degree of revenue diversication is captured by the proportion of non-interest income in total rev-
enues (see Stiroh (2006b) and Baele et al. (2007)). When a bank is less reliant on interest income, it is
supposed to be better diversied in the case of negative shocks to its interest income or funding cost. How-
ever, non-interest sources of income may be more volatile, especially in periods of nancial market stress,
and hence provide an imperfect hedge. As a result, the ultimate effect on bank/sovereign excess correlations
is unclear a priori.
The country-specic variables attempt to capture the state of public nances as well as the importance
of business cycle conditions in each of the countries concerned. The main variable of interest is the debt-
to-GDP ratio, since it is the major determinant of the sovereign rating (see, e.g., Bernoth et al. (2004)). We
also include the ratio of government revenues to GDP for each country as a proxy for the revenue-generating
capacity that sovereigns have to deal with banking problems. Since taxes are needed to service additional
debt, this is an indicator of the hard budget constraint countries are facing. The larger the banks in a country,
the more problematic bank rescues may be for public nances. Therefore, we include the size of the bank
sector in each country as a proportion of GDP. The bigger the relative size of the banking system, the higher
we expect bank/sovereign risk spillovers to be. Further, to account for business cycle conditions, an indicator
for economic sentiment is added to our analysis. We use the economic sentiment indicator provided by
the European Commission, which is composed of ve sectoral condence indicators (industrial, services,
consumer, construction and retail trade) with different weights, each condence indicator being based on
surveys. Including these variables, and some interaction terms, enables us to get insight into the determinants
of bank/sovereign contagion.
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4. Results
4.1. Excess correlations
We investigate the presence of contagion between banks and countries by examining the excess correlation,
which is the correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk over and above what can be explained by
fundamental factors. We start by giving an overview of the factor models used to calculate the excess
correlations (see eq. 1). Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the state variables in our analysis, whereas
Table 4 shows the average coefcient estimates and their signicance in the bank factor models.13 Running
these models on a yearly basis allows us to analyze the evolution over time of the impact of the state variables
and they eventually yield the excess correlations. We notice a sharp increase in exposure to economy-wide
credit risk (measured by the iTraxx factor) during 2007 and 2008 and this exposure remains elevated until
the end of the sample period. Table 4 shows that the vast majority of banks loads signicantly on the iTraxx
factor (up to 97% of the banks in the sample in 2007). The signicance of the other coefcient estimates
is much lower (below 10% for both the market factor and Vstoxx implied volatility). These results are
in line with Ejsing and Lemke (2011), who use the iTraxx index of non-nancial CDS premia as single
common risk factor, arguing that it explains most of the variability in corporate and sovereign CDS spreads.
However, including more state variables implies that we control for more possible sources of commonality,
which implies that the excess country/bank correlations are estimated more conservatively14.
In the left hand side panel of Figure 1, we investigate how the average correlation between bank and
home country credit risk varies over time, whereas the right hand side panel of Figure 1 reports the cor-
responding correlation in residuals, i.e. excess correlation, which is our preferred contagion measure. As
expected, we notice an increased correlation between sovereign and bank CDS spreads during the recent
nancial crisis in the left hand side panel of Figure 1. As mentioned before, an increase in correlation does
not necessarily imply evidence of contagion. Instead, contagion can only be inferred from a statistically
signicant increase in excess correlation. The right hand side panel of Figure 1 shows the average yearly ex-
cess correlation between the sovereign CDS spread and the average CDS spread of the banks headquartered
in the country. We observe that correlation in CDS spread changes are on average higher than correlation in
the residuals. Table 5 indicates that the average bank/sovereign correlation in our sample is 35%, whereas
13For convenience, we only report the results for the banks. The results of the sovereign factor models are similar and are
available upon request.
14In part 4.3 we discuss the robustness of our results w.r.t. an alternative specication of the factor model.
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the average excess correlation is 17%. Comparing both panels in Figure 1 indicates that common factors
can only partly explain the increase in correlations during the crisis; even after controlling for common fac-
tors, there is still a strong increase in correlations between sovereign and bank CDS spreads between 2006
and 2011. It are precisely these excess correlations that we try to explain using country- and bank-specic
variables.
The gures show a clear increase in excess correlations over the past years. To formally test whether
this increase is also statistically signicant, we make use of the Fisher transformation of (excess) correlation
coefcients. The left-hand side in Table 6 (`Base Year: 2007') depicts the percentage of signicant bank-
country excess correlations during each year compared to excess correlations in 2007; the right-hand side
(`Base Year: 2008') shows the results when taking 2008 as a benchmark. Moreover, we differentiate between
contagion between banks and their home country (Panel A), banks and foreign countries (Panel B) and banks
and GIIPS countries (both home and foreign, in Panel C). All three panels point to signicant contagion in
the vast majority of our sample. For example, in 2009 and 2010 we nd evidence of signicant contagion for
respectively 86% and 64% of the banks with their home country (base year 2007). Furthermore, we observe
that, in general, evidence of contagion between banks and foreign countries is slightly lower (76% and 63%
of the banks in the sample in 2009 and 2010). Finally, we also notice signicant contagion between banks
and the GIIPS countries, which is most pronounced in 2009. As can be seen in the table, the number of
observations in 2008 is always higher than in 2007. Therefore, we verify whether the evidence of contagion
is still present when taking 2008 as the base year. Our previous conclusions are conrmed, as can be seen
on the right-hand side of Table 6.
To summarize, we nd signicant evidence of increasing contagion between banks and countries in
the period covering the bank crisis as well as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Yet, we are particularly
interested in how to explain this excess correlation. We therefore turn to the analysis of bank- and country-
specic characteristics.
4.2. Explaining bank-country contagion
In this part, we study the impact of bank- and country-specic characteristics on bank-country contagion.
The particular structure of our database, in which we have excess correlations for each bank in our sample
with different sovereigns on a quarterly basis, allows us to disentangle the impact of bank- and country-
specic characteristics. More specically, by either comparing the relation between one bank and different
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sovereigns (using bank-time xed effects) or by comparing the relationship of different banks with one
country (using country-time xed effects), we can make a distinction between the impact of bank and coun-
try variables. Except for the home country dummy, all right hand side variables in these regressions are
standardized, which means that the coefcients show the impact of a one standard deviation change of the
independent variables.
In a rst step, we study the impact of bank-specic characteristics on the country-bank excess corre-
lations. We do this by comparing the excess correlations of different banks from the same country with a
single country at a certain point in time. In terms of the regression setup, this implies that we introduce
home country/foreign country time xed effects. By comparing banks from the same country, we prevent
that sovereign relationships that are unrelated to country-bank relationships disturb our analysis. It also
allows us to control for potential differences between banks due to regulatory or institutional differences
at the home country level. By comparing the different banks with a single country, we make sure that the
only variation left in the excess correlations is due to bank-specic factors. The rst specication of Table 7
shows the impact of a set of bank characteristics on contagion. We start by regressing the excess correlations
on ve bank balance sheet characteristics, i.e. bank size (total assets over GDP), asset structure (loan-to-
asset ratio), funding risk (short term funding over total funding), capital adequacy (total capital ratio) and
income diversication (non-interest income as a percentage of total income). In general, we nd that bank
size, capital adequacy levels and funding structure have a signicant impact on bank-country contagion.
For example, the coefcient of minus 1.76 for the total capital ratio implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the total capital ratio (i.e. a rise in the total capital ratio of about 2.2 percentage points, see
Table 3) leads to a decrease in country-bank excess correlations of about 1.76 percentage points. For the
average bank in our sample, this means a reduction in excess correlation of almost 8 percent. Furthermore,
banks with a higher proportion of short-term debt in their total funding exhibit higher bank-country excess
correlations. The impact of a standard deviation change in the short-funding ratio is similar to the impact of
a standard deviation increase in the capital ratio. This conrms that banks with potentially volatile funding
are more exposed to shocks in the quality of their assets, conrming the presence of the collateral channel
(see Section 2). This result is in line with the ndings of Vuillemey and Peltonen (2012), who investigate
whether sovereign CDS mitigate or amplify shocks on sovereign bonds. Their main nding is that the main
risk for CDS sellers is in the sudden increases in collateral requirements.
These nding stress the importance of adequate bank capital buffers for bank stability. Whereas previous
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studies showed a strong effect of bank capital on bank-specic risk indicators (see, e.g. Wheelock and
Wilson (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2011)) our ndings suggest that adequate capital levels are also an
important buffer against contagion. Similarly, where Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) nd that banks
increase most of their short-term funding at the cost of enhanced bank fragility, our ndings point at the
importance of stable funding as a feature in mitigating contagion.
In column 2 of Table 7 we interact each bank-specic variable with a home country dummy to analyze
whether there is any asymmetry in the above results caused by a stronger relation with the home country.
The results show that the impact of the bank-specic variables is equally strong towards the home country
compared to other countries, as none of the interaction terms is signicant. The impact of the size of a bank
(in percentage of GDP) on the excess correlations, for example, is not statistically different when comparing
the home country excess correlations with the foreign country excess correlations. This suggests that there is
no direct evidence in favor of the guarantee channel in this setup. However, further results using a different
setup (see Table 9) indicate that the guarantee channel is at work. Overall, bank size is positively related to
excess correlations, irrespective of focussing on the relation with the home country or a foreign country.
In the third column, we add banks` sovereign debt exposure as an explanatory variable. Notice that this
reduces the sample size, as we only have information on debt exposures from 2010 onwards. The results
for this setup rst of all conrm our previous ndings; better capitalized banks and banks with a lower
proportion of short-term debt in their total funding exhibit lower bank-country excess correlations, although
the capital ratio becomes insignicant in this setup. Furthermore, the impact of the income diversication
variable becomes signicant. Thus, in this subsample, banks with a lower percentage of non-interest income
have signicantly lower excess correlations. The fact that this variable has a stronger impact in this subsam-
ple is due to the sample period.15 As we only have data on sovereign debt exposures from 2010 onwards, this
subsample covers the recent crisis period. Being a more retail-oriented bank, i.e. having a lower proportion
of non-interest income, reduces bank risk (see, e.g. Altunbas et al. (2011), Baele et al. (2007)) and helps
to survive the most stressful moments of the sovereign debt crisis. These results point to a change in risk
perception during periods of increased sovereign distress of certain bank business models. The sovereign
debt exposure variable itself is not signicant in this setup. We would expect higher exposures to lead to
15We run the same regression as in column one on the sample for which we have EBA data (column 3) and reach similar
conclusions. This conrms that the change in signicance for the loan to asset ratio and the income diversication variable is due
to a the change in sample period and is not caused by the introduction of the EBA exposure variable.
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higher excess correlations. However, we control for home country/foreign country time xed effects, which
means that we compare the relationship of different banks from the same country with one and the same
country at a certain point in time. Thus, the insignicant result for the sovereign exposure variable is most
likely a reection of the fact that the variation in exposures between banks in the same country is rather
limited.16 Column 4 of Table 7 shows that our results also hold when using the Tier 1 ratio as a capital ratio
instead of the total capital ratio. Overall, our results lend support to the new prudential rules contained in
Basel III, which focus both on the level and quality of bank capital as well as the need for stable funding
sources.
Next, we focus on the impact of home country effects, sovereign CDS spreads and the actual sovereign
bond exposures of the banks on excess correlations. We expect that excess correlations will be higher when
a country`s default risk is higher, when we consider the relation between a bank and its home country and/or
when banks are more exposed to sovereigns through their bond portfolio (asset holdings channel). Our
contagion variable measures the degree of excess correlation between a country and a bank, but in itself
does not allow us to make any statements about the direction of the spillover. Using bank-time xed effects
allows us to compare the excess correlations of one bank with different sovereigns.This gives us a better
view on how factors at the sovereign level can affect the excess correlations between sovereigns and banks.
By interacting the sovereign CDS spread with bank-specic variable, we are also able to analyze which bank
characteristics can act as a buffer againsts spillovers from the sovereign level.
In the rst column of Table 8, we regress the contagion variable on a home country dummy, the sovereign
CDS spread and an interaction terms between both while controlling for bank-time xed effects and for a
potential non-linear relationship between the sovereign CDS spread and excess correlations. We start by
focusing on the relationship between a bank and its home country. We hypothesize that the contagion
between a bank and its home country is stronger than between a bank and any other sovereign. This can
be caused by several factors, be it a strong home bias in their bond holding portfolio, higher bailout risk or
scal consolidation leading to lower economic activity in the short term (Avdjiev and Caruana (2012)). The
rst column of Table 8, corroborates the home country hypothesis. The excess correlation between a bank
and its home country is on average 2.7 percentage points higher than with another country, after controlling
for the impact of sovereign CDS spreads. Next, our results show that banks have higher excess correlations
16Furthermore, when using a different regression setup (bank-time xed effects),we do nd a signicant impact for sovereign
bond exposures, see Table 9 below.
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with countries that have a higher level of credit risk. The squared term of the CDS spread is negative,
indicating that the positive effect becomes negative when the spread gets higher. However, the impact only
becomes negative for countries above the 96th percentile, which in practice means that we only measure
a negative relationship with Greece. Hence, except for Greece, the expected positive relationship between
sovereign CDS spreads and excess correlations holds. Also interesting is the positive and highly signicant
impact of the interaction term between the sovereign spread and the home dummy, indicating that the excess
correlations of a bank with its home country is higher when the home country has a higher level of credit
risk.
In the second column of Table 8, we test whether there is an asset holdings channel at work during the
sovereign debt crisis. We do this by introducing bank-specic sovereign bond exposures, which we collect
from the 2010 and 2011 EBA stress test exercises. The results in column 2 of Table 8 show that a bank with a
one standard deviation higher exposure to country A than to country B has an excess correlation with country
A which is about 1.5 percentage points higher. This conrms the presence of an asset holdings channel
during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, the positive coefcient for the interaction term between the
sovereign CDS level and the exposure variable in column 3 shows that a higher sovereign CDS spread
amplies the impact of the asset holdings channel, although this interaction term is only signicant at the
15% level. Overall, we nd support for the asset holdings channel. Banks with a larger exposure to a country
are more vulnerable to risk shocks originating from that country.
In the last three columns of Table 8, we again focus on the importance of bank-specic characteristics.
More specically, instead of looking at the direct impact of bank characteristics, which we did in Table 7,
we now investigate which bank characteristics could reduce the negative impact of higher sovereign credit
risk. In other words, we analyze how banks could protect themselves against increased credit risk at the
sovereign level. We do this by adding interaction terms between the sovereign CDS spreads and bank-
specic characteristics in our regression specication. In column 4, we focus on the sample for which
we have EBA data available, in the fth column we do the same analysis but for a broader sample and in
the last column we replace the total capital ratio with the Tier 1capital ratio. Our results again stress the
importance of solid capital ratios to withstand sovereign default risk. More specically, the coefcient of
-0.8 for the interaction term between the sovereign CDS spread and the total capital ratio in the fourth and
the fth column shows that a one standard deviation rise in the total capital ratio lowers the impact of a
standard deviation change in sovereign credit risk on excess correlations from 1.83 percentage points to
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1.15 percentage points, which is a decline of more than 35 percent. The last column in Table 8 conrms that
this result also holds when using an alternative capital ratio (Tier 1 ratio). The interaction terms between
the other bank-specic characteristics and the sovereign CDS spread are not signicant. Overall, the results
in these last three columns show that higher capital adequacy ratios not only have a direct impact on excess
correlations, but also have a positive indirect effect by lowering the negative impact of higher sovereign
credit risk, which underscores their importance for maintaining nancial stability.
So far, the only country-specic variable we investigated is the sovereign CDS spread. We show that
banks are more strongly correlated with countries that have a higher level of credit risk and that higher
capital levels can reduce this negative effect. We now take this analysis one step further by studying country-
specic characteristics that are expected to have an impact on the credit risk of a country and could thus be
of importance for the contagion between banks and sovereigns. By again using bank-time xed effects, we
analyze the correlation of each bank in our sample with the different countries, which allows us to attribute
differences in excess correlation to country-specic factors. We focus on the impact of government debt
(debt to GDP ratio), government revenues (as percentage of GDP), the importance of the banking sector in
a country (total bank sector size over GDP) and the overall economic sentiment.
The results in column one of Table 9 show that bank-country contagion is more pronounced for countries
with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. The positive and signicant coefcient of 1.21 for the debt ratio shows that
for every standard deviation change in the debt ratio, the excess correlation increases by 1.21 percentage
points. Higher debt ratios reduce the probability of a bailout in the banking sector and also lead to higher
bank-level credit risk through the bond portfolios of nancial institutions, which explains this positive and
signicant effect. However, the standard deviation of the debt ratio in our sample is around 27 percent (see
Table 3), hence the economic impact is rather limited in this setup. Other country-specic characteristics,
such as the share of government revenues in GDP or the size of the banking sector in a country do not turn
out to be statistically signicant. Furthermore, even after controlling for these country-specic factors, the
home-country relationship still remains an important driver of the excess correlations. The coefcient of
2.88 for the home dummy is positive and signicant at the 1 percent level. The coefcient for the economic
sentiment indicator is positive, which is somewhat unexpected. This could indicate that market participants
base their risk assessment rather on the health of bank balance sheets than on the economic conditions in
a country. Moreover, growth has been dismal in many of the countries during the sample period, which
makes it more difcult to assess the potential impact of economic conditions. In the second column of
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Table 9 we analyze whether the home-country effect and the country characteristics potentially reinforce
each other. Interestingly, the positive and signicant interaction term between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the
home dummy conrms that government debt is an important contributor to the contagion between a bank
and its home country. More specically, the impact of the home country dummymore than doubles when we
compare a bank operating in a country with an average debt-to-GDP ratio with a bank operating in a country
that has a debt-to-GDP ratio in the 90th percentile of our sample.17 This result is in line with the argument
that banks exhibit a home bias in their bond portfolios and with the conjecture that governments in a weak
scal position are less likely to step in to save nancial institutions when needed, conrming the presence of
both the asset holdings channel as well as the guarantee channel. Comparing column 1 with column 2 also
shows that the inuence of the debt-to-GDP ratio is most pronounced in explaining the excess correlation
of banks with their home country. A one standard deviation change in the debt-to-GDP ratio adds 1.05%
points to the excess correlation for foreign countries, whereas this augments to 3.04% points (1.05+1.99)
for home countries. Column 3 shows that the signicant impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio also holds when
controlling for sovereign bond exposures. Furthermore, in this specication we also nd a positive and
signicant coefcient for the government revenues variable. A high level of government revenues lowers
the possibility to further increase taxes in future crisis situations, which will make it harder for governments
to react to a crisis and could thus lead to increased credit risk. Overall, these results indicate that banks tend
to be more strongly correlated with countries with less sustainable debt levels, and this effect is largest in
magnitude for the home country. This conrms that worsening public nances are one of the main drivers for
contagion effects between sovereigns and banks. The implication is that restoring stability in the nancial
system requires simultaneous efforts in the eld of public nances.
4.3. Robustness
In this section we show that our main nding are robust to using alternative factor models for calculating the
excess correlations and to different ways of clustering standard errors in the panel regressions. Furthermore,
column 3 of Table 7 and column 5 of Table 8 already indicated that our results also hold when using an
17The coefcient for the home country banks becomes 2.57 (coefcient for home dummy) + 1.99*1.5 (coefcient for interaction
term*standardized value of the debt to GDP ratio at the 90th percentile) = 5.5 for banks operating in a country in the 90th percentile
in terms of debt ratio, whereas the coefcient for a bank operating in a country with the average debt-to-GDP ratio equals 2.57+
1.99*0 = 2.57.
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alternative capital ratio.
We start by evaluating the choice of the factor models used to calculate the excess correlations. In our
main analysis, we calculate the excess correlations based on yearly factor models that include four common
factors, i.e. an overall stock market index for the EU, the iTraxx Europe CDS index, the Vstoxx volatility
index and the term spread. To make sure that our main results are not inuenced by our choice of factor
model, we calculate two sets of new excess correlations, one set based on a factor model only including the
iTraxx CDS index and a set based on a factor model with the same factors, but with an alternative choice of
the time periods. The iTraxx-only model is an interesting benchmark as it is a model that is frequently used
in the existing CDS literature (see e.g., Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010)). The
model with alternative time periods addresses the critique that structural breaks within the yearly regression
window could potentially bias our measure of contagion. To address this issue, we divide our sample period
into different time windows, chosen at well specied events, to avoid structural breaks within the time
windows. More specically, we divide our sample period into 7 different periods being 2006, 2007, January
2008 until August 2008 (pre-Lehman), September 2008 - March 2009 (strong banking distress), April 2009-
March 2010 (In April, the EU orders France, Spain, the Irish Republic and Greece to reduce their budget
decits, start of sovereign crisis), April 2010-March 2011 (no major events) and April 2011 - September
2011 (strong rise in default risk of Southern European countries). Both factor models conrm the results
of our baseline factor model. For the model with the different time windows, the Itraxx is again the most
important common factor. For both the Itraxx-only and the extended time windows model, we again nd
signicant spillovers for the majority of the banks in our sample and a clear increase in excess correlations
over the past years. The results for these factor models are available upon request.
After calculating the two sets of alternative excess correlations, we reinvestigate the impact of bank and
country characteristics as done in Section 4.2. The results are shown in columns 2 and 3 of tables 10 to 12 in
Appendix. The fourth column in these tables adds an extra robustness check by clustering the standard errors
at either the bank level (Table 11 and 12) or at the country level (Table 10) instead of at the bank-time or at
the country-time level. This alternative clustering setup allows that the error terms are correlated over time
within the same bank/country, while they were only allowed to be correlated within the same bank/country
at one point in time in our baseline setup. The results all conrm our main ndings. Both higher capital
ratios and lower money market funding decrease excess correlations (Table 10). Furthermore, higher capital
ratios reduce the positive impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads on excess correlations (Table 11). The
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robustness checks also conrm the existence of a home country effect and the positive relation between
sovereign debt exposures and excess correlations. Finally, higher debt ratios are positively related to higher
excess correlations, especially when focussing on the relationship between domestic banks and the home
sovereign (Table 12).
5. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on risk spillovers between banks and sovereigns during the European
nancial and sovereign debt crisis. Whereas there is a substantial literature exploring the determinants of
bank or sovereign credit risk (measured by bond yields or CDS spreads) separately, empirical evidence
exploring contagion between the two is scarce. This paper attempts to ll the gap by examining the pattern
of contagion in the sovereign-bank nexus in Europe and by investigating which bank-specic and country-
specic determinants drive contagion.
We dene contagion as "excess correlation", i.e. correlation over and above what is explained by funda-
mental factors. Our preferred measure of sovereign and bank credit risk is CDS spreads. After controlling
for common factors (market risk, economy-wide credit risk, term spread changes and volatility), we docu-
ment signicant empirical evidence of bank/sovereign contagion. In the year 2009, when the sovereign debt
crisis emerged, we nd signicant spillovers for 86% of the banks in the sample. This number increases to
94% when only considering spillovers between the banks and the GIIPS countries. Moreover, we provide
empirical evidence of a substantial home bias, conrming the expectation that contagion between banks and
their home country is stronger. The close link between domestic banks and their sovereigns can be attributed
to several factors. We report evidence supporting the asset holdings channel caused by the large share of
domestic debt in banks' sovereign portfolios and evidence in favor of the guarantee channel caused by the
fact that the presence of large banks increases the bailout pressure on governments.
We exploit the cross-sectional differences between bank/sovereign excess correlations by relating them
to bank- and country-specic variables. We include a broad set of measures intended to capture the strategic
choices inherent in bank business models. The capital adequacy level of banks has the most economically
signicant effect; we nd that an increase in the total capital ratio reduces the excess bank-country correla-
tion signicantly. Furthermore, the lower the banks' reliance on short-term funding sources (measured as the
proportion of short-term funding in total debt), the lower the intensity of risk spillovers between banks and
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sovereigns. These ndings support the new regulatory Basel III framework which imposes more stringent
capital adequacy ratios and new liquidity measures. At the sovereign level, we nd that higher debt-to-GDP
ratios signicantly increase the degree of bank/sovereign contagion. The effect even becomes twice as big
for countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios (in the sample, a ratio above 101%, compared to the average of
74%). This nding motivates the recommendation that public nances need to be consolidated, especially
in the countries with high debt levels. A credible commitment to reduce debt levels over time will probably
require efforts at the domestic level as well as enforceable coordination at the European level and, perhaps,
some form of (partial) debt mutualisation.
We investigate the relationship between bank/sovereign risk spillovers and banks' holdings of sovereign
debt. For that purpose, the EBA disclosures of banks' sovereign exposures prove to be particularly valuable,
since they allow us to verify whether (i) banks with different holdings of sovereign debt exhibit higher excess
correlations with the countries involved, and (ii) whether excess correlations are higher for the countries
to which the bank is more exposed. Using different regression specications, we conrm both hypotheses.
Hence, investors differentiate rationally between countries with different levels of indebtedness and between
banks with different sovereign debt exposures.
We also document that increased sovereign credit risk is in itself a driver of bank-sovereign excess corre-
lations. We nd that contagion is more pronounced when the sovereign CDS spreads are higher. Moreover,
we document that the link between sovereign debt holdings and contagion is stronger when the sovereign
CDS spread is higher. When we investigate country-specic determinants of excess correlations, we nd that
sovereign debt-to-GDP levels play a decisive role as the main determinant of bank-sovereign risk spillovers.
In the period of increased stress in sovereign debt markets, we document that also the government revenue
ratio reinforces the risk spillovers. These ndings suggest that credible plans to put public nances on a
sustainable track are a necessary ingredient of any crisis resolution attempt.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest several actions to alleviate the contagion between
bank and sovereign risk. The ambition of policymakers and supervisors should be to (1) decrease the prob-
ability of contagion and (2) when contagion occurs, decrease the intensity of the risk spillovers. In order to
achieve these objectives, action in three dimensions is necessary: make banks more robust, make public -
nances more resilient and weaken the bank-sovereign link. On the bank side, the degree of capital adequacy
turns out to be crucial. Moreover, banks should be restricted in their reliance on money market funding.
Both elements are at the core of the internationally agreed Basel III rules that will be phased in gradually.
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Our results lend support to these objectives and policymakers and supervisors should provide incentives to
banks to adjust their business models accordingly. Since the home bias in bank bond portfolios is identied
as a channel of contagion, there might be scope for concentration limits in various dimensions. On the sov-
ereign side, making public nances more sustainable and ensuring that resolution mechanisms are in place
to deal with distressed banks are important policy objectives. Finally, our results indicate that breaking the
link between banks and their sovereigns should be a priority. This will require a so-called banking union at
the European (or Eurozone) level, implying that not only bank supervision should be executed at the Euro-
pean level (e.g. by the ECB), but also that deposit insurance and bank resolution, and the associated burden
sharing arrangements have to implemented on a European scale.
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6. Tables and Figures
Table 1: CDS spread changes - Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the daily sovereign and bank CDS spread changes
between the rst quarter of 2006 and the third quarter of 2011 for all banks and countries in
our sample. We use spreads on 5-year CDS contracts. All CDS quotes are obtained from
Bloomberg, CMA. The CDS spread series are transformed into daily arithmetic returns.
Sovereign year MEAN STD MIN MAX
2006 -0.004 0.064 -0.250 0.344
2007 0.012 0.123 -0.533 1.129
2008 0.020 0.094 -0.356 1.511
2009 -0.001 0.054 -0.382 0.989
2010 0.004 0.046 -0.388 0.395
2011 0.003 0.041 -0.191 0.258
Banks year MEAN STD MIN MAX
2006 -0.002 0.030 -0.388 0.634
2007 0.010 0.072 -0.439 1.237
2008 0.007 0.072 -0.560 1.109
2009 -0.001 0.037 -0.280 0.485
2010 0.004 0.046 -0.425 2.148
2011 0.003 0.040 -0.361 1.229
Table 2: State variables - Summary statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the four state variables used in our main factor
model. To control for market-wide business climate changes in the European Union, we in-
clude Datastream's total stock market index for the EU. To control for market-wide credit risk,
we include the iTraxx Europe index. The third common factor is the Vstoxx volatility index,
capturing market expectations of volatility in the Eurozone. The fourth common factor is the
term spread, which is calculated as the difference between the 10-year government bond yield
for each country and the 1-year Euribor rate. All state variables are obtained from Datastream
and transformed into arithmetic returns, except for the term spread, which we include in rst
differences.
MARKET ITRAXX VSTOXX TERM
MEAN 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001
STD 0.014 0.039 0.062 0.041
MIN -0.075 -0.278 -0.221 -0.392
MAX 0.097 0.291 0.388 0.179
Table 3: Bank and Country specic variables - Summary statistics
Statistics for the country variables are calculated at the country-time level, whereas the statistics
for the bank variables are calculated at the bank-time level, which explains the differences in
number of observations. The capital ratio is calculated as Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital over total
assets. Funding risk is the share of short term debt in total debt. The loan ratio is the ratio
of total loans over total assets. Income diversication is calculated as the share of non-interest
income over total income.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Country variables
Sovereign CDS spread 86.56 124.14 150
Debt to GDP ratio 74.37 27.44 150
Government revenues /GDP 45.30 6.44 150
Economic sentiment indicator 93.87 11.41 150
Bank variables
Bank size / GDP 60.38 50.39 293
Capital ratio 6.35 2.46 293
Loan ratio 62.79 16.12 293
Funding risk 45.03 21.52 293
Income diversication 30.30 14.89 293
Table 4: State variables - Average coefcients and signicance
This table reports the average coefents for the four state variables used in the factor models for the banks. The state variables
included are a EU stock market Index, the European iTraxx index, the Vstoxx volatility index and the term spread between the
10-year government bond yield for each country and the 1-year Euribor rate. For each of these variables, we report the average
yearly coefcient for the banks in our sample and the percentage of banks for which the specic state variable is signicant in
the factor models. We also report the number of banks in the sample for each year and the average adjusted R-squared. Changes
in the number of observations are due to data availability of bank CDS spreads.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
coef % sign coef % sign coef % sign coef % sign coef % sign coef % sign
MARKET -0.0436 0.00% -0.2865 0.00% 0.0669 6.52% -0.2347 0.00% -0.1503 3.77% -0.2918 0.00%
ITRAXX 0.0402 13.64% 0.7490 96.77% 0.6365 91.30% 0.4010 86.27% 0.4400 92.45% 0.4772 84.91%
VSTOXX -0.0065 0.00% -0.0784 0.00% 0.0705 8.70% -0.0735 0.00% -0.0022 5.66% -0.0572 0.00%
TERM 0.0217 4.55% 0.0485 6.45% -0.0784 0.00% 0.0080 5.88% 0.0126 18.87% 0.0232 32.08%
# banks 22 31 46 51 53 53
adj. R2 0% 32% 33% 18% 32% 29%
Table 5: Correlations and Excess correlations - Summary statistics
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the pairwise bank/sovereign correlations in our
sample. The second row contains the summary statistics of the excess correlations, calculated as the pairwise correlations of
the residuals from the bank and sovereign factor models.
# OBS. MEAN ST.DEV. MIN MAX
Average correlation 3034 35.29 22.72 -36.10 87.70
Average Excess Correlation 3034 17.38 18.73 -55.94 84.27
Table 6: Contagion - statistical signicance
The table presents the percentage of bank-country excess correlations that are signicantly different from the excess correlation
in a pre-dened base year for three different setups. We compare the excess correlations with two different base years, being
2007 (left-hand side) and 2008 (right-hand side). The table consists of panels A, B and C. In panel A, we focus on the relation
between a bank and its home country. The panel shows the number of bank-home country correlations that are signicantly
different from the correlations in the base year. In panel B, we analyze the correlations between a bank and foreign sovereigns.
We report the number of bank-country correlations that are signicantly different from the correlations in the base year. In
panel C, we focus on the relationship between a bank and the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). We
again report the number of bank-country correlations that are signicantly different from the base year.
BASE YEAR: 2007 BASE YEAR: 2008
HOME Panel A HOME
signicant total percentage signicant signicant total percentage signicant
2007 Base year 2007 3 14 21%
2008 3 14 21% 2008 Base year
2009 12 14 86% 2009 24 35 69%
2010 9 14 64% 2010 26 35 74%
2011 5 14 36% 2011 19 35 54%
FOREIGN Panel B FOREIGN
signicant total percentage signicant signicant total percentage signicant
2007 Base year 2007 45 172 26%
2008 45 172 26% 2008 Base year
2009 130 172 76% 2009 260 467 56%
2010 108 172 63% 2010 216 467 46%
2011 67 172 39% 2011 143 456 31%
GIIPS Panel C GIIPS
signicant total percentage signicant signicant total percentage signicant
2007 Base year 2007 4 31 13%
2008 4 31 13% 2008 Base year
2009 29 31 94% 2009 40 46 87%
2010 23 31 74% 2010 34 46 74%
2011 16 31 52% 2011 24 45 53%
Table 7: Excess correlations and bank characteristics
This table analyzes the impact of bank characteristics on contagion. In the rst column, we regress country-bank excess correlations on
a set of bank-specic characteristics and a home country/foreign country - time xed effect. By including this xed effect, we compare
the excess correlation of bank i at time t with country j to the correlation of another bank k - located in the same country as bank i -
with country j at time t. Thus, the part of the variation that is left in the bank-country correlation can only be explained by differences
in bank-specic characteristics. In the second column, we do a similar analysis, but we also interact each bank-specic variable with
a home country dummy. This allows us to analyze whether bank-specic variables are of different importance when considering the
relationship of a bank with its home country. In the third column, we control for the impact of sovereign bond exposures. In the last
column we replace the total capital ratio with the Tier 1 capital ratio. All variables are standardized, such that the coefcients indicate
the impact of a one standard deviation change of the variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Size 1.441** 1.440** 0.462 1.710***
(0.686) (0.711) (0.793) (0.641)
Size x Home -0.0650 -0.160
(2.773) (2.655)
Total Capital ratio -1.707** -1.758** -0.261
(0.789) (0.835) (1.075)
Total Capital ratio x Home 0.363
(2.590)
Loan to Assets ratio 0.178 0.292 -0.0642 -0.807
(0.547) (0.571) (0.765) (0.637)
Loan to Assets ratio x Home -1.311 -1.221
(2.021) (2.586)
Funding risk 1.642*** 1.703*** 1.867*** 1.855***
(0.474) (0.489) (0.541) (0.454)
Funding risk x Home -0.769 -0.827
(1.951) (1.722)
Income diversication -0.506 -0.508 1.912*** -0.573
(0.510) (0.528) (0.686) (0.530)
Income diversication x Home 0.0351 -0.0106
(2.070) (2.082)
EBA Country Exposures 0.618
(0.951)
Tier 1 Capital ratio -1.696***
(0.613)
Tier 1 Capital ratio x Home 0.0476
(2.513)
Constant 17.57*** 17.57*** 17.64*** 17.57***
(5.32e-08) (0.0158) (0.162) (0.0228)
Observations 3,034 3,034 1,349 3,034
R-squared 0.767 0.767 0.692 0.767
HomeForeign-Time FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster HomeForeign-Time HomeForeign-Time HomeForeign-Time HomeForeign-Time
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Country-bank spillover effects
This table shows the impact of sovereign credit risk on excess correlations between banks and sovereigns. In each of the regressions,
we control for bank-time xed effects, which boils down to comparing the impact of credit risk of different sovereigns on one and
the same bank. The rst column presents the results when regressing the excess correlations on the sovereign CDS spread, a home
dummy and the interaction between both. In the second column, we replace the home dummy with eba exposure data, which captures
the sovereign bon exposure of a bank to the sovereign with which we are measuring the excess correlation. In the third column, an
interaction term between the EBA exposure variable and the sovereign CDS spread is added. The fourth column shows the impact of
bank-specic characteristics on the relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the excess correlations. The last two columns
are two robustness checks. In the fth column, we check whether the decrease in sample size due to using the EBA exposure data has
an impact on the role of bank-specic variables. In the last column, we include the Tier 1 capital ratio as an alternative capital measure
instead of the total capital ratio. The last two rows of the third, the fourth and the last column show the impact of the sovereign CDS
spread when the foreign exposure variable is one standard deviation above its mean. The exposure is expressed as a percentage of the
total sovereign exposure of the bank. All variables are standardized such that the coefcients indicate the impact of a one standard
deviation change.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Sovereign CDS spread 1.837** 1.813** 1.790** 1.776** 1.829** 1.982**
(0.770) (0.853) (0.850) (0.846) (0.771) (0.833)
Sovereign CDS spread _Squared -0.723*** -0.677*** -0.648*** -0.636*** -0.710*** -0.644***
(0.147) (0.160) (0.165) (0.164) (0.147) (0.164)
Home dummy 2.706*** 2.726***
(0.839) (0.843)
Home x 5.361*** 5.408***
Sovereign CDS (1.453) (1.452)
EBA Country Exposures 1.463*** 1.243*** 1.237*** 1.210***
(0.328) (0.355) (0.360) (0.357)
EBA Country Exposures x 0.738 0.782* 0.639
Sovereign CDS (0.468) (0.467) (0.453)
Total Capital ratio x -0.807* -0.795*
Sovereign CDS (0.485) (0.465)
Funding risk x -0.282 -0.144 -0.370
Sovereign CDS (0.269) (0.303) (0.277)
Loan to Assets ratio x 0.363 0.405 -0.241
Sovereign CDS (0.488) (0.406) (0.466)
Income Diversicationx 0.0212 0.115 -0.125
Sovereign CDS (0.476) (0.394) (0.468)
Size x -0.449 -0.443 -0.0641
Sovereign CDS (0.368) (0.377) (0.356)
Tier 1 ratio x -0.505*
Sovereign CDS (0.297)
Constant 18.11*** 18.91*** 18.85*** 18.83*** 18.09*** 18.85***
(0.165) (0.114) (0.135) (0.132) (0.166) (0.134)
Observations 3,034 1,349 1,349 1,349 3,034 1,349
R-squared 0.670 0.575 0.576 0.579 0.671 0.579
Bank-time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-time Bank-time Bank-time Bank-time Bank-time Bank-time
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Excess correlations - Impact of country characteristics
This table shows the relationship between country characteristics and bank-country excess correlations. In the rst column, we regress
the excess correlations on a home dummy, a set of country-specic characteristics and bank-time xed effects. In the second column,
we also interact each country-specic variable with a home country dummy. In the last column, we replace the home country dummy
with a variable that contains EBA exposure data. By using bank-time xed effects, we ensure that the only variation left in the excess
correlations can be attributed to country-specic characteristics. All variables are standardized such that the coefcients represent the
impact of a one standard deviation change in the variable.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Home dummy 2.876*** 2.574***
(0.881) (0.925)
Debt to GDP 1.215*** 1.052*** 0.919***
(0.221) (0.234) (0.287)
Debt to GDP x 1.993**
Home (0.843)
Government Revenues 0.0628 0.0536 1.664***
(0.268) (0.281) (0.391)
Government Revenues x -0.845
Home (0.861)
Bank sector size 0.229 0.229 0.605*
(0.229) (0.237) (0.322)
Bank sector size x -0.213
Home (0.981)
Economic Sentiment 1.317** 1.207** 0.489
(0.563) (0.563) (0.686)
Economic Sentiment x 1.284
Home (1.074)
EBA exposure 0.0954***
(0.0182)
Constant 17.33*** 17.33*** 16.82***
(0.0732) (0.0723) (0.353)
Observations 3,034 3,034 1,349
R-squared 0.661 0.662 0.562
Bank-Time FE YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7. Appendix
Table 10: Robustness - impact bank characteristics
This table contains robustness checks for the impact of bank-specic characteristics on excess correlations. The rst column is the
benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 2 in Table 7. The second and the third column focus on the robustness of our
results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2 we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we
use alternative time windows to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the last column we use the same factor model as in
our baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the country level instead of on the country-time level.
Benchmark ITraxx only Time Windows clustering
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Size 1.440** 1.279* 1.279* 1.440
(0.711) (0.746) (0.746) (1.600)
Size x Home -0.0650 1.240 2.018 -0.0650
(2.773) (2.864) (2.851) (1.560)
Total Capital ratio -1.758** -2.179** -2.179** -1.758***
(0.835) (0.904) (0.904) (0.440)
Total Capital ratio x Home 0.363 1.345 1.742 0.363
(2.590) (2.496) (2.757) (0.991)
Loan to Assets ratio 0.292 0.458 0.458 0.292
(0.571) (0.567) (0.567) (0.666)
Loan to Assets ratio x Home -1.311 -1.258 -1.496 -1.311
(2.021) (2.167) (2.005) (0.982)
Funding risk 1.703*** 1.832*** 1.832*** 1.703**
(0.489) (0.502) (0.502) (0.716)
Funding risk x Home -0.769 -1.037 -1.545 -0.769
(1.951) (2.038) (1.993) (1.002)
Income diversication -0.508 0.331 0.332 -0.508
(0.528) (0.556) (0.557) (1.778)
Income diversication x Home 0.0351 -0.701 -0.761 0.0351
(2.070) (2.091) (2.033) (1.322)
Constant 17.57*** 19.28*** 19.24*** 17.57***
(0.0158) (0.0231) (0.0245) (0.00761)
Observations 3,034 3,060 3,060 3,034
R-squared 0.767 0.759 0.762 0.767
HomeForeign-Time FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster HomeForeign-Time HomeForeign-Time HomeForeign-Time Home Country
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Robustness - impact home country and sovereign CDS
This table contains robustness checks for the impact of the home country effect, sovereign CDS spreads, and related interaction terms
on excess correlations. The rst column is the benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 5 in Table 8. The second and
the third column focus on the robustness of our results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2
we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we use alternative time windows to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the
last column we use the same factor model as in our baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the bank level instead of on the
bank-time level.
Benchmark Itraxx only Time windows clustering
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Sovereign CDS spread 1.829** 3.296*** 3.282*** 1.829**
(0.771) (0.662) (0.660) (0.845)
Sovereign CDS spread Squared -0.710*** -0.982*** -0.983*** -0.710***
(0.147) (0.131) (0.131) (0.157)
Sovereign CDS x -0.795* -0.717 -0.752* -0.795*
Total Capital ratio (0.465) (0.437) (0.439) (0.441)
Sovereign CDS x -0.144 -0.163 -0.181 -0.144
Funding risk (0.303) (0.327) (0.330) (0.286)
Sovereign CDS x 0.405 0.504 0.482 0.405
Loan to Assets ratio (0.406) (0.462) (0.464) (0.255)
Sovereign CDS x 0.115 0.144 0.132 0.115
Income Diversication (0.394) (0.365) (0.364) (0.274)
Sovereign CDS x -0.443 0.136 0.112 -0.443
Size (0.377) (0.400) (0.401) (0.330)
Home dummy 2.726*** 1.899** 1.287 2.726***
(0.843) (0.817) (0.816) (0.777)
Sovereign CDS x 5.408*** 4.121*** 2.459* 5.408***
Home (1.452) (1.359) (1.364) (1.189)
Constant 18.09*** 20.12*** 20.12*** 18.09***
(0.166) (0.147) (0.146) (0.145)
Observations 3,034 3,060 3,060 3,034
R-squared 0.671 0.692 0.691 0.671
Bank-time FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-time Bank-time Bank-time Bank
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Robustness - country characteristics
This table contains robustness checks for the impact of country-specic characteristics on excess correlations. The rst column is the
benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 2 in Table 9. The second and the third column focus on the robustness of our
results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2 we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we
use alternative time periods to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the last column we use the same factor model as in our
baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the bank level instead of on the bank-time level.
Benchmark Itraxx only Time Windows
VARIABLES Excess Correl. Excess Correl. Excess Correl.
Home dummy 2.574*** 1.756** 2.574***
(0.925) (0.886) (0.878)
Debt to GDP 1.052*** 0.664*** 1.052***
(0.234) (0.242) (0.167)
Debt to GDP x 1.993** 2.352*** 1.993**
Home dummy (0.843) (0.823) (0.959)
Government Revenues 0.0536 -0.496* 0.229
(0.281) (0.282) (0.234)
Government Rev enues x -0.845 -0.819 -0.213
Home dummy (0.861) (0.843) (0.853)
Bank sector size 0.229 -0.126 0.0536
(0.237) (0.236) (0.262)
Bank sector size x -0.213 -0.862 -0.845
Home dummy (0.981) (0.962) (0.909)
Economic Sentiment 1.207** 1.026** 1.207**
(0.563) (0.505) (0.512)
Economic Sentiment x 1.284 0.357 1.284
Home dummy (1.074) (1.052) (0.811)
Constant 17.33*** 19.10*** 17.33***
(0.0723) (0.0697) (0.0750)
Observations 3,034 3,060 3,034
R-squared 0.662 0.680 0.662
Bank-Time FE YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A Network based Stress Test Tool for the European Banking
Sector
Valerie De Bruyckere 1
Abstract
This paper presents a network based methodology to stress test the European banking sector
using publicly available information. Banks are not only exposed to shocks from common risk
factors (macroeconomic risk factors, sovereign risk, nancial risk and housing price risk), but
also to shocks from all other banks in the system. To do so, this paper relies on Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA) of Locally Weighted Regression models. BMA allows to identify a set of
relevant risk factors out of a larger set of potentially important regressors. I illustrate the power
of the model in projecting future evolutions in bank equity prices. The model correctly projects
the direction of 77% of bank equity price changes over an horizon ranging from one quarter to
four quarters ahead. Moreover, I show that the performance of my model increases to 81% due
to the use of the Locally Weighted Regression model, further illustrating the usefullness of this
model as a stress test tool. Furthermore, I provide insight into the time-varying importance of
risk factors, and I analyse the interconnectedness of the nancial system both in terms of the
strength and probability of the connections. I compute network centrality measures (degree,
closeness and betweenness) and show how their relate to di¤erent states of the economy.
Keywords: nancial networks, bayesian model averaging, locally weighted regression, stress
testing, systemic risk, forecasting, nancial stability
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under the Lamfalussy Fellowship Program sponsored by the ECB. This paper bene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1 Introduction
Since the start of the nancial crisis, macro-prudential oversight has gained in importance and
is currently a top priority in the nancial stability debate. The emergence of new regulatory
bodies such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the European Union, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the US, and the creation of a single supervisory mechanism
(SSM) for the oversight of credit institutions, which is a key element in the EUs plan to establish
a banking union, are illustrative of this fact. The goal of macro-prudential oversight is to focus on
the nancial system as a whole. This implies identifying, assessing and prioritizing system-wide
risks, and formulating recommendations on how to mitigate them. This paper aims to contribute
to this by developing a stock market based stress test tool for the banking sector.
The identication if system-wide risks is closely related to the literature on systemic risk
measures. Many empirical papers construct measures of systemic risk based on stock market
information. However, current systemic risk measures have generally been limited to the mea-
surement of exposure to market risk (examples of these include Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon,
and Richardson (2010) and Van Oordt and Zhou (2010)). In contrast, this paper models bank
risk exposure to the whole set of common (potential) risk factors, such as macroeconomic risk
factors, sovereign risk, house price risk and nancial sector specic risk. Moreover, this paper
argues that nancial institutions are not only sensitive to common risk factors, but also to po-
tential shocks from other banks in the nancial system. The goal of this paper is to provide
a stock market based stress test tool for the European banking sector, taking into account the
network structure of the nancial sector as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), Diebold and
Yilmaz (2011) and Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2011). At the same time, the model
controls for the banks exposure to a wide range of common risk factors. To do so, this paper
relies on Bayesian Model Averaging of Locally Weighted Regression models (LOESS).
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) techniques allow to identify a set of relevant risk factors
out of a larger set of potentially important regressors. The logic starts from the idea of "model
uncertainty", meaning that a researcher is a priori uncertain about which (constellation of)
risk factors a¤ects a particular nancial institution. When estimating only one model, the
researcher clearly ignores the uncertainty he has about the correct model. He imposes the "right"
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model on the data, and the only uncertainty that is considered is parameter uncertainty, where
one typically interprets the coe¢ cients of signicant variables. To address this issue of "model
uncertainty", this paper uses Bayesian Model Averaging techniques. In the logic of Bayesian
Model Averaging, the model space includes all model combinations which can be made out of a
given set of regressors. More specically, if there is a list of k potential explanatory variables,
2k di¤erent model combinations can be made, where each model is dened through the inclusion
or exclusion of (a subset of) the explanatory variables2. For each of the 2k di¤erent models,
the "posterior model probability" gives insight into how likely each model is, given the model
space of all model combinations. A similar metric, labeled the "posterior inclusion probability",
expresses how likely a certain regressor (for instance a bank) a¤ects another nancial institution.
These bilateral probabilities are used to construct a Stress Matrix, indicating the probability that
each bank a¤ects another bank in the nancial system. A similar Stress Matrix is constructed
for the strength of the relationship between nancial institutions. To assess the strength of
the connection between banks, I use the posterior parameter estimates. In Bayesian Model
Averaging, the information from all models is combined. The posterior parameter estimate is
obtained as the weighted average of the parameter estimates in the di¤erent models, where the
weight is given by the posterior model probability.
Locally Weighted Regression models allow to condition the estimate of bank risk exposure
on the specic value of a chosen state vector. In that perspective, it is akin to tail based
estimators of bank risk, such as in Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005), De Jonghe
(2010) and Van Oordt and Zhou (2010). Contrary to these measures, this model can condition
the estimate of interbank relationships on a specicic realization of any chosen state vector. This
can for instance be the market index being on its 5th percentile, in line with previously proposed
measures of bank tail risk, but it can also be conditioned on a recession (measured by a specic
value for industrial production), or any other common factor in the model. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the rst paper which introduces and implements a Bayesian LOESS model.
This approach is especially useful from a nancial stability (or stress testing) perspective, since
2The Bayesian approach compares all models simultaneously, as opposed to model selection criteria (such as
Akaikes information criterion (Akaike (1974)), Schwarzs criterion (a Bayesian information criterion, Schwarz
(1978)) or Fishers information criteria (Wei (1992))) where only one model is retained.
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the supervisor is particularly interested in bank risk exposures during times of nancial market
stress, during a recession, during times of money market stress, ... Modelling the dependence
between nancial institutions in the tail of the distribution of a specic risk factor is key in our
understanding of bank risk behavior. Combining the BMA approach with LOESS regressions
allows to simultaneously address issues of model uncertainty and the presence of heterogeneous
e¤ects across di¤erent realizations of a state vector. Moreover, I show that this particular feature
of the model improves its performance as a stress test tool.
The usefullness of this model is illustrated with di¤erent applications. First, this paper
provides insight into the time varying importance of risk factors for nancial institutions, using
the posterior inclusion probabilities. On the other hand, the strenght of the e¤ect can be assessed
through the time varying parameter estimates. Second, the ability of this model to correctly
project future evolutions bank equity prices is assessed by analysing the percentage of correctly
estimated directions of change in bank equity prices. The model correctly projects 77% of bank
equity price changes over an horizon ranging from one quarter to four quarters ahead. Moreover,
I show that the performance of my model increases to 81% due to the LOESS feature of the BMA
set-up, further indicating the usefullness of this model as a stress test tool. Third, I illustrate how
this model can be used for stress testing with three hypothetical stress test scenarios, on three
stress test dates (the two CEBS/EBA stress test release dates, 1st of July 2010 and 1st of July
2011, as well as the 1st of January 2012). Fourth, I compute key indicators of network centrality
(degree, closeness and betweenness), and analyse how the network structure has evolved over
time. Finally, I assess the structure of the network over di¤erent realizations of state vectors
(such as industrial production, stress in the money market and economy wide credit risk).
The model proposed in this paper has several advantages which are worth mentioning. First,
the model can be used as a stress test tool for the European banking sector. One can use the
model to evaluate the impact of hypothetical scenarios on the European banking sector. Second,
the methodology allows to include any risk factor which could potentially a¤ect bank stock
returns. Additional macroeconomic risk factors, additional nancial risk factors or additional
risk taking institutions can be included in the model. This feature of the model di¤erentiates
it from other papers in this eld (e.g. Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) and Alter and Beyer (2012)).
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Third, the model allows to track how the importance of a particular risk factor (or a block of risk
factors) has evolved over time. This way, we can get insight into the time evolution of risk factors
in the nancial system. Fourth, the results in the Stress Matrix can be used to assess which
nancial institutions are most central to the nancial network structure, in terms of network
centrality measures such as degree, closeness and betweenness. Finally, the algorithm used in
this paper is not only useful in this specic set-up, but might also be useful to apply to other
research questions where there are many potential factors a¤ecting the dependent variable, for
instance in the case of credit risk modelling.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews and contrasts this model to the several
related strands of literature. Section 3 documents on the data used in this study. Section 4
outlines the methodology, whereas Section 5 analyses the empirical results of the model and the
di¤erent applications. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
Since the subject of this paper is very topical and since the model includes a wide range of risk
factors, this paper connects to several strands of literature. First, the construction of network
centrality measures from the Stress Matrix connects this paper to the literature on systemic
risk measures. Second, the Stress Matrix of the nancial network relates it to the literature on
nancial networks and measures of network centrality. Third, it connects to the macro-nance
literature and the empirical banking literature using bank factor models. Finally, the proposed
set-up allows to analyse the e¤ect of hypothetical scenarios on bank stock prices, connecting it
to the literature on bank stress testing.
The approach taken in this paper is related to market based measures of systemic risk, such
as the CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), the Marginal Expected Shortfall
measure proposed in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) or extreme value
based measures of bank risk, such as in Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005), De Jonghe
(2010) and Van Oordt and Zhou (2010). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) and Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, and Richardson (2010) track the relationship between individual nancial institution
and overall market movements. In contrast, the approach taken in this paper considers the
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relationship between a nancial institution and all other nancial institutions, while at the same
time controlling for exposure to market movements (and other common factors). Hartmann,
Straetmans, and de Vries (2005) derive indicators of the severity and structure of banking system
risk from asymptotic interdependencies between banksequity prices. De Jonghe (2010) also uses
extreme value theory to compute systemic banking risk by the tail beta. Van Oordt and Zhou
(2010) propose a related measure, the tail regression beta, which takes into account both tail
dependence and tail risk in the market and the nancial asset itself. Contrary to these measures,
this model conditions the estimate of interbank relationships on a specicic realization of a chosen
state vector. This can for instance be the market index being on its 5th percentile, in line with
previously proposed measures of bank tail risk, but it can also be conditioned on a recession
(measured by a specic value for industrial production), or any other common factor in the
model. In Section 5, I show that the ability of the model to condition the interbankrelationships
on a certain state of the economy improves the ability of the model to project future bank stock
return evolutions at all horizons (ranging from one quarter ahead to two years ahead).
In order to measure the systemic importance of nancial institutions, the measure must
contain information on the institutions potential impact on the nancial system (or on individual
nancial rms) in the event of failure or distress. In practice, capturing these contagion or
spillover e¤ects is a di¢ cult task, as these can operate through di¤erent channels, and the
information from di¤erent data sources only sheds light on part of the network linkages in the
banking sector. Moreover, data on each of these channels is not always available (for instance,
data on interbank exposure is not publicly available)3. Therefore, several papers assess the
systemic importance of nancial institutions using stock return data. Bank stock prices are
particulary useful to model systemic risk, because they combine market perceptions of the rms
outlook, publicly available balance sheet and income statement data and currently available
market data. Moreover, they cover the di¤erent channels through which risks can transmit
within the nancial sector, such as common credit exposures, interbank lending or trade of
3As mentioned in Cerutti, Claessens, and McGuire (2012) market participants need better information on
aggregate positions and linkages to appropriately monitor and price risks. To overcome the shortcomings in the
availability of bank-by-bank biletaral exposures, techniques have been developed to randomly generate interbank
networks. An example of this is Halaj and Kok (2013).
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derivatives. Finally, stock market data have some additional advantages over balance sheet or
income statement data, in that (i) stock market data have a higher frequency, and hence allow a
more timely assessment of risks, and (ii) balance sheet and income statement data is subjective
to accounting discretion, such as window dressing and other earnings smoothing techniques.
In sum, the literature on systemic risk is very widespread, and a plethora of systemic risk
measures has been developed. This is clearly illustrated in the rst working paper of the O¢ ce
of Financial Research (Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012)), which provides an extensive
survey of current systemic risk measures. Hence, the goal of this paper is not to develop a new
measure of systemic risk, but rather to (i) provide a stress test tool to allows supervisors to
assess the impact of a hypothetical scenario on the future evolution of stock returns, (ii) to get
insight into the time varying importance of risk factors, and (iii) to get insight into the network
structure of the nancial sector based on publicly available data.
A recent strand of literature in the eld of empirical banking studies the network structure
of the nancial sector. On the one hand, there are papers which make use of (country specic)
interbank data to construct and analyse the network (for instance Karas and Schoors (2012) for
Russia, Langeld, Liu, and Ota (2012) for the UK and Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium).
On the other hand, a recent strand of literature models interbank relationships using publicly
available data. Examples of these are Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2011), Diebold and
Yilmaz (2011), Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2012), Dungey, Luciani, and Veredas (2012).
Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2011) provide a network description of publicly traded US
nancial institutions, in an approach which combines both balance sheet data of the rms, macro-
economic data and bank stock returns. Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) use high-frequency intra-day
data from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database to estimate a bivariate connectedness matrix.
Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2012) incorporate the approach of Hautsch, Schaumburg, and
Schienle (2011) to predict events of bank distress. Dungey, Luciani, and Veredas (2012) generate
a network structure of the nancial sector based on correlations in volatility shocks. Further-
more, I connect to the literature on networks by computing three commonly used measures of
network centrality, i.e. degree, closeness and betweenness.
The modeling of nancial stock returns as a function of macroeconomic factors connects this
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paper to an evolving strand of literature in the eld of macro-nance, linking nancial sector
risks and macroeconomic risks. Trichet (2009) mentioned that nancial and real sectors are
increasingly intertwined. Not only may a shock in the nancial sector trigger a crisis in the rest
of the economy, also the build-up of macroeconomic or sovereign risk will a¤ect the evolutions
in the nancial sector. Therefore, this paper takes into account that nancial institutions are
also exposed to common factor shocks. More specically, this model has a macroeconomic block,
a sovereign block, a nancial block and a housing block. It therefore connects to a growing
literature in the eld of macro-nance. Examples of these are Gross and Kok (2012), Alter and
Beyer (2012) and Dewachter and Wouters (2012). Moreover, the use of bank factor models in the
empirical banking literature is very widespread. The most common form of bank factor model is
the one factor model, including a general stock market index. Baele, De Bruyckere, De Jonghe,
and Vander Vennet (2013) however show that other risk factors also signicantly a¤ect bank
stock returns, and their importance varies signicantly over time. The suggested model can be
considered as an extended bank factor model.
Finally, I illustrate how this model can be used for examining the potential impact of specic
scenarios as in a stress-test context. This methodology in this paper can be classied as a market
based, Top-Down stress-test, following IMF (2012). It is similar to stress tests set-ups proposed
by Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007) and Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2010)) and Segoviano and
Goodhart (2009).
3 Data
The variables included in this analysis can broadly be divided into two categories. First, I allow
that shocks stemming from other banks in the system are a¤ecting every other bank. Secondly,
every bank is exposed to common risk factors. These common risk factors can broadly be divided
into 4 blocks: a macroeconomic block, a sovereign block, a housing block and a nancial block4.
4The current set-up does not include lags of the explanatory variables, i.e. I measure the contemporaneous
impact of each risk factor on each bank. However, this model can easily be extended with lags of (some) variables
to allow for a delayed response of a risk factor. This extension is left for future research.
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The sample period ranges from the 3nd quarter of 2005 until the 3rd quarter of 2012. Table 2
contains a detailed description of the data series, the source and the data manipulations.
Banking Block
To identify the potential risk of other banks in the system, I include the stock return series
of all other banks in the sample. The sample of banks included in the sample is based on a few
criteria. First, I start with the banks which were included in the 2010/2011 stress tests of the
European Banking Authority. I take log returns of the weekly stock prices of these banks. Then,
I require at least 80% of liquid data points (liquid is dened as a nonzero stock return) within
each quarter5. I further reduce the sample by excluding banks which have less than 5 years of
consecutive liquid stock returns. I nally balance the sample by dropping all banks which have
illiquid stock return series for at least one quarter between January 2005 and October 2012. This
results in a sample of 34 banks from 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
France, UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden). The summary statistics of
the all independent variables in this study can be found in Table 3. The complete list of banks
included in the analysis can be found in Table 1.
Macro Block
To capture the potential exposure of banks to shocks in the macroeconomic environment, I
include several risk factors. I include ination, industrial production growth, the 3Month euribor,
a market index, the Vstoxx implied volatility index and the Itraxx index. Both the ination rate
and industrial production series are obtained from the ECB Statistical Datawarehouse. However,
the frequency of these series is monthly. I therefore interpolate these two series with a cubic spline,
to match the weekly frequency of the other regressors in the system. The market index is the
total stock market index for the EU (Datastream code TOTMKEU). It mirrors all EU stock
markets, not only the nancial sector. The Vstoxx volatility index captures market expectations
of volatility in the Eurozone (also see, e.g., Berndt, Douglas, Du¢ e, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005)
and Tang and Yan (2010)). This index is generally perceived as a market sentiment or investor
fear indicator. Finally, I include the Itraxx index to proxy for the evolution of market-wide credit
5 I make an exception for Dexia during the second and third quarter of 2012, since this would otherwise reduce
the sample period to the 1st quarter of 2012.
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risk. The Itraxx index is constructed as the equally weigthed average of the 125 most liquid CDS
series in the European market. A higher iTraxx indicates a higher overall default risk in the
economy, thus I expect a negative relationship between the iTraxx index and bank stock returns.
Industrial production growth and ination are included in levels, whereas the other series are
included in logarithmic returns.
Sovereign Block
The recent sovereign debt crisis has indicated that bank risk and sovereign risk can become
very intertwined. Studies as De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vander Vennet (2012), Alter
and Schuler (2012), Alter and Beyer (2012) and Gross and Kok (2012) therefore analyse spillovers
between nancial institutions and sovereigns. To allow shocks in sovereign credit risk to a¤ect
nancial institutions, I include the 10-year government bond yield of 13 countries (Germany,
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, UK, Denmark, Sweden and
Hungary). The series are included in logarithmic returns.
Financial Block
I include two measures for nancial sector specic risk. To measure stress in the European
funding market, I include the spread between the 3 month eonia index swap and the 3 Month
Euribor interest rate. Secondly, I include the Itraxx senior Financial index, which tracks the
evolution of the credit risk in nancial institutions in Europe. However, the Itraxx nancial
index is highly correlated with the Itraxx index, which is included in the macroeconomic block.
Hence, I orthogonalize the Itraxx nancial index with respect to the Itraxx, and take the residual
series instead.
Housing Block
As a measure of the evolution of house prices, I include an EU house price index obtained
from the ECBs statistical datawarehouse. The quarterly house price series is interpolated with a
cubic spline to a weekly frequency. The house price index is transformed to logarithmic returns.
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4 Methodology
In the next subsections, I explain the methodology used to assess the interconnectedness in the
nancial system. In subsection 4.1 I introduce the concept of the Stress Matrix. Subsection 4.2
explains the logic of Bayesian Model Averaging and the algorithm to browse the model space.
In subsection 4.3, I introduce the Bayesian LOESS regression model. Finally, in subsection 4.4
I describe the di¤erent network centrality measures (degree, closeness and betweenness).
4.1 The Stress Matrix
To infer on the risk exposures of each bank to the range of potential risk factors, I estimate the
following equation:
Y = :X + " (1)
where Y is a vector consisting of the M banks in the system
Y =
0BBBBBBBBB@
y1
y2
:::
yM 1
yM
1CCCCCCCCCA
(2)
and X is a matrix consisting of the N potential risk factors, where M is a subset of N .
X =
0B@ x1 x2 ::: xM 1 xM| {z } xM+1 ::: xN 1 xN| {z }
BankBlock Common Factors
1CA (3)
More specically, I estimate the following system of equations:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
y1 = 1;2x2 + 1;3x3 + :::+ 1;MxM + 1;M+1xM+1 + ::::::::::+ 1;NxN + "1
y2 = 2;1x1 + 2;3x3 + :::+ 2;MxM + 2;M+1xM+1 + ::::::::::+ 2;NxN + "2
y3 = 3;1x1 + 3;2x2 + :::+ 3;MxM + 3;M+1xM+1 + ::::::::::+ 3;NxN + "31
:::
yM = M;1x1 + M;2x2 + :::+ M;M 1xM 1 + M;M+1xM+1 + :::+ M;NxN + "M
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
(4)
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where each bank is exposed to shocks from other banks in the system, and to shocks from
the common factors (macroeconomic, sovereign, nancial sector specic and house price shocks).
Concentrating only the connections between the banks, I introduce the concept of the Stress
Matrix, both in terms of the strength of the connection, as in terms of the probability of a
connection.
Stress Matrix (strength of connection) Stress Matrix (probability of connection)26666666664
: 1;2 1;3 ::: 1;M
2;1 : 2;3 ::: 2;M
3;1 3;2 : ::: 3;M
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
M;1 M;2 M;3 ::: :
37777777775
26666666664
: P1;2 P1;3 ::: P1;M
P2;1 : P2;3 ::: P2;M
P3;1 P3;2 : ::: P3;M
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
PM;1 PM;2 PM;3 ::: :
37777777775
(5)
The Stress Matrix introduced in this paper is similar in nature to the Connectedness Table
in Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) and the Spillover Matrix in Alter and Beyer (2012). The Con-
nectedness Table in Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) is constructed based on variance decompositions,
whereas the Spillover Matrix in Alter and Beyer (2012) is constructed based on Generalized Im-
pulse Responses. The contribution of this approach is that Bayesian Model Averaging is able to
accomodate a much larger set of potential risk factors (in casu banks), such that the Stress Ma-
trix can be larger. In Alter and Beyer (2012), the size of the spillover matrix is 20x20, allowing
for spillovers between 11 countries and the banking sectors of 9 countries, whereas the dimension
of the (bank specic) spillover matrix is 13x13 in Diebold and Yilmaz (2011). Since I included
stock returns of 34 nancial institutions in this study, the dimension of the Stress Matrix is 34x34
(including the common factors, the dimension of the model is 34x56). However, the model can
easily be extended with other banks (as long as (liquid) stock return data are available). More-
over, the Stress Matrix measures both the strength of the relationship and its probability. The
strength of the relationship is given by the posterior parameter estimate, whereas the probility
is computed based on the posterior inclusion probability of each bank.
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4.2 Bayesian model averaging
To analyse the probability that each bank a¤ects another bank in the system, and the strength
of that relationship, this paper use Bayesian Model Averaging. Bayesian Model Averaging was
rst developed by Leamer (1978), and has since then been used in several disciplines, ranging
from statistics (Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) and Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and
Volinsky (1999)), to the large literature on cross-country growth regressions (Fernandez, Ley,
and Steel (2001b), Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004)
among others) and nance (Cremers (2002), Avramov (2002) and Wright (2008)). In the logic of
Bayesian Model Averaging, the model space includes all model combinations which can be made
out of a given set of regressors. More specically, if there is a list of k potential explanatory
variables, 2k di¤erent model combinations can be made, where each model is dened through
the inclusion or exclusion of (a subset of) the explanatory variables6. For each of the 2k di¤erent
models, the posterior model probability gives insight into how likely a specic model is, given all
other models in the model space.
To indicate the di¤erent models estimated for each bank in the system, I add a superscript
6The idea to use variable selection techniques to model drivers of stock return data, can also be found in
Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2011) and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010). Hautsch, Schaumburg, and
Schienle (2011) propose a systemic risk beta as a measure for nancial companiescontribution to systemic risk,
given network interdependence between rms tail risk exposures. In fact, the authors use the Least Absolute
Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) to identify the set of relevant tail risk drivers for each nancial
institution. The selection technique allows to shrink the number of relevant risk drivers from a high-dimensional
set of possible cross-linkages between all nancial rms. Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) use the same idea,
although in a somewhat di¤erent context. The authors investigate the predictive power of nancial intermediary
balance sheet aggregates for excess returns on a broad set of equity, corporate and Treasury Bond portfolios.
They use the Least Angle Regression (LAR) technique (a generalization of the Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection
Operator LASSO) and nd that security broker-dealer leverage and the shadow bank asset growth are selected
as the best predictors. However, the advantage of Bayesian Model Averaging over selection methods is that the
information from all models is combined in the nal estimation. Whereas variable selection approaches dene a
threshold up to which covariates are considered relevant, Bayesian Model averaging weights the di¤erent models
according to their informativeness, i.e. the results of all models are weighted with their corresponding posterior
model probability.
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k. This modies the system of equations in (4) to8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
y1 = 
1;kx1;k + "k1
y2 = 
2;kx2;k + "k2
y3 = 
3;kx3;k + "k3
:::
yM = 
M;kxM;k + "kM
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
(6)
where for instance x1;k indicates the regressors in model Mk for bank 1.
In Bayesian Model Averaging, the researcher has a prior belief about model k, summarized in
the model prior p(Mk), where every model is indicated with subscript k. The posterior probabilty
of model k is given by
p(Mkjy) = p(yjM
k)p(Mk)P
m2M p(yjMm)p(Mm)
(7)
where p(yjMk) is the marginal likelihood of modelMk, and p(Mk) is the prior on modelMk.
Whereas the posterior model probability in equation 7 gives insight into how likely a specic
model is, the more interesting metric expresses how likely a certain regressor should be included
in the model. This is captured by the posterior inclusion probability. Following Leamer (1978)
and Doppelhofer and Weeks (2009), it is calculated as the sum of the posterior model probabilities
of the models which include the specic variable. The posterior inclusion probability of variable
i for bank j is given by
PIPi;j =
256X
k=1
p(M j;kjyj)  I(xi 2 Xjyj ;M j;k) (8)
These posterior inclusion probabilities for i = 1; :::;M and j = 1; :::;M form the entries of
the elements in the Stress Matrix of probabilities in equation 5.
To obtain posterior estimates of risk exposure, Bayesian Model Averaging combines the in-
formation from all models. The posterior parameter estimate is obtained as the weighted average
of the parameter estimates in the di¤erent models, where the weight is given by the posterior
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model probability.
E(j jyj) =
256X
k=1
p(M j;kjyj)  E(j;kjyj ;M j;k) (9)
These posterior estimates for j = 1; :::;M form the rows of the Stress Matrix and express the
strength of the connection between banks in equation 5.
The model prior p(M) used in this paper is a prior on the number of regressors. The maximum
number of regressors is set to 7, whereas lambda is set to 3. The model prior follows a poisson
distribution,
p(Mk) =
l
k
e 
lk!
where lk is the number of regressors in modelMk. Moreover, I assess the robustness of my results
to the commonly used Binomial model prior, assuming equal prior probability for all models (but
still constrained to models with a maximum dimension of 7), more specically
p(Mk) =
1
256
(10)
The correlation in posterior parameter estimates and posterior inclusion probabilities between
both sets of results is always above 99%, and the minimum correlation is never below 96%.
The set of potential risk factors a¤ecting each bank is too big to estimate every model in
the model space. Given the set of 56 potential regressors, this means the model space contains
256 (72057594037927900) models. Even constraining the dimension of the models to maximum
7 only reduces the model space to 268602259. Hence, some numerical technique is necessary to
approximate the model space. I therefore use a shochastic search algorithm to jump between
models of the same or di¤erent dimensionality. I use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to
simulate a Markov chain consisting of di¤erent modelsMk. I use the recently proposed Subspace
Carlin and Chib (SCC) algorithm of Athanassios and Dellaportas (2012). The authors show
that this algorithm avoids some pitfalls and performs better than existing algorithms (such as
the Carlin and Chib algorithm, the Metropolised Carlin and Chib, Shotgun Stochastic Search,
Reversible Jump, ...).
As with any posterior simulator, it is important to verify convergence of the algorithm. I
follow the suggestion of Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a). Based on a reduced set of mod-
els, calculate the posterior model probability analytically (using equation 7) and using the SCC
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algorithm. If the algorithm has converged, then both ways of calculating the posterior model
probabilities should give the same result. Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b) suggest the cor-
relation between the analytical posterior model probabilities and the model probabilities of the
algorithm to exceed 0:99. Already with 1000 burn-in draws and 15000 iterations, this result is
achieved for most banks in the sample.
4.3 Bayesian Locally Weighted Regression (LOESS)
To allow the estimated network structure to depend on the state of the economy (measured by a
specic realization of a state vector), I make use of the locally weighted regression technique, as in
Cleveland (1979) and Cleveland and Devlin (1988). The idea is to condition the estimates of stock
returns of bank j on a certain state of the economy, for instance measured by industrial production
being on its 25th percentile. The LOESS technique is a frequentist econometric technique (as
opposed to Bayesian econometrics), but this method is adjusted to a Bayesian LOESS to integrate
it into the Bayesian Model Averaging framework. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst
paper which develops and implements a Bayesian Locally Weighted Regression Model.
To specify that the exposure of bank j to certain risk factors is conditional on a certain choice
for x, equation 11 species the relationship between stock returns of bank j to the set of risk
factors (in xj).
yj;t = g(xj;t) + "j;t (11)
The function g() is conditional on a choice for x (xt), for instance the economy being in a specic
adverse state. I will refer to a particular choice xt as a gridpoint. The estimate g^(xj;t) is the
coe¢ cient estimate of the locally weighted regression. The locally weighted regression operates
through two channels. First, the locally weighted regression uses only a number of neighbouring
observations closest to the gridpoint. The number of neighbouring observations q is determined
by the fraction f , where f = q=n, with n the total number of observations in the sample. The
choice of q determines the proportion of observations in the neighbourhood of xt which is taken
into account in the locally weighted regression. In this paper, f is chosen and set at 1=3, implying
that one third of the observations in the neighbourhood of a specic gridpoint are taken into
account7. The second way in which the estimate g^(xt) conditions on a specic gridpoint, is
7The sample period ranges from 2005Q3 until 2012Q3. With weekly stock returns, this implies that 127 weekly
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by assigning weights to the q observation vectors which are closest to xt. To assign weights to
observations, the tricube weight function is used:
W (u) =
8<: (1  u3)3 if 0  u < 10 otherwise
9=; (12)
The weight function W is applied to the relative distance of the observation w.r.t. the q-th
nearest observation to xt, as follows:
wt(x) =W

(x; xt)
d(x)

where d(x) is the distance between x and the qth nearest observation x and (x; xt) is the
Euclidian norm. Note that the x and xt should be normalized prior to measuring the Euclidian
distance.
The Bayesian locally weighted regression is obtained by imposing the Normal-Gamma natural
conjugate prior on the coe¢ cients, using Zellners g-prior where g = n (the number of observa-
tions). Details of this approach can be found in the Appendix to this paper. The bottomline is
that the estimator is a function of the weighted OLS estimator for  where the weights W are
given by the weight matrix in equation 12.
^ = (X 0WX) 1X 0Wy
4.4 Network Centrality Measures
To study the network properties of the interbank network, I use three classic network centrality
measures (degree, closeness and betweenness). The network is composed of vertices (banks),
which are connected to each other through edges.
Degree centrality Degree centrality equals to the number of ties a vertex has with other
vertices. To classify whether a bank has a tie with another bank, a threshold is imposed on
stock returns are used for each gridpoint (380=3). In the analysis over moving windows (of 6 or 8 quarters) (for
instance subsection 5.1) , I set f = 1, implying that all observations in the window are used. The LOESS feature
of the model then only comes from the weights assigned to neighbouring observations.
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the stress matrix. More specically, I consider a bank to be connected to another bank if the
posterior inclusion probability is larger than 50%. Moreover, since the stress matrix is a directed
matrix, both the indegree and the outdegree can be constructed. To compute the indegree, I sum
over the columns of the Stress Matrix of probabilities, whereas I sum over the rows to compute
the outdegree. The indegree of bank i is given by
Indegreei =
NX
j=1
I(PIPj > 50%)
whereas the outdegree of bank j is given by8
Outdegreej =
NX
i=1
I(PIPi > 50%)
where I() is an indicator function equal to one if the PIP is greater than 50%, and zero
otherwise. Generally, banks with a higher outdegree have a greater capacity to inuence other
banks, whereas banks with a greater indegree are more exposed to shocks from other banks in
the system.
Closeness A more sophisticated centrality measure is closeness (Freeman (1979)) which
emphasizes the distance of a vertex to all others in the network. Closeness can be regarded as
a measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to others in the
network. Again, as the Stress Matrix is a directed matrix, both in- and out-closeness can be
computed:
Closeness(in)i
NX
j=1
1
d(i; j)
Closeness(out)j =
NX
i=1
1
d(i; j)
where the distance d(i; j) between bank i and bank j is dened as 1  PIP (i; j).
Betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is based on the number of shortest paths
passing through a vertex. Vertices with a high betweenness play the role of connecting di¤er-
ent banks. In nancial networks, vertices with high betweenness are typically the brokers and
8 I keep the terminology in terms of bank i and bank j to stress that the direction of summation is di¤erent
(columns versus rows).
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connectors who bring others together. Being between means a vertex has the ability to control
the ow of knowledge between most others. As in the case of the degree centrality, I specify a
threshold on the posterior inclusion probability of 50% to consider a link between bank i and
bank j.
5 Empirical Results
This Section describes the empirical results of the BMA LOESS model. Before presenting the
Stress Matrix, I describe in subsection 5.1 the results of the model over rolling windows of
respectively 6 and 8 quarters. The goal is to get insight into the time varying importance of risk
factors. In subsection 5.2 I illustrate the power of my model to project future evolutions of bank
stock prices. In subsection 5.3 I show how this model can be used to project bank stock prices
using three hypothetical stress test scenarios on three dates. Finally, I show in subsecion 5.4 how
the three measures of network centrality (degree, closeness and betweenness) have changed over
time, and how they relate to di¤erent realizations of the common factors.
5.1 Time varying importance of blocks
To analyse how the importance of certain risk factors has changed over time, I run the model
over rolling windows of 6 quarters (1; 5 years), rolling forward every quarter. In this part of
the paper, I do not use the LOESS feature of the model, as estimating the model over every 6
quarter period already implies that I am centering the estimations on a specic point (in time).
The sample period starts in the second quarter of 2005, so the rst estimate is obtained for
the third quarter of 2006. Presenting the results of all 56 regressors would be infeasable, and
therefore I summarize the results per block. Figure 1 shows the maximum posterior inclusion
probability of the regressors in each block. Already in the third quarter of 2007, the PIP of
the bank sector jumps to 50%, indicating the stress in the bank sector. The underlying results
indicate that this maximum is due to Dexia, just as the second spike in the second quarter of
2008. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the median and the interquartile range of the PIPs in the
banking block. This graph indicates that the median (and also the mean) hide considerable cross
sectional heterogeneity.
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In general, the importance of shocks to house prices in Europe is relatively low (below 5%).
Macroeconomic risk factors have in general a PIP of below 30%, except at the very end of the
sample period, where they increase to 42%. Panel A in Figure 2 shows that this is due to
the increased importance of ination risk in the second and third quarter of 2012. Sovereign
risk reaches its maximum importance in the rst and the third quarter of 2009 (with a PIP of
31%). Panel B of Figure 2 presents the PIPs of the GIIPS countriessovereign bond yields. The
maximum of 31% is due to the sovereign debt problems in Ireland. Note that the importance
of the risk factors is averaged across the banks, meaning that the sovereign debt problems of
Ireland had the largest e¤ect on the bank stock prices in the sample9. The importance of nancial
sector specic risks is in general also low (below 10%), except for the rst quarter of 2009, where
the maximum importance was 20%. To show that these conclusions are robust to a longer
time window (8 quarters instead of 6), I include in Panel A of Figure 3 the same PIPs of the
macroeconomic risk factors for rolling windows of 8 quarters. Panel B of Figure 3 provides insight
into the two nancial sector specic risk factors, and indicates that the jump in the nancial
sector PIP in the rst quarter of 2009 was due to nancial sector specic credit risk (Itraxx
nancial series).
5.2 Out-of-sample Projections
To verify whether this model is useful as a stress test tool, I assess the ability of the model to
correctly project the direction of future bank stock prices. More specically, I assume for every
equation in (4) the realized path. In other words, I assume that history is realized to assess
how well a hypothetical scenario would project the future stock price evolution. I assess the
performance of the model for periods of one to eight quarters ahead.
Label with H the number of correct positive signals, F the number of false positive signals,
Z the number of correct negative signals and M the number of false negative signals, then the
proportion of correct signals can be calculated as
PC(%) =
H + Z
H + F + Z +M
(13)
9The fact that this sample contains more banks of certain countries, and that banks have been shown to have
a strong home bias in their sovereign bond portfolios (see De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vander Vennet
(2012)), might a¤ect the conclusions here.
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Panel A of Figure 4 shows the time varying ratio PC for projection horizons from one to
four quarters ahead. The two, three and four quarter ahead PC ratios do not reach the end of
the sample period, as these data are necessary to assess the projection accuracy. The PC ratio
is compared to the 50% threshold. The Figure shows that the PC ratio exceeds the thresholds
in most periods. It is below 50% during the last quarter of 2008 (this means over the period
2006   2008) for two and four quarter ahead projections (respectively 41% and 44%). The PC
ratio also drops below 50% towards the end of the sample period. The average PC ratio over all
time windows is 73%, 75%, 77% and 74% for projections one to four quarters ahead. Panel B
of Figure 4 compares the PC ratio over projected windows of one to four quarters ahead, using
estimation windows of 6 versus 8 quarters. The Figure shows that the projection accuracy is
always higher when the estimation window is 8 quarters (instead of 6). Moreover, the projection
accuracy is highest for projections 3 quarters ahead (77% of the directions of bank stock prices is
correctly projected). Finally, Panel C of Figure 4 shows the RMSE over the estimation windows
(8 quarters). The RMSE of the model is largest in the second quarter of 2008, suggesting that
this period of the nancial crisis what most unpredictable.
Finally, I illustrate the usefullness of the Bayesian LOESS model in Figure 5. This bar
chart compares the projection accuracy (measured with the PC ratio) of BMA using a standard
bayesian linear model versus the Bayesian LOESS model for projection horizons ranging from one
to eight quarters ahead. The LOESS estimates are centered around the last value of industrial
production in each estimation window (8 quarter windows). The proportion of the window that
is used is 100% (i.e. f equals 1), implying that the LOESS feature of the model is only due to
the weighting scheme. The projection accuracy of the LOESS model is higher than that of the
standard linear model for every projection horizon. For horizons 3 quarters ahead, the PC ratio
equals 81% with the LOESS model, as compared to 77% with a standard linear model10. This
suggests that the LOESS feature of the model improves the projection accuracy, and makes it
10The model does not include lags of the explanatory variables. However, inspection of the Durbin Watson
statistics over the rolling windows suggests that for some banks, during some quarters, there is still autocorrelation
left in the residuals. From an econometric point of view, this implies that the coe¢ cient estimates are unbiased
and consistent, but not e¢ cient. Including lags of the explanatory variables could improve the e¢ ciency, and could
potentially even further improve the projection accuracy. This is left for future research.
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an interesting tool for stress test purposes11.
5.3 Stress Testing the European Banking Sector
To illustrate how this model can be used in a stress test context, I assess the future evolution of
bank stock prices on three stress test dates, for three hypothetical scenarios. The three stress test
dates are the 1st of July 2010 and 2011 and the 1st of January 2012. The rst two dates coincide
with the release of the CEBS/EBA stress test results. The three scenarios describe current risks
in the nancial and sovereign debt crisis.
1. An aggravation of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
2. A deterioration in the credit quality due to a weakened economic environment.
3. Further fragmentation and distress in bank funding markets.
These scenarios are translated into specic "paths" for (some of) the explanatory variables.
More specically, I assume (i) a downward movement in (all) bank stock prices and (ii) an upward
movement in (all) sovereign bond yields over a one quarter horizon for the rst scenario12. To
allow for di¤erent degrees of severity in the scenarios, I assign a number from 1 to 6. The Worst
Case Scenario (WCS) is labeled by 1, whereas the Best Case Scenario (BCS) is labeled by 6. To
assume realistic scenarios, I use the observed sample period to assign a value for the scenarios.
More specically, 1 (WCS) corresponds to the maximum drop in bank stock stock returns over
a quarterly horizon, 2 corresponds to the 20th percentile, 3 to the 40th percentile, 4 to the
60th percentile, 5 to the 80th percentile, and 6 to the maximum observed quarterly observed
stock return. As an increase in sovereign bond yields corresponds to the adverse scenario, I
reverse the numbers for the sovereign risk factors. For the other risk factors, I assume that they
remain constant. To proxy for the second scenario, a deterioration in the credit quality due to a
weakened economic environment, I assume a path for the Itraxx index, keeping the value of all
other regressors constant. For the third scenario, I assume a path for the Vstoxx, the spread,
and the Itraxx nancial index. More specically, I assume increased volatility in de market,
11 Ideally, the supervisor would want to center the estimate around the expected value of industrial production.
12Note that the path of the scenario does not matter, i.e. it does not matter whether I assume the scenario to
be realized over the rst week of the quarter, or whether I assume it to realize gradually over the quarter.
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increased money market stress, and increased nancial sector specic credit risk. To project the
future evolution of bank stock prices, I use the 8 quarter window of data to do the estimation (I
do not use the LOESS feature of the model here, i.e. the results are based on the BMA of the
linear bayesian model).
Figure 6 plots the projected evolution in bank stock prices over the next quarter for the three
projection dates, and the three hypothetical scenarios. The last value of all stock prices is 100.
To show the dispersion across the 34 banks in the sample, I plot the median and the interquartile
range. Panel A in Figure 6 shows the results of the three scenarios on the rst stress test day
(1st of July 2010). The gure shows that the 1st (WCS) to 3rd path for the rst scenario would
have predicted a downward trend for the interquartile range of the banks. In the WCS, the
median banks stock return is projected to drop from 100 to 36 over the next quarter. On the
second and third stress test day (Panel B and C in Figure 6), the e¤ect for the median bank
is much less severe (for the median bank, the model projects a drop to respectively 45 and 43).
The e¤ects of the second scenario is much less severe than the rst on the third projection date.
The median bank would see no change in its stock price (and remain at 100), although for some
banks there is a negative e¤ect. On the second projection day however, an increase in credit risk
in the economy would have had a much larger e¤ect on the banks. This result can be explained
by the increased credit risk in the economy in the period prior to the 1st of July 2011. Finally,
the projected e¤ects of the third scenario are very dispersed over the cross section of banks, and
between the three projection days. On the rst and third projection day, no signicant e¤ect is
be projected. On the 1st of July 2011 however, the e¤ect of a fragmentation in bank funding
markets would have had more severe e¤ects on bank stock price evolutions. In the WCS, the
median banks stock return is projected to drop to 91, whereas the 25th banks stock return
would decrease by half. The results suggest that the state of the economy on the 1st of January
2012 was much more resilient to a deterioration in the credit quality (scenario 2) and distress
in funding markets (scenario 3) than it was on the previous second stress test date. The model
projects that further a further aggravation of bank and sovereign risks (scenario 1) would have
had an adverse negative impact on the banking systemss equity valuations on the 1st of January
2012.
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5.4 Measures of Network Centrality
Figure 7 visualizes the nancial network structure centered around two values of industrial pro-
duction. The gure on the left hand side takes the lowest value of industrial production in the
sample (the value at the end of April 2009) as the gridpoint in the LOESS estimation, whereas
the gure at the right hand side takes the maximum (in sample) value of industrial production
(end of May 2010) as a gridpoint. The graph only visualizes connections between banks when
the PIP is larger than 50 percent. The probability of the connection (the PIP) is connected to
the darkness of the lines. All banks in the graph get equal size (the red circle). The location of
the banks on the graph is an approximation of their geographical location in Europe. However,
it is hard to draw strong conclusions about the interconnectedness of the system from this graph.
Therefore, I compute the network centrality measures discussed in Section 4.4.
Figure 8 summarizes how the degree, closeness and betweenness vary over moving windows
of 8 quarters. Panel A shows that the average degree (the average number of connections a bank
has in the system) reached a maximum of 3:7 in the last quarter of 2010. The estimation window
for the value ranges from 2008Q1 until 2010Q4, which is exactly the period with the highest
market tensions within the nancial system. Panel B of Figure 8 conrms that the closeness was
also at its highest value during that quarter. This means that information was spreading very
fast between banks during this period. The graph shows that there is a spike in the network
centrality in the third quarter of 2011 for all three measures. The LTRO program launched
by the ECB in the fourth quarter could be a possible explanation for the decline afterwards.
Moreover, the three graphs show the decline in network centrality from then until the end of
the sample period. The network centrality measures indicate that the stress between banks in
the system has declined over time. Indeed, credit risk in the nancial sector has become more
bank specic, and the sovereign debt problems of certain European countries have dominated
the news more than before.
To get insight into how these network centrality measures relate to certain values of the
common factors, I estimate the BMA LOESS model conditional on specic values for the level of
5 common factors: industrial production, the Vstoxx implied volatility index, the total market
index (totmkeu), the Itraxx and the spread. Figure 9 shows the values of the three network
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centrality measures (degree, closeness and betweenness, in Panel A to C) for 5 values of the
common factors. The 5 values are the values at equally spaced intervals between the minimum
and the maximum (in the levels) of the common factor. The observed patterns are not always
monotonous, but some patterns can be observed.
At the lowest level of industrial production, the average number of connections a bank has
with other banks is slightly higher. This means that some banks seem to a¤ect other banks
more during recessions. In line with intuition, the degree and the closeness of the system are
higher when the Itraxx is higher. For the betweenness, this relationship is not there. This can be
explained by the fact that information may also be spreading rapidly over the nancial system in
times of low credit risk. Exactly the opposite pattern can be found for the stock market index.
At high values of the stock market index, the degree and closeness are lower. The Vstoxx does
not seem to be meaningfully related to the degree and betweenness, although the closeness of
the system is higher for extreme volatility as compared to extremely low volatility in the market.
Finall, in line with intuition, the interconnectedness of the nancial system is higher when the
spread is higher. This relationship holds for all three measures of network centrality, although
the middle gridpoints are not always linearly related to the outer ones.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a methodology to stress test the European banking sector using publicly
available data. Banks are not only exposed to shocks from common risk factors (macroeconomic
risk factors, sovereign risk, nancial risk and housing price risk), but also to shocks from all other
banks in the system. To do so, this paper relies on Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) of Locally
Weighted Regression models. BMA allows to identify a set of relevant risk factors out of a larger
set of potentially important regressors. The goal of this paper is to (i) provide a stress test tool
to allows supervisors to assess the impact of hypothetical scenarios on the future evolution of
stock returns, (ii) to get insight into the time varying importance of risk factors, and (iii) to get
insight into the network structure of the nancial sector.
Several contributions of this model are worth mentioning. First, this paper provides insight
into the time varying importance of risk factors for nancial institutions, using the posterior
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inclusion probabilities. On the other hand, the strenght of the e¤ect can be assessed through
the time varying parameter estimates. Second, ability of this model to correctly project future
evolutions bank equity prices is assessed by analysing the percentage of correctly estimated
directions of change in bank equity prices. The model correctly projects 77% of bank equity
price changes over an horizon ranging from one quarter to four quarters ahead. Moreover, I show
that the performance of my model increases to 81% due to the LOESS feature of the BMA set-
up, further indicating the usefullness of this model as a stress test tool. Third, I illustrate how
this model can be used for stress testing with three hypothetical stress test scenarios, on three
stress test dates (the two CEBS/EBA stress test release dates, 1st of July 2010 and 1st of July
2011, as well as the 1st of January 2012). Fourth, I compute key indicators of network centrality
(degree, closeness and betweenness), and analyse how the network structure has evolved over
time. Finally, I assess the structure of the network over di¤erent realizations of state vectors
(such as industrial production, stress in the money market and economy wide credit risk).
The questions addressed in this paper are important from a policy perspective, as assessing
empirically the impact of a hypothetical (stress test) scenario has clear implications for crisis
management, i.e. crisis resolution at the individual bank level versus macro-oriented stabilisation
policies.
The approach in this paper o¤ers interesting possibilities for future research. The Bayesian
nature of this set-up o¤ers interesting opportunities to incorporate other sources of information.
Hartmann, de Bandt, and Peydro-Alcalde (2009) stress that nancial systemic risk is charac-
terized by both a cross-sectional and a time series dimension. This idea is also exploited in
Schwaab, Lucas, and Koopman (2010). In the specication of the prior on the parameters, I
have used relatively uninformative priors so far. Hence, it could be interesting to see whether
the incorporation of balance sheet based characteristics of banks would allow to further improve
the projection performance, by centering the parameter prior around the posterior estimate of
similar banks (in terms of balance sheet characteristics). Moreover, the same idea could be used
along the time series dimension of the data, incorporating information from the previous time
window into the new parameter prior. Incorporating usefull sources of other information could
potentially improve the projection performance of this model even further.
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7 Tables
Table 1: List of banks included in the sample
This table lists the 34 banks included in the banking block, along with the home country of the bank. The selection
is based on the 91 banks included in the 2010 stress test, further reducing this sample by only considering stock
listed banks, and applying stringent liquidity criteria.
Nr Country Bank Name
1 AT Erste Bank Group (EBG)
2 BE DEXIA
3 BE KBC BANK
4 DE DEUTSCHE BANK AG
5 DE COMMERZBANK AG
6 DK DANSKE BANK
7 DK Jyske Bank
8 DK Sydbank
9 ES BANCO SANTANDER S.A.
10 ES BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA S.A. (BBVA)
11 ES BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, S.A.
12 ES BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A.
13 FR BNP PARIBAS
14 FR CREDIT AGRICOLE
15 FR SOCIETE GENERALE
16 GB ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP plc
17 GB HSBC HOLDINGS plc
18 GB BARCLAYS plc
19 GB LLOYDS BANKING GROUP plc
20 GR EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS S.A.
21 GR ALPHA BANK
22 GR PIRAEUS BANK GROUP
23 HU OTP BANK NYRT.
24 IE ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC
25 IE BANK OF IRELAND
26 IE IRISH LIFE AND PERMANENT
27 IT INTESA SANPAOLO S.p.A
28 IT UNICREDIT S.p.A
29 IT BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA S.p.A
30 IT UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE SCPA (UBI BANCA)
31 PT Banco BPI, SA
32 SE Nordea Bank AB (publ)
33 SE Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (SEB)
34 SE Swedbank AB (publ)
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Table 2: Summary table of the regressors in the model
This table summarizes the di¤erent regressors in the model. The regressors are grouped into di¤erent blocks: a
banking block, a macoreconomic block, a sovereign block, a house price price block and nally a nancial block.
The table indicates the source of the data, the data transformation(s) and the frequency of the series. Series with
a frequency lower than weekly are transformed to a weekly frequency using a cubic spline interpolation.
Source
Data
Transformati
on
Frequency
BANKING BLOCK
Bank stock prices
34 stock listed banks in the EBA
stress test sample of 2010
Bloomberg log returns weekly
MACRO BLOCK
1
Industrial
production
Euro area 17 (fixed composition) -
Industrial Production Index, Annual
rate of change
ECB SDW
cubic spline +
level
monthly
2 HICP inflation
Euro area (changing composition) -
HICP - Overall index, Annual rate of
change
ECB SDW
cubic spline +
level
monthly
3 ST interest rate 3 month EURIBOR rate ECB SDW log returns weekly
4 Default spread iTraxx Europe Benchmark Index DS log returns weekly
5 Market index
total EU market index (mnemonic
TOTMKEU)
DS log returns weekly
6 VSTOXX
option implied volatility index
(mnemonic VSTOXXI)
DS log returns weekly
SOVEREIGN BLOCK
1
Sovereign bond
yield (10 year
maturity)
10 year government bond yield Bloomberg log returns weekly
HOUSING
1 Real estate The EU ECB house price index ECB
cubic spline
+log returns
quarterly
FINANCIAL BLOCK
1
Stress in interbank
market
Spread between the 3 month eonia
index swap and the 3 month euribor
Bloomberg level weekly
2
Bank specific credit
risk
iTraxx Europe Financial Sector
Index, orthogonalized w.r.t. the
iTraxx Europe Financial Sector Index
Bloomberg logreturns weekly
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the regressors in the model
This table contains the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kur-
tosis) of the regressors in the model. The frequency of all regressors is weekly, and the time period ranges from
the second quarter of 2005 until the third quarter of 2012.
MEAN ST.DEV. MIN MAX SKEWNESSKURTOSIS
BANKING BLOCK
banks -0.0044 0.0766 -1.4887 0.7286 -0.6212 11.6337
MACRO BLOCK
infl 2.1117 0.9691 -0.6000 4.0303 -0.7146 3.5826
ip 0.2573 7.2780 -21.2900 9.7865 -1.4103 4.2146
euribor3m -0.0060 0.0282 -0.1735 0.0692 -1.6869 8.2686
vstoxx 0.0016 0.1220 -0.3654 0.6774 0.6969 6.1511
totmkeu -0.0001 0.0369 -0.2543 0.1211 -1.3795 10.2072
itraxx 0.0033 0.0860 -0.2870 0.4868 0.6154 6.9414
FINANCIAL BLOCK
spread 0.4052 0.3584 -0.0080 1.8640 1.4221 5.5571
itraxx_fin 0.0000 0.0589 -0.2395 0.4835 1.4736 16.7982
SOVEREIGN BLOCK
DE -0.0022 0.0433 -0.1775 0.1806 -0.1218 5.8889
IT -0.0011 0.0326 -0.1246 0.1283 -0.2933 5.2887
FR 0.0010 0.0297 -0.1930 0.0966 -1.1099 10.1016
ES 0.0016 0.0359 -0.1972 0.1150 -0.9929 8.5740
PT 0.0023 0.0445 -0.3013 0.2013 -0.5447 11.1475
GR 0.0045 0.0616 -0.6984 0.3286 -4.5444 58.0086
IE 0.0013 0.0415 -0.2457 0.3066 1.3913 21.4691
AT -0.0013 0.0354 -0.1659 0.1682 0.1857 8.3290
BE -0.0007 0.0353 -0.2320 0.2034 -0.2437 11.2843
UK -0.0025 0.0370 -0.1676 0.1543 0.0030 5.8136
DK -0.0025 0.0462 -0.2574 0.2242 -0.3365 11.9814
SE -0.0020 0.0428 -0.1999 0.1929 -0.1709 6.8492
HU 0.0003 0.0397 -0.1202 0.2578 1.2142 9.4775
HOUSE PRICE BLOCK
house prices0.0003 0.0008 -0.0014 0.0017 -0.3194 2.3591
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Figure 4: Projection Accuracy
This Figure shows di¤erent aspects of the projection accuracy of the model. Panel A shows the percentage of
correctly projected signs of bank stock returns (PC) for di¤erent projection horizons (1quarter ahead to 4 quarters
ahead). Panel B compares the PC for windows of 6 versus 8 quarters, whereas Panel C shows the RMSE of the
8 quarter rolling windows.
Panel A: Percentage of correctly projected signs of bank stock prices
Panel B: Average percentage of correctly projected signs of bank stock prices
Panel C: RMSE over 8 quarter rolling windows
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Figure 5: Projection Accuracy of standard BMA versus LOESS BMA
This bar chart indicates the projection accuracy (measured with the PC ratio) of BMA using the bayesian linear
model versus the bayesian LOESS model. The results summarize the projections over horizons ranging from one
to 8 quarters ahead. The estimation window is 8 quarters. The parameter f is set to 1 for the Bayesian LOESS
model, and the estimates are centered around the last value of industrial production in each estimation window.
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Figure 6: Projected Bank Stock Prices for 3 Stress Test Scenarios on three dates
This graph shows the projected evolution of bank stock prices on three stress test dates (1st of July 2010 and
2011 and 1st of January 2012) for three scenarios. The severity of the scenario is indicated by the number ranging
from 1 (Worst Case Scenario) to 6 (Best Case Scenario). The projection horizon is one quarter. The end of period
bank stock price is 100.
Projection Day 1 (July 1st 2010)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Projection Day 2 (July 1st 2011)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Projection Day 3 (January 1st 2012)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
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Figure 8: Network Centrality Measures over time
This graph shows how the three measures of network centrality (degree, closeness and betweenness) have evolved
over time. I use 8 quarter rolling windows for the estimations.
Panel A: Degree Centrality (mean) over time
Panel B: Closeness
Panel C: Betweenness
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Figure 9: Network Centrality Measured over di¤erent values of the common factors
This graph shows how the degree, closeness (out) and betweenness vary for di
,
d erent values of industrial production,
market volatility (vstoxx), the stock market index (totmkeu), the itraxx and the spread. The gridpoints range
from 1 to 5 (1 is the lowest value, 5 is the highest value in sample).
Panel A: Degree
Panel B: Closeness (out)
Panel C: Betweenness
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9 Appendix: The Bayesian LOESS
The Bayesian locally weighted regression is obtained by imposing the Normal-Gamma natural
conjugate prior on the coe¢ cients, together with Zellners g-prior where g = n. More specically,
jh v N(; h 1V )
where  is a vector of zeros, and
V = g(X 0X) 1
where g is Zellners prior, and specied as g = n. The prior for h follows the Gamma
distribution, with hyperparameter s 2 set at 1*10 3 and v set at 1.
h v G(s 2;v)
With this choice of priors on the parameters, the posterior has the following form:
 = V (V  1 +X 0X^)
V = (V  1 +X 0X) 1
where ^ corresponds to the weighted OLS estimator for  with the weighting matrix given
by equation 12 above.
^ = (X 0WX) 1X 0Wy
The marginal likelihood of model Mj is obtained as
p(yj jMj) = cj
 
j Vj j
jV jj
!1=2
(vjs
2
j )
 vj=2
where
cj =
 

vj
2

(vjs
2
j )
vj=2
 

vj
2

n=2
with vj =vj + n and s2j implicitly dened through
vjs
2
j =vjs
2
j + vjs
2
j + (^j  j)[V j + (X 0jXj) 1] 1(^j  j)
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where vj = n  k2 and s2j is the usual OLS quantity dened as:
s2j =
(y  X^)0(y  X^)
vj
I take the following values for the hyperparameters: Zellners g-prior is dened by g = n, I set
s2j at 1 (which is larger than the empirical variance of the standard errors of a small subset of the
models), and I set vj at 0.001, which is very small as compared to the sample size n, hence this
implies a large uncertainty around the prior value of s2j :This choice of hyperparameters ensures
a relatively noninformative prior on the coe¢ cients.
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